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The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The attempt to establish a common European framework for core platforms' duties and responsibilities toward other actors in the digital environment is at the core of the recent scholarly debate surrounding the Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposal. In particular, the everlasting juxtaposition between the “data power” – as emerging from recent cases (Section 2) – that dominant tech companies enjoy and the concept of consumer sovereignty (Section 3) lies at the core of the proposal's attempt to identify digital core platforms as market gatekeepers. Accordingly, this chapter critically investigates the divide between power imbalance and consumer sovereignty in light of the architecture designed by the DMA, with a specific focus on its effectiveness in identifying gatekeepers' power drivers (Section 4). After highlighting the main critical aspects of the pertinent rules, opportunities for fruitful developments are then identified through the reframing of some of the notions considered in the proposal, and namely the role of “lock-in” effects and “data accumulation” (Section 5). Lastly, this chapter suggests that the DMA advancements – while desirable – are bound to be fragmentary in the absence of a wider appraisal of the nature of data power imbalance dynamics in the modern digital markets (Section 6).

The US Supreme Court has stated, “The content of the Internet is a diverse as human thought.” It may also be surmised that the Internet is nothing more than a new medium and that the application of competition law to the Internet may be as broad as all of competition law itself. The diversity of the Internet constitutes a guide to finding thoughtful competition law solutions to e‐commerce phenomena under EU law in (i) merger control, (ii) horizontal and vertical restraints analysis under Article 81 EC (exclusive distribution, selective distribution, music licensing), (iii) abuse of dominant position under Article 82 EC.

Competition law is key to the promotion of consumer welfare and consumer choice, efficiency maximization, market integration, market liberalization, and competitiveness. The review of the evolution of competition law enforcement in Greece shows that it has run in parallel with the path of the Greek economy toward liberalisation modernisation, development and growth. Upon this basis, competition law has contributed to increased levels of investment in the Greek economy, the development of new services and new corporate structures and accountability in Greece. In a fast changing world, in which market and societal development is increasingly interdependent across national borders, the question now turns on to whether competition law enforcement in Greece ought also to take into account public policy objectives, such as environmental protection and sustainability or industrial policy objectives. The competition law enforcement authorities and national Courts have made great progress in the last 20 years in keeping abreast with developments in respect of competition law compliance and enforcement and this has provided a better guarantee for a level playing field and fairer conditions of competition in the various product and services markets in Greece.

Purpose: This chapter addresses the main issues about regulation and protection of competition in Kosovo, with particular attention given to the control of enterprises concentration. The importance of controlling concentrations is based on the fact that enterprise concentration, whether local or international, can produce unequitable market conditions, creating monopolistic positions for some. Therefore, control of access from the Competition Authority is necessary, in order for competition to a level playing field for all.

Design/Methodology/Approach: The authors carried out a desk review of academic literature, the national reports provided by the competition authority and international institutions, competition law and other available important data. This is to determine and highlight the development of economic competition and control of concentrations, for example regulation and supervision in Kosovo and to determine whether this is in line with European Union directives.

Findings: Findings show that competition in Kosovo is still at a phase of development and more is needed to improve and ensure an adequate competition regime in accordance with EU regulations and practices. Significant efforts are necessary to improve legislative alignment and enforcement, specifically on control of mergers and acquisitions.

Practical Implications: The authors herein propose a few measures to be undertaken in order to ensure the effective implementation of the law on the protection of competition and the market economy.

Originality/Value: The authors define the needs for strengthening and the implementation of Competition Law in Kosovo, such as undertaking the proper coordinated steps in order to have adequate competition authority.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the impact of the incentives of competition authorities concerning antitrust enforcement on the structure of enforcement and understanding of the substantive norms and welfare standards in Russia using case-level evidence.

The study is based on a unique data set of appeals to infringement decisions in 2008-2012. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are applied to derive an understanding of the targets of competition policy in the practice of enforcement.

The analysis reveals that the majority of cases would never be investigated under conventional understanding of the goals of antitrust enforcement. It is also shown that antitrust authorities tend to investigate cases that require less input but result in infringement decisions with lower probability of being annulled and lower cost to proceed. Structure of enforcement is skewed toward cases where harm serves as independent and sufficient evidence of competition law violation.

The results show that it is dangerous to motivate authority and public servants based either on number of tasks completed or completeness of tasks when they are heterogeneous in terms of difficulty and where easier ones provide lower positive effects on welfare. Judicial reviews may poorly contribute to performance measurement under a discretionary choice of enforcement targets.

It is often “assumed,” even among well-informed lawyers and economists, that European competition law is an emulation of the US antitrust law because of American influence on European political and economic debates after the Second World War. However, such an assumption is disputable: in accordance with Professor Gerber, the competition law in Europe is an indigenous product based primarily on ideas developed in Germany by the so-called ordoliberal thought. In this respect, the article 102 TFEU may be considered a proof. The aims of this article are to furnish a critical examination of ordoliberal ideas of anticompetitive conducts and underline the relevance of ordoliberal thought for the development of the modern European competition law.

This paper aims to study the historical origins of margin squeeze cases in the USA and Europe.

The author compares and contrasts major margin squeeze investigations in the USA and the European Union (EU) in terms of the role of efficiency and fairness and shows their roots in the socialist calculation debate of the 1940s.

It was found that the USA and EU diverge in their approaches towards margin squeeze claims. While the USA case law focuses more on efficiency, the European Commission makes decisions based more on fairness and “protection of rivals”. This shows that political and ideological preferences influence legal decision-making.

The paper is limited to major cases in telecommunications. It leaves aside cases in other areas. Thus, the author cautions that the generalization of the findings of the paper to all margin squeeze cases, or competition policy in general, may be difficult.

While there is extensive literature on margin squeeze cases in the USA and EU, there is little work on the historical and ideological connections. The paper contributes to the literature by drawing attention to political influences over technical decisions.

Describes how mathematics enjoyed a virtual monopoly as the privileged method of economic inquiry in the post‐war period. Counters the argument that such a position generates negative consequences, such as monopoly rents and the abuse of dominant positions. Argues that competing schools of economic thought such as Chicago, Harvard, neoclassical and post‐Keynesian, neo‐Australian, evolutionary and institutional economists all hold positions that diverge on essentials. Suggests that the market structure of post‐war economies is not a monopoly but a heterogeneous asymmetric oligopoly with a few large and a fringe of small suppliers. Analyses the relationship between two large and two fringe suppliers, stating that the oligopoly metaphor suggests that there is competition between schools that may lead to winners and losers and to changes in the market shares. In conclusion, offers a projection of what the author expects, i.e. who will lose and how the market structure will change, offering an insight into the role of mathematics.

The purpose of this paper is to find out the jurisdictional power of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) in order to entertain the combinations taking place outside India having an impact on India.

The author has established, with the help of varied case laws, that CCI has jurisdiction over the combinations taking place outside India and it is supported by the “Effect Doctrine” and the “Doctrine of Minimum Contact”.

Merger and Acquisition is a buzzword for the growth of international trade and all the countries want to secure their interest. By looking at that, it is argued and suggested in this paper that CCI can take jurisdiction on the above combination when it has any impact on the Indian economy.

There is a scarcity of data available in the public domain and, with the CCI being in its nascent stage, it is suggested that how and in which situations the Commission will invoke its jurisdiction.

This research will help in protecting the interest of the domestic conglomerates and small businesses in India, as there will be a check system established by the CCI on all the combinations having an impact on the Indian market and economy.

This paper has tried to establish the extra‐territorial jurisdiction of the Competition Commission of India, which was not available to any authority in India prior to the enactment of the Competition Act in 2002. It will help the Indian economy and market to grow in a structured manner and protect it from the combinations taking place outside India having an adverse impact.