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The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

This monograph identifies five essential elements for an effective policy to promote consumer interests viz. protection, information, advice, education and representation. The author explores each in considerable depth to assess the extent to which this year's Fair Trading Act will contribute to them. Her verdict is that although not as much as might be hoped will be achieved, by and large the Act is a useful measure. It should bring a higher standard to trade practices particularly in the field of selling and promotion. But it can do little to provide consumer education or representation and these the author considers to be major omissions from the present consumer scene.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Explores the genesis of a plan to erect a statutory “ring fence” around the accountancy profession in Britain during the 1960s. Focuses on two elemental problems in actualising a closure strategy: defining a basis for inclusion and exclusion; and, gaining the sanction of the state. Reveals that the complexities of devising an exclusionary code permitted opportunities for “inclusionary usurpation” by “outside” practitioner groups. Examines the quest by accountants to elicit government support for monopolisation during a period in which restrictive practices were outlawed and the professions were “under fire”. The achievement of de jure closure is shown to be dependent on the predilections of senior bureaucrats and the capacity of the profession to negotiate an “informal contract” with the state. Contends that the profession‐state interface primarily engages the apex of the organisational élite and mandrinate Civil Servants.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

An important aspect of UK competition policy is the attempt to maintain competitive markets by prohibiting restrictive agreements and cartels involving price fixing, market sharing, etc., the effect of which is to suppress, limit or distort active rivalry between suppliers. Examines UK policy towards restrictive agreements, alongside similar attempts to control cartels in the European Community. Outlines the regulatory frameworks operating in the UK and EC and emphasizes particular points of interest in the application of policy control by reference to selected restrictive agreement/cartel cases. While the attack on formal “open” collusion has been highly successful, it is clear from the work of the Office of Fair Trading and the European Commission that clandestine (”covert”) collusion between suppliers remains an on‐going problem.

There are few better examples of public policy being used to cut through what might to many seem to be sound legal reasoning than in the recent decision of the House of Lords in Re Supply of Ready‐mixed Concrete (No. 2), Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete (UK) and Another. The case represents a milestone or perhaps more appropriately the end of the road, for a scries of cases involving actions brought by the Director of Fair Trading against a number of companies and individuals for allegedly unlawful restrictive agreements in relation to the supply of ready‐mixed cement. In the present case the two respondent companies were made subject to orders by the Restrictive Practices Court in March 1978 and March 1979 restraining them from, inter alia, giving effect to or enforcing agreements with other parties, relating to the supply of ready‐mixed cement in contravention of s. 35(1) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976. This provision among other things, renders unlawful certain agreements restricting competition between two or more peresons carrying on business in the production or supply of goods, unless such agreements are registered.

Explores the impact of recent EEC legislation, in particular the implications of Article 85, plus its regulations, of the Treaty of Rome where arrangements for selective or exclusive dealing can only be exempted from prohibition when the economic importance of the agreement is minor, or when the arrangement results in economic or technical benefits for the consumers. States marketing executives have, therefore, to take note of both national and community legislation in EEC countries. Reports that recently, companies that market in the Common Market countries, have become more aware of the EEC Commission's policy against firms who restrict, to the consumer's detriment, competition. Sums up that the Commission has implemented policy to prohibit selective distribution from 1962 forwards – this can only be avoided when the economic importance of the agreement is minor, considering market share involved.

June 28, 1967 Master and Servant — Confidential information — Duty not to disclose — Implied term of contract — Extent of obligation — Alleged misconduct by employers — Alleged agreement by laundries to keep up prices — Agreement contrary to public interest — Whether disclosure to press justified — Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956 (4 & 5Eliz.II , c.68), ss.6, 9.