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This paper aims to better understand why neoliberal governance is so resilient to the crises that frequently affect all or part of the economy.

The argument of this paper relies on a macroanalysis of discourses surrounding the Global Financial Crisis.

Drawing on Girard and Foucault’s work, this paper argues that the resilience of neoliberalism partly ensues from the proclivity of this mode of governing to foster, for reasons that this paper seeks to highlight, spontaneous and widespread processes of scapegoating in times of turmoil. As a consequence of these processes, crises often are collectively construed as resulting from frauds: the blame is focused on specific actors whose lack of morality is denounced, and this individualizing line of interpretation protects the regime from systemic questioning.

Particular actors, rather than the system itself, are made accountable when things go wrong. Consequences are paramount. Today’s political economy is characterized with a proclivity toward social reproduction. While substantive change is possible in theory, considerable challenges are involved in practice in overcoming the dominance of neoliberalism in society.

Although Girard’s work has exerted significant influence over a number of disciplines in the social sciences, his ideas have not yet been widely used in governance and accountability-related research. Anthropological theorizations – such as those proposed by Girard – are valuable in providing us with a sense of how power develops in the economy.

This paper aims to highlight the role and impact of corporate governance in combating fraud by drawing on insights from the literature, identify gaps in the literature and suggest new directions for future research.

The paper is based on a comprehensive general literature review using multiple search engines and databases.

This paper finds that effective corporate governance can help reduce fraud risk, prevent fraud and detect fraud, particularly corporate fraud, insider fraud and asset diversion. Some companies use corporate governance mechanisms to bolster their reputation following fraud detection. Ineffective corporate governance increases fraud risk, provides the opportunity for perpetrating fraud and reduces the likelihood of fraud detection. The paper sheds light on several governance mechanisms that could help in mitigating fraud risk, as reported in the literature. The paper categorises these governance mechanisms into four broad governance aspects, including board leadership and the role of ethics; (b) board characteristics, composition and structure; ownership structure; accountability. The paper proposes a guide summarising these broad fundamental governance aspects, including specific anti-fraud controls and examples of how organisations could enhance ethical cultures and the tone at the top.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to elucidate the role of corporate governance in countering fraud and develop guidance in this area. The proposed guidance could be helpful to businesses leaders, policymakers, researchers and academics alike.

Asil Nadir stands accused of fraud and theft. The sums involved are massive. He is openly accused of the misappropriation of about £371 million. In private, the figure is thought to be substantially greater. However, contradictory views are promoted to account for this situation and his ultimate downfall. For example, (i) the regulatory administrators allege that Nadir is a criminal who misappropriated company funds; (ii) Nadir's conspiracy theory counterclaims the accusations of fraud and theft with a claim of conspiracy based on the actions of the establishment (the Inland Revenue, the VAT Office, the Serious Fraud Squad, banks and pressure groups), which was bent on his downfall; and (iii) the alternative view is that Nadir was an accident waiting to happen. His cultural background, characteristics and traits are entrepreneurial in nature, but ultimately these proved dysfunctional given the structural development of his company.

The case begins with newly appointed chairman and interim CEO Garo Armen dwelling on the significant issues that Elan Corporation, an Irish pharmaceutical company, faces. Its share price has plummeted 96% after accusations of accounting fraud and the discontinuation of an important clinical trial due to the drug's severe side effects. As a result, Elan faces insolvency. About $2 billion in debt that could no longer be satisfied in stock will soon mature, and there are questions regarding the company's structure and various operating concerns. Armen is also concerned about the ethical consequences of the company's failing and thus not being able to develop potentially life-saving medicines. Armen must decide what the nature of Elan should be moving forward and what strategy it should adopt. The operational and financial issues discussed in the case are complicated by Elan's status as an Irish company with significant international operations. The case closes with Armen reflecting on the decisions he has made—which students should critique and suggest alternatives to—as well as an open decision on choosing a successor CEO.

1. Crafting a vision and strategy for a newly streamlined organization and implementation 2. Balancing the complexities of an international corporation in a turnaround situation 3. Quantitatively identifying the probability, advantages, and disadvantages of bankruptcy 4. Succession planning decision making 5. Responding to fraud accusations 6. Managing a distressed workforce and retaining key employees

The purpose of this paper is to determine if the failure of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to persecute Madoff is, in fact, an ethical failure. The authors turn to the extension of Aristotelian theory of moral values, virtue epistemology, to identify specific failures. The authors generalize this study’s conclusions to an overall responsibility of regulatory agencies to exercise epistemic virtues in their decision-making process. The authors explore how behavioral biases confound the execution of epistemic duty, and how awareness of behavioral biases can alleviate epistemic failures. The authors conclude this study with recommendations to prevent future frauds of Madoff proportions.

The authors rely on recent advances in virtue epistemology and behavioral finance. The authors combine these two theoretical approaches to better understand the duty of competence inherent in being a finance professional, and even more so in being a regulator entrusted with overseeing financial industry, and psychological biases that may prevent finance professionals and regulators from performing this duty.

The paper concludes that the SEC employees failed to exercise epistemic virtues in their handling of the complaints implicating Madoff’s firm of fraud. This failure reveals a consistent pattern of behavioral biases in decision-making. The authors posit that knowledge of ethical theory, specifically virtue epistemology, as well as awareness of behavioral biases, which inhibit epistemically virtuous cognitive process, can improve the functioning of both finance industry and its overseers. The authors suggest that future finance professionals and regulators need to acquire this knowledge while pursuing their undergraduate education: it is the duty of business schools to facilitate this progress.

This paper combines the theory of virtue epistemology with the current knowledge of behavioral biases, which distort rational decision-making, to explain the failures of regulators to analyze fraud reports. The authors extend this finding to recommend the inclusion of the theory of virtue epistemology in business schools’ ethics curriculum.

Reviews the various types of fraud in which a building society mortgage valuer may become involved. Considers the possible conflicts of interest which could lead to fraudulent practices. Recommendations are made for improving the consistency and accuracy of building society mortgage valuations together with suggestions for ensuring that the valuer is truly independent.