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Solves von Stackelberg equilibria in a Bertrand‐Edgeworth duopoly game. Shows that, initially, the environment is characterized by efficient rationing and capacity constraints. Since interest lies in sustaining monopoly outcomes from non‐co‐operative behaviour, introduces the buyout option, where rivals can absorb one another’s output before any consumer. Reveals that the outcomes change drastically in that players together are able to reach the monopoly profits.

Notes that sizable workforce reductions have been commonplace in the US economy in the 1980s and 1990s. However, some employers have resisted the temptation to reduce costs through massive layoffs, believing that it is more advantageous to retain their employees than to terminate them. These employers have managed to minimize or even prevent layoffs by using a variety of strategies. Describes some widely used strategies and provides examples of companies that have implemented them successfully.

Purpose – Although there is extensive work on labor mobility, research on entrepreneurial mobility is fragmented and many aspects are largely neglected. We develop a framework for analysis that integrates different perspectives on entrepreneurial mobility to provide a broad agenda for future research.

Design/methodology – We build upon the strategic entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial behaviour theory, resource-based theory and other literatures, to distinguish four quadrants involving high and low geographical mobility and high and low organizational mobility.

Findings – Within each quadrant we identify different types of entrepreneurial mobility, specifically habitual entrepreneurs, management buyouts, university spin-offs, returnee entrepreneurs and transnational entrepreneurs. Issues concerning the development of research programs and methods, with particular emphasis on datasets, are discussed.

Originality/value – It is hoped that this chapter will spur entrepreneurship and strategy scholars to recognize that the scope of the entrepreneurial mobility concept is considerably greater than hitherto appreciated, providing interesting new avenues for theoretical and methodological development in this area.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the informational asymmetry (informational advantage of managers) in leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.

Unlike previous studies of informational asymmetry in LBOs, this research uses a set of reverse‐LBO and re‐LBO firms. The paper proposes and empirically tests three hypotheses that draw on the informational advantage of managers in LBOs. Specifically, the value gain (VG) realized by the reverse‐LBO firms is compared with that realized by a control sample of firms; the wealth distribution between managers and pre‐buyout shareholders is studied; and, finally, the performance of re‐LBO firms relative to reverse‐LBO firms is evaluated.

The results do not support the view that managers use buyouts to exploit their informational advantage. Specifically; the performance of LBO firms under the private ownership is comparable to those of matching public firms; the management team's return in a LBO deal is not significantly more than pre‐buyout shareholders’ return; and repeating reverse‐LBO firms (re‐LBOs) do not necessarily perform better than the non‐repeating reverse‐LBO firms.

While reverse‐LBOs have been investigated to some extent in the prior literature, studies on re‐LBOs are quite scant – although these transactions offer a new and interesting avenue to examine the motivations behind LBOs in general. The use of the entire LBO − reverse‐LBO − re‐LBO cycle in testing the informational advantage of managers is a novelty. It is hoped that re‐LBOs will attract the amount of attention they deserve as these firms may offer interesting means to reinvestigate commonly debated theories of corporate finance.

Management′s perception towards buyouts, the impact that various forms of the buyout are having on the marketplace, and how buyout popularity effects the economy are discussed. The buyout has also become a popular alternative for entrepreneurs, who in the past have founded companies rather than buying existing firms. The advantages that buyouts offer the entrepreneur compared to the traditional approach are also discussed. A survey of managers who have been involved in buyouts is discussed and correlated to current literature involving the new entrepreneur and his/her involvement in the buyout phenomenon.

This study aims to examine the governance structure of the firm undergoing a complete buyout cycle (reverse leveraged buyout). Its purpose is to empirically explore the evolution of corporate board structures as a unique source of value creation, in addition to the agency mechanisms of the discipline of debt and incentives of equity participation.

The authors rely on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop sets of hypotheses that examine changes in the board composition of 65 R‐LBOs and 65 matched continuing firms spanning a 25‐year period (1979‐2004).

The empirical results reveal numerous insights about why R‐LBOs go private, to what extent boards restructure during the buyout phase, and how those changes relate to firm performance. Taken together, the findings give strong credence to the argument that boards represent a supplemental source of value creation in the buyout process.

For scholars, the study presents a platform for further inquiry into the role of boards of directors in R‐LBOs as well as the inclusion of resource dependence theory to inform on the phenomenon.

The study helps to address this new source of value creation for practical interest. It offers a benchmark for buyout firms to compare their board characteristics by establishing linkages between pre‐buyout deficiencies, post‐buyout modifications, and post‐SIPO performance.

The results shift scholarly attention away from the structural governance tools to the group dynamics of the board. The findings call into question the restricted attention given by buyout researchers to leverage and ownership as value drivers by prompting a closer evaluation of the relationship between buyout board structures and related structuring of debt and managerial equity participation. Furthermore, the inclusion of the resource‐dependency perspective alongside agency theory as an explanatory theory allows for a richer account of the LBO phenomenon and its sources of value creation.

Home buyout programs are typically funded by the federal government and implemented by local agencies. How these agencies design and implement buyouts has considerable impacts on participating households and communities, making understanding the internal processes of implementing agencies a critical component of buyout research. This study addresses this issue by exploring the early design and implementation phases of a buyout program in Harris County, Texas, following Hurricane Harvey.

Data were collected via semi-structured interviews with buyout staff and government stakeholders. Data were analyzed in two phases using grounded theory methodology and holistic coding.

There was considerable tension regarding the role of buyouts in mitigation and recovery. Participants conceptualized buyouts as mitigation programs, but recognized that residents, in contrast, viewed buyouts as a tool for household recovery.

This study adds to questions raised in the literature about the efficacy of buyouts and other relocation efforts implemented in response to disasters and global climate change. Future research should work to build systematic knowledge regarding design, implementation, and impacts of buyouts on affected households and communities.

Tension in the purpose of buyouts may be the cause of consistent shortcomings in buyout implementation including attrition, checkerboarding, and transfer of risk. Funding, timing, and the scale of buyouts do not align with household recovery needs and priorities, limiting the mitigation potential of buyouts.

This study identifies a fundamental tension in the purpose of buyout programs that has yet to be discussed in the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of pre-acquisition earnings management on the performance of private firm management buyouts.

The study examines 291 UK private firms acquired by their managers between 2004 and 2012. Earnings management is investigated by means of cross-sectional discretionary accruals models, and estimated discretionary accruals are regressed on performance changes in the three years following acquisition.

Management buyouts of private firms are preceded by earnings overstatement and followed by performance deterioration. Private equity sponsored firms engage less in earnings management and remain more profitable than non-sponsored buyouts. Upward earnings managers cease to outperform industry after second post-buyout year, while aggressive earnings managers do not outperform industry at all. Discretionary total accruals are inversely associated with performance changes in the three years after buyout, and explain over 4 per cent of the changes in performance.

Pertinent to the utilisation of private firms and their exemption from publishing cash flow statement, the study relies on accrual-based models for tests of earnings management.

The paper contributes to the mergers and acquisitions literature and value creation debate in buyouts by providing the first tests of earnings management and post-acquisition performance in private firm management buyouts.

This paper is a clinical examination of the October 2013 Management Buyout of Dell Inc. by founder Michael Dell and Silver Lake Partners for a total consideration of $13.88 per share. The proposed transaction was targeted by shareholders unhappy with the deal price and voting framework. Various shareholders went on to file an appraisal suit. Examining these events yields insights into shareholder rights issues in a major transaction.

The paper examines events surrounding the acquisition including the negotiation process, go-shop period, shareholder activist demands for a higher price, shareholder voting and the subsequent appraisal trial and appeal.

Despite suggesting Dell's board fulfilled its fiduciary duties, Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis Laster awarded petitioning shareholders $17.62 per share, a 27% premium to the final deal consideration. This article draws on Laster's decision and research examining topics raised by the surrounding events to argue minority shareholder interests were not sufficiently protected.

The Dell transaction represents only one data point. Moreover, Vice Chancellor Laster's decision was reversed on appeal.

Nevertheless, the paper discusses the nuances surrounding many issues of interest to practitioners involving large going private transactions. It could also be used to illustrate many “real world” perspectives in an advanced corporate finance or mergers and acquisitions class.

Atari, a maker of video games, went through several owners over the years winding up controlled by Infogrames, a French publisher of video games. Infogrames later sold Atari shares in a secondary public offering, eventually reducing the parent’s share to 51.6 percent by September 2005 creating a complicated two-tier ownership structure. Two levels of management made it difficult to get things done. The financial structure was a problem for Infogrames because the French company had to consolidate 100 percent of Atari’s results even though it only owned 51 percent of the company. Atari was generating substantial losses, had defaulted on its debt, and was faced with the possibility of filing for bankruptcy without more working capital. The independent directors of Atari, when confronted with an unsolicited Infogrames buyout offer, had several options: (1) agree to the $1.68 offer (take the money and run); (2) pursue a white knight (a buyout from another investor of company that would be willing to pay a higher price and invest working capital); (3) file a lawsuit to stop the takeover to buy time or perhaps force Infogrames to increase its offer.

Communications in a turnaround How planning and executing a communications strategy is as important as other functional actions Dealing with an international ownership base with a U.S. turnaround of a legacy brand with no hard assets Fiduciary duty and governance issues arising from a takeover offer.