Search results

This paper aims to analyze the impact of the cost coefficient of product emission reduction, coefficient of low-carbon product advertising effort cost, and sharing ratio of low-carbon product advertising effort cost on the profit of a dual-channel supply chain. After determining the best model and relevant influencing factors, the paper puts forward corresponding management inspirations and suggestions.

The paper opts for an exploratory study using Stackelberg game theory to construct a centralized decision-making (MC mode), a low carbon product advertising effort cost free sharing decentralized decision-making (SD model) and a low carbon product advertising effort cost sharing decentralized decision-making (JD model) game model. Through using optimization methods to get the equilibrium solution, the relevant management suggestions are obtained by comparison analysis.

The paper shows that the JD model is better than the SD model in terms of the profits of the manufacturer, retailer and supply chain, and the improvement of Pareto is realized. The proportion of cost sharing of low carbon product advertising effort is positively related to the wholesale price and direct influence coefficient of low carbon product advertising effort on channel, while negatively related to the retail price and the cross influence coefficient of low carbon product advertising effort on alternative channels. Under the JD model, the manufacturer can reduce advertising costs through improving the efficiency and pertinence of direct channel advertising and urging the retailer to do a better job in sales management to improve gross margin and require the retailer to increase advertising efficiency and pertinence of retail channel to reduce advertising costs of retail channel and other ways to increase their profits. The retailer can make use of its advantages closer with consumers to improve the efficiency and pertinence of advertising in the retail channel to raise the influence coefficient of advertising and reduce the advertising cost in the retail channel.

The innovations of this paper are listed as follows: First, it has considered advertising investment from both the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously. Second, it has considered a low-carbon background to investigate cooperative advertising decision for low-carbon products. Third, it has considered the decision on the level of product emission reduction and the level of low-carbon product advertising effort investment simultaneously.

As the quality of the environment decreases, enterprises and consumers' awareness of environmental protection is constantly improving. More and more enterprises begin to increase their investment in carbon emission reduction and attract environmentally friendly consumers to buy low-carbon products through advertising. The purpose of this paper is to utilize a realistic differential game model to provide dynamic carbon emission reduction strategies, advertising strategies and cooperation methods for complex supply chain members from a long-term perspective.

This paper uses the extend Vidale-Wolfe model (V-W model) to discuss the dynamic joint emission reduction strategy in the supply chain.

(1) When consumers' awareness of environmental protection increases, on the whole, carbon emission reduction and profit of products show an upward trend. (2) From a long-term perspective, the manufacturer's advertising subsidy to one of the retailers is the best choice. If the strength of the two retailers is unbalanced, the manufacturer will choose to cooperate with the dominant retailer. (3) Advertising, as a marketing means for retailers to promote low-carbon products, can alleviate the adverse effects of prisoner's dilemma in a semi-cooperative state, but it cannot achieve the Pareto optimization result.

This paper focuses on the analysis of the situation that when the manufacturer is the leader and thinks that consumers are active advocates of low-carbon products.

The results of this paper can provide theoretical basis for the joint emission strategy of supply chain members in low-carbon environment.

Motivated by consumers' concerns about water resources, this paper studies the interactive impact of advertising efforts and water-saving on corporate profits in apparel supply chains. Moreover, this study attempts to find an effective way to improve the profit of supply chain members under different game scenarios. Therefore, this study explores the game scenarios with considering the cost-sharing contract.

This paper constructs two basic game models considering different market power in the apparel supply chains, and explores the Pareto improvement combined with cost-sharing contracts based on the basic models. Furthermore, this study extends the models by considering cost-saving and non-linear demand.

In this paper, it can be found that advertising efforts and water-saving have complex interactive relationships. Counter-intuitively, the increase in advertising efforts may increase water savings. Furthermore, it presents a Pareto improvement when considering cost-sharing contracts, and both the manufacturer and the retailer's profits may improve simultaneously. Moreover, it does not affect the main conclusions when consider the effects of cost-saving and non-linear demand.

Although some important findings have been reached, this paper can be extended in many ways in the future. For example, the coordination mechanism among supply chain members can be considered and the fair distribution of profits can be studied. Moreover, the influence of the government policies on the optimal strategy, as well as changes in social welfare can be considered.

This study offers supply chain members the guidelines on coordinating water-saving investment and advertising efforts which provided new insight into the interaction of these two factors in the apparel supply chains. Moreover, it can provide a coordination mechanism for the supply chain members to improve their profits.

This paper explores the interactive relationship between water-saving and advertising efforts. It can not only save more water resources but also enable consumers to enjoy more environmentally friendly apparel products.

The current literature mainly focuses on the impact of advertising efforts on firm profit. However, this paper studies the interaction between advertising efforts and water-saving in apparel supply chains. Furthermore, this study explores the optimal pricing strategies and Pareto improvement by considering cost-sharing contracts. It can provide theoretical and practical guidance for the decision-maker in deciding on advertising and water-saving investment.

The authors consider a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem for an emission-dependent dyadic supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer under subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction. The consumers are assumed to prefer to low-carbon products and formulate a supply chain optimal control problem.

The authors adopt differential game to analyze investment strategies of cost subsidy coefficient with respect to vertical incentive of a manufacturer and a retailer. A comparison analysis under four different decision-making situations, including decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, maximizing social welfare, is obtained.

The results show that the economic benefit and environmental pressure have a win–win performance in centralized decision-making. In four different game models, equilibrium strategies, profits and social welfare show changing diversity and have a consistent development trend as time goes on.

The authors estimate the demand function is a linear function in this paper. According to the consumers’ preference to low-carbon products, consumer’s awareness meets the law of diminishing marginal utility like advertising goodwill accumulation. The carbon-sensitive coefficient might be a quadratic expression, which will complicate the problem and be consistent with reality.

It captures that there is a necessity to strengthen cooperation and exchange of carbon emission technology among the enterprises by simulation of different decision-makings when government granted cost subsidy.

The results provide significant guidelines for the supply chain to make decision-makings of emission-reduction technology investment and relevant government departments to determine emission subsidies costs.

An endogenous subsidies coefficient is produced by the social welfare function. Distinguished from previous study, it also considered the influences of carbon emission trade policy and consumer preference.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of fairness concern on the optimal pricing, carbon emission reduction (CER), green marketing efforts (GME) and utility of supply chain members in a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. First, three basic models that consider the manufacturer’s different attitudes toward the retailer’s fairness concern are constructed. The optimal decisions of these models are obtained. Second, these optimal solutions are compared, and the effects of some key parameters including fairness concern on the optimal decisions and utility are examined for the three models. Furthermore, the manufacturer may misestimate the retailer’s fairness concern; therefore, an extended model is proposed.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game theoretic framework, where the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and CER level and, then, the retailer determines the retail price and GME.

The results show that fairness concern has a negative impact on the wholesale price, the level of CER and GME, and fairness concern are not always beneficial for maximizing utility, although it is related to whether the manufacturer pays attention to the retailer’s fairness concern. The manufacturer will gain more utility when considering the fairness concern of retailers than non-consideration. Overestimating or underestimating the fairness concern of the retailers does not lead to benefits for the manufacturer.

This study has the following two limitations that need to be addressed in future research. First, the authors only consider the fairness concern of a single retailer but not peer-induced fairness among multiple competing retailers, which can be taken into account in future studies. Second, the demand function is linearly related to price, CER and GME. Because of the uncertainty of market information, the uncertainty demand function can be further considered.

This paper simultaneously considers the factors CER, GME and fairness concern. The utility function of the retailer is established according to taking the Nash bargaining solution as a fairness reference point, and four different models are constructed and compared.

The existence of the advertising delay effect and its impact on supply chain operations have been demonstrated in the current study. Therefore, this study develops a timely inventory control strategy for the fresh produce supply chain to address the advertising delay effect in the fresh produce supply chain.

This study proposes a game model based on the Nerlove-Arrow time delay differential equation and Pontryagin's maximum principle. Through comparative analyses of the optimal equilibrium strategies, the authors compare the optimal equilibrium strategies, product goodwill and optimal inventory trajectories for suppliers and retailers under secondary replenishment decisions and decentralized decisions.

The authors find that (1) Only when the sales cycle meets certain conditions can the overall profit of the supply chain under the secondary replenishment decision be greater than that under the decentralized decision. As the price markup coefficient increases, the total profit of the supply chain first increases and then decreases. (2) With the increase in the delay time, the replenishment quantity during the initial period gradually decreases. After the delay time elapses, the inventory depletion rate under secondary replenishment decisions is faster than that under decentralized decision-making. (3) Although there is a continuously increasing maximum value of product goodwill with the increase in delay time, it becomes difficult to achieve this value for longer delays.

The authors’ findings provide a theoretical basis for supply chain members of fresh agricultural products to select replenishment and inventory control strategies when adopting different levels of delay in advertising marketing.

Firstly, this paper explains the impact of advertising delay effect on fresh produce supply chain from a dynamic perspective, and secondly, it provides guidance on advertising formulation and inventory replenishment for fresh produce retailers under the influence of advertising delay effect.

The purpose of this study is to help governments make carbon-tax policy and help enterprises make decisions under that policy.

Based on the carbon-tax policy, with the consideration of consumers’ low-carbon preferences, this paper compares the pricing, emission reduction and advertising decisions in three different games (one centralized game and two decentralized Stackelberg games).

This paper concludes that, through centralized game, namely, cooperation game, manufacturers, retailers and consumers can reach their optimal situation. In the numerical simulation, this paper analyzes the impact of carbon-tax rate to the decisions of manufacturer and retailer, as well as their profit.

Using the Nash Bargaining Model, the introduction of the bargaining power and the degree of risk aversion of the parties, this study provides some solution for the distribution of the additional profit when they cooperate, in which way they can reach their Pareto optimality.

This paper aims to discuss the low carbon supply chain practices in China’s textile industry. To curb greenhouse gas emissions, the Chinese government has launched restrict regulatory system and imposed the energy consumption constraint in the textile industry to guarantee the achievability of low carbon economy. The authors aim to examine how the energy consumption constraint affects the optimal decisions of the supply chain members and address the supply chain coordination issue.

The authors conduct two case studies from Chinese textile companies and examine the impact of energy consumption constraints on their production and operations management. Based on the real industrial practices, the authors then develop a simple analytical model for a low carbon supply chain in which it consists of one single retailer and one single manufacturer, and the manufacturer determines the choice of clean technology for energy efficiency improvement and emission reduction.

From the case studies, the authors find that the textile companies develop clean technologies to reduce carbon emission in production process under the energy consumption enforcement. In this analytical model, the authors derive the optimal decisions of the supply chain members and reveal that supply chain coordination can be achieved if the manufacturer properly sets the reservation wholesale price (WS) despite the production capacity can fulfill partial market demand under a WS (or cost sharing) contract. The authors also find that the cost-sharing contract may induce the manufacturer to increase the investment of clean technology and reduce the optimal WS.

This paper discusses low carbon supply chain practices in China’s textile industry and contributes toward green supply chain development. Managerial implications are identified, which are beneficial to the entire textile industry in the developing countries.

The promotion of new energy vehicles (EVs) is an effective way to achieve low carbon emission reduction. This paper aims to investigate the optimal pricing of automotive supply chain members in the context of dual policy implementation while considering consumers' low-carbon preferences.

This article takes manufacturers, retailers and consumers in a main three-level supply chain as the research object. Stackelberg game theory is used as the theoretical guidance. A game model in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower is established. The author also considered the impact of carbon tax policies, subsidy policies and consumer preferences on the results. Furthermore, the author investigates the optimal decision-making problem under the profit maximization model.

Through model solving, it is found that the pricing of EVs is positively correlated with the unit price of carbon and the amount of subsidies. The following conclusions can be obtained by numerical analysis of each parameter. Changes in carbon prices have a greater impact on conventional gasoline vehicles. Based on the numerical analysis of parameter β, it is also found that when the government subsidizes consumers, supply chain members will increase their prices to obtain partial subsidies. Compared with retailers, low-carbon preferences have a greater impact on manufacturers.

The new energy automobile industry involves many policies, including tax cuts, tax exemptions and subsidies. The policy environment faced by the members of a supply chain is complex and diverse. Therefore, the analysis in this article is based only on partial policies.

The authors innovatively combine the three factors of subsidy policy, carbon tax policy and consumer low-carbon preference, with research on the pricing of EVs. The influence of policy factors and consumer preferences on the pricing of EVs is studied.