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The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

This study aims to reduce the construction safety accidents of prefabricated building (PB) projects, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety supervision by government departments, and provide theoretical reference for improving the safety supervision system of PB construction.

Considering the information asymmetry between government supervision departments and construction contractors and the interactive relationship between the two parties under bounded rationality, we propose an evolutionary game model for the construction safety dynamic supervision of PBs and analyze the evolutionary strategy of the game. The system dynamics (SD) method is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under a dynamic supervision strategy and the adjustment of external variables.

The cost difference between the government's strong and weak supervision, the construction contractor's additional expenditure for strengthening safety management, and other factors affect system stability. The government can dynamically adjust the penalties based on the construction contractor's subjective willingness to ignore safety management and further adjust their rate of change based on the completion of the supervision goals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction safety supervision.

This study makes contributions in two areas. Through a combination of SD and an evolutionary game, it provides new insights into the strategic choice of the main body related to PB construction safety. Additionally, considering the nonlinear characteristics of construction safety supervision, it provides useful universal suggestions for PB construction safety.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of government supervision and market environment on farmers' pesticide application behavior, as well as the intermediary effect of farmers' literacy, and investigate the substitution effect between government supervision and market environment.

In this paper, logit and Poisson regression models were used to investigate the comprehensive impact of government supervision and market environment on farmers' pesticide application behavior, and the intermediary effect model is used to examine the intermediary effect of farmers' literacy.

Government supervision is an important constraint for the formation of individual behavior paradigm, but it has both positive and negative effects, depending on different instruments. The market subject constraint and market incentive are two important ways that the market environment affects Chinese farmers' pesticide application behavior. Farmers' literacy plays a partial mediating role in the influencing mechanism of government and market factors. The government supervision and market environment, two different constraint forces, have substitution effects in the process of regulating farmers' pesticide application behavior.

In the influence mechanism, farmers' literacy, such as values, responsibilities and skill requirement related to scientific pesticide use, was included into the analysis framework as intermediary variables. The authors found that government supervision and market environment not only directly affect farmers' pesticide application behavior but also indirectly affect farmers' pesticide application behavior through farmers' literacy.

Nucleic acid testing is an effective method of accurate prevention and control and a key measure to block the spread of the epidemic. However, the fraud in nucleic acid testing occurred frequently during epidemics. This paper aims to provide a viable scheme for the government to strengthen the supervision of nucleic acid testing and to provide a new condition for the punishment for the negative act of the government and the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud.

This paper formulates an evolutionary game model between the government and nucleic acid testing institution under four different mechanisms of reward and punishment to solve the issue of nucleic acid testing supervision. The authors discuss the stability of equilibrium points under the four distinct strategies and conduct simulation experiments.

The authors find that the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty outperforms the strategies of static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The results reveal the appropriate punishment for the negative act of the government can enhance the positivity of the government's supervision in the strategy of dynamic reward and static penalty, while the upper limit of the reward for nucleic acid testing institution of no data fraud cannot be too high. Otherwise, it will backfire. Another interesting and counterintuitive result is that in the strategy of dynamic reward and dynamic penalty, the upper limit of the penalty for data fraud of nucleic acid testing institution cannot be augmented recklessly. Otherwise, it will diminish the government's positivity for supervision.

Most of the existing evolutionary game researches related to the reward and punishment mechanism and data fraud merely highlight that increasing the intensity of reward and punishment can help improve the government's supervision initiative and can minimize data fraud of nucleic acid institution, but they fall short of the boundary conditions for the punishment and reward mechanism. Previous literature only study the supervision of nucleic acid testing qualitatively and lacks quantitative research. Moreover, they do not depict the problem scenario of testing data fraud of nucleic acid institution regulated by the government via the evolutionary game model. Thus, this study effectively bridges these gaps. This research is universal and can be extended to other industries.

In China, external supervision on construction safety mainly comes from the government and supervision engineers (SEs). However, the construction safety supervisory mechanism (CSSM) contains some dilemmas affecting the improvement of safety performance, such as the declining impact of SEs, the increasing rent-seeking behaviors of contractor and excessive government interference. This study aims to depict and analyze the CSSM in China from an evolutionary game view. The objectives are to understand the supervision strategy and evolutionary behaviors of different stakeholders, propose suggestions for improving safety performance and help the key safety supervision stakeholders, especially the government, formulate a suitable safety supervision strategy.

This research uses tripartite dynamic evolutionary game theory to study the CSSM in China and solve the stable equilibrium solution using system dynamics.

This study has revealed the game relationship of construction safety supervision mechanisms in China and solved the stable equilibrium solution. The results prove that a supervision engineer (SE) plays a crucial role in the CSSM, and “supervision engineer useless” is an unreasonable assertion. For government supervision agency (GSA), excessive inspection and free-market regulation are neither wise strategies. GSA can reduce the inspection frequency when general contractors (GCs) input high safety investments and SEs implement responsible supervision. But keeping proper government supervision to avoid GC's unlawful behaviors and SE's rent-seeking is indispensable. In addition, excessive governmental supervision will weaken SE's role, so the government should transfer some supervision powers to SE.

This study focuses on the dynamic evolution process between GSA, GC and SE. This method is different from most research that neglected the dynamic characteristic of system and game solution stability. The research methods not only contribute to construction safety supervision policy-making in China but also help to improve supervision efficiency in other countries and other fields.

The role of a government investment project (GIP) management supervisor is to improve supervision performance and the Chinese government has issued a series of polices, displaying the determination to solve supervision problems. The purpose of this paper is to assist the government to play its role of supervisor and to realize progress supervision performance for GIP in practice with the Agent Construction System (ACS).

Taking consideration of the essence of ACS, the paper analyzes the system supported theory, which is a supervision mechanism, with contract management as the core and goals as orientation. The authors design the system frame and its composing modules according to the main function of this information system.

The research builds an expected supervision information system with four functional modules, which is designed according to logical sequence of supervision, based on a theoretical supervision mechanism.

The system is, to the best of the authors' knowledge, the most advanced and practical information system for GIP supervision published in the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to study how the government stimulates incineration plants to participate in waste classification management, and how to adjust the subsidy strategy for them.

Considering that the classification behavior of residents will produce herd effect, and waste classification can reduce the disposal cost of incineration plants, the authors constructed a differential game model between the government and waste incineration plants, and analyzed the input strategy of the government and incineration plants when they cooperate in the management of municipal waste classification.

Increasing the input level of supervision or raising subsidy price, the government can promote incineration plants to increase the input level of incentive. Moreover, from a long-term perspective, increasing the input level of supervision is more effective. Compared with government supervision, the method of incineration plants incentive can more effectively increase the amount of waste disposal. Furthermore, the government supervision and the incineration plants incentive have a positive interaction effect on improving the amount of waste disposal. Increasing the input level of incineration plants incentive or the level of waste-to-energy technology can increase the amount of waste disposal, and from a long-term perspective, increasing the level of R&D investment is more beneficial to increasing the amount of waste disposal.

The results are helpful to improve the investment in the management of waste classification, and also provide a certain theoretical basis for the government's subsidy policy for incineration plants, so as to reduce the financial pressure of the government.

The purpose of the study is to investigate strategies for enhancing pollution oversight by local governments while reducing government-enterprise collusion (GEC) levels. Additionally, the factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants are explored. Potential approaches to improving them and for effectively reducing waste incineration pollution are suggested.

The authors examined the most effective methods for mitigating incineration-related pollution and preventing collusion and developed a differential game model involving interactions between local governments and incineration plants. The findings of this work have significant policy implications for central governments worldwide seeking to regulate waste incineration practices.

The results indicate that, first, elevating environmental assessment standards can incentivize local governments to improve their oversight efforts. Second, collusion between incineration plants and local governments can be deterred by transferring benefits from the plants to the local government, while increased supervision by the central government and the enforcement of penalties for collusion can also mitigate collusion. Third, both central and local governments can bolster their supervisory and penalty mechanisms for instances of excessive pollution, encouraging incineration plants to invest more in pollution control. Finally, when the central government finds it challenging to detect excessive incineration-related pollution, enhancing rewards and penalties at the local government level can be a viable alternative.

This study stands out by considering the dynamic nature of pollutants. A differential game model is constructed which captures the evolving dynamics between local governments and incineration plants, offering insights regarding the prevention of collusion from a dynamic perspective. The findings may provide a valuable reference for governments as they develop and enforce regulations while motivating incineration plants to actively engage in reducing waste-incineration pollution.

The construction of geographical indications agri-food (GIAF) brands play an important role in rural revitalization in China, this study aims to explore how to jointly promote brand building among multiple parties.

A tripartite game model of the producers, sales operating enterprises, and local governments is constructed to analyze the strategy choice of the parties in the complex system behavior evolution stability, and the simulation analysis of the influence factors of brand construction of GIAF and verify the game result.

(1) Increased government subsidies and supervision costs are beneficial to accelerating variety improvement and quality improvement of agri-food, but it is not conducive to the government, Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the subsidy and supervision cost is kept within a reasonable range; (2) The dividend distributed to producers by sales operating enterprises play an important role in encouraging producers to improve the quality safety of agri-food, but it must be kept within a reasonable range to avoid discouraging the enthusiasm of sales operating enterprises; (3) Cost reduction, and revenue improvement are also effective ways to cooperate with all parties in brand co-construction.

This study does not consider consumers or logistics companies in the evolutionary game model.

This study proposes innovative policies and suggestions for improvement of the brand co-construction of all parties.

Based on the “Rural Revitalization” initiative, this study enriches research methods about brand value and provides a new perspective for brand value co-construction, and theoretical guidance, and empirical basis for formulating innovation policies and recommendations.

The construction industry is widely recognized as one of the most hazardous sectors in the world. Despite extensive research on safety management, a critical issue remains that insufficient attention is devoted to safety practices in rural areas. Notably, accidents frequently occur during the construction of rural self-built houses (RSH) in China. Safety management tends to be overlooked due to the perceived simplicity of the construction process. Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge that China currently lacks comprehensive laws and regulations governing safety management in RSH construction. This paper aims to analyze the behavior of key stakeholders (including households, workmen, rural village committee and the government) and propose recommendations to mitigate safety risks associated with RSH construction.

This paper applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the symbiotic evolution among households, workmen and rural village committee, in situations with or without government participation. Additionally, numerical simulation is utilized to examine the outcomes of various strategies implemented by the government.

Without government participation, households, workmen, and rural village committee tend to prioritize maximizing apparent benefits, often overlooking the potential safety risks. Numerical simulations reveal that while government involvement can guide these parties towards safer decisions, achieving the desired outcomes necessitates the adoption of reasonable and effective strategies. Thus, the government needs to offer targeted subsidies to these stakeholders.

Considering that during the construction phase, stakeholders are the main administrators accountable for safety management. However, there exists insufficient research examining the impact of stakeholder behavior on RSH construction safety. This study aims to analyze the behavior of stakeholders about how to reduce the safety risks in building RSH. Thus, the authors intend to contribute to knowledge in this area by establishing evolutionary game model. Firstly, this study carried out a theoretical by using tripartite evolutionary game to reveal the reasons for the high safety risk during building RSH. Practically, this research points out the important role of households, workmen and rural village committee in improving safety management in rural areas. Besides, some suggestions are proposed to the government about how to reduce construction safety risks in rural areas.