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The aim of this study is to approach the way in which corporate governance influences the occurrence of financial fraud, as expressed by the M-Beneish score. In order to get further into the topic, we have first computed a corporate governance score based on the comply-explain statement and then selected a few elements that are part of the corporate governance reporting: equilibrium of board members (EQUIL), independence of board members (INDEP), selection of the board members (NOM), remuneration policy (REM), audit committee (AUDIT) and the proportion of female directors on boards (GenF). They were tested, one by one, using the financial fraud score to see the way in which they interact.

The study is conducted on a sample of 65 companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) for the 2016–2022 period. The data were processed using three-stage general least square [general least squares (GLS), with iteration, igls and option] with a common first-order panel-specific autocorrelation correction, so as to explain how a poor adoption of the corporate governance score and its elements has a negative implication for the M-Beneish score, controlling for the auditor opinion, type of auditing company and if the company is privately owned.

The results support most of our research hypothesis, revealing that a poor adoption of the corporate governance score and its components – AUDIT, EQUIL, INDEP and GenF – negatively influences the M-Beneish score, i.e. a low corporate governance score will lead to an increase in financial fraud. This is an encouraging aspect, for an improved adoption of the corporate governance principles reduces the occurrence of financial fraud.

This is a study that concerns the relationship between corporate governance and financial fraud for the case study for Romania.

The study highlights the importance of adopting the corporate governance code applied to the Romanian business environment. By measuring the presence of financial fraud appearance through the M-Beneish score, we have managed to outline the negative relationship between the two components. Thus, it is an important aspect of which companies should take account, so they will have long-term benefits and ensure the continuity of the business.

The policy implications of this project are for policymakers, so that they will understand how a good corporate governance mechanism will enhance high-performing businesses. Different aspects regarding corporate governance were validated and are in the process of being validated. Managers can extract and try to understand and apply the good characteristics of corporate governance for the well-being of their companies. At a broader level, the macroeconomic environment will increase its own well-being while encouraging market players to enhance qualitative corporate governance reporting. There is no doubt that corporate governance has a positive impact on businesses.

The study highlights the importance of adopting the corporate governance code as applied to the Romanian business environment. By measuring the occurrence of financial fraud using the M-Beneish score, we have managed to outline the negative relationship between the two components. Therefore, this is an important aspect that companies should take into account in order to have long-term benefits and ensure the continuity of their business.

Research into top management team (TMT) performance and consensus has been equivocal; furthermore, research into the role of non‐executive directors (NEDs) in UK SMEs concluded that multiple perceptions of “reality” exist between directors. By adopting an innovative methodological approach to analysis, the “black box” complexity of SME board information processes, perceptions and TMT relationships are made visible. This allows the tension caused by differing perceptions of the NED role on a small company TMT to be explored. The aim of this paper is to do this.

In an in‐depth case study of one SME board, four directors' information and perception differences are investigated using a combined Johari window and set theory framework.

Application of this innovative analytical framework allowed the information process and differing perceptions of multiple directors to be plotted systematically. This surfaces the normally hidden “generative mechanisms” underlying the “real domains” of the SME board processes by explaining why and how the directors choose to share and hide information about the NEDs' role. Surfacing the nature of this information sharing and hiding is at the heart of appreciating the process of precarious equilibrium that achieves a fragile cohesion within the TMT.

This study reveals the fragility of TMTs to the process of information sharing and hiding. It demonstrates the sensitivity of the group to perceptions of the NED role and the influence the NED can have on information processes within the group and potentially its cohesion. NEDs joining small company boards need to be sensitive to the existing informational asymmetries that may be vital to maintaining precarious equilibrium and cohesion. In their role they are likely to become the confidant of more than one director and thus nodal points of “secret” information. They need considerable interpersonal sensitivity and tact if they are to fulfil their role of challenging the directors without detrimentally disrupting the group dynamic.

This paper answers the call for more qualitative research to investigate the “lived experience” and “behavioural processes” of directors by adopting the combined Johari window and set theory framework. This analysis tool offers an innovative method that will be of value to other researchers and practitioners investigating TMT group dynamics. It provides a rare opportunity to understand the information process and perceptions of a small company TMT and the influence on the equilibrium and cohesion of the group.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

Questions whether the planned European Monetary Union is capable of solving the social economic challenges of our time. Examines the economic and financial history of modern times; explains the formulation of the impossibility theorem in practice, suggesting the equation of unified knowledge as a solution to the problem of economic calculation; and constructs a plan for a free and stable European Monetary and Economic Union. Looks at the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) questioning its ability to solve the basic problems of the member states of the European Union. Addresses a number of issues contained within the Treaty: acceptable socially beneficial goals; unacceptable socially harmful, adverse anti‐equilibrium means, policies, reforms and regulations; and the phenomenon of physics’ ‘chain reaction’ within economics. Gives a synopsis of anti‐equilibrium elements and forces in the Treaty of Maastricht, debating what needs to be done to ensure that European Monetary and Economic Union can become an immediate and lasting success.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

The Nationalökonomische Gesellschaft (Austrian Economic Association, NOeG) provides a prominent example of the Viennese economic circles and associations that more than academic economics dominated scientific discourse in the interwar years. For the first time this chapter gives a thorough account of its history, from its foundation in 1918 until the demise of its long-time president, Hans Mayer, 1955, based on official documents and archival material. The topics treated include its predecessor and rival, the Gesellschaft österreichischer Volkswirte, its foundation in 1918 soon to be followed by years of inactivity, the relaunch by Mayer and Mises, the survival under the NS-regime and the expulsion of its Jewish members and the slow restoration after 1945. In particular, an attempt is made to provide a list of the papers presented to the NOeG, as complete as possible, for the period 1918–1938.

The chapter contributes to the theoretical understanding of how corporate governance affects organizational processes and outcomes in not-for-profit organizations. The contribution claims that cooperation is not only a good proposition held by the variety of actors relevant to corporate governance of non-for-profit organizations, but it also determines the wealth maximization of organization's stakeholders. Theoretical results, according to the common agency framework, are driven by the case study of the largest humanitarian organization’ corporate governance: the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

The imposition of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act and the NYSE/NASDAQ regulations boosted the proportion of independent directors serving on corporate boards. For certain firms, increasing the number of independent directors may impose costs that exceed the benefits. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of increased independence following SOX, relative to the pre-SOX board independence benchmark, on managerial authority and entrenchment within the firm.

Data are collected from COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, and RiskMetrics. Data are divided into two periods, pre-SOX (1996-2001) and post-SOX (2002-2006). The focus is on the sub-group of firms who were not complying with the board independence requirement prior to SOX and became compliant afterwards. Various regressions are employed to assess the implications of increased independence following SOX on managerial authority and entrenchment.

The appreciation in board independence post-SOX significantly inflates both managerial compensation and the likelihood of CEO duality. Also, there is a positive association between board independence and managerial entrenchment during both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Imposed board composition requirements diminished board monitoring efficiency and boosted the CEO dominance and control over the firm.

This research adds to the extant literature investigating the implications of SOX on internal monitoring and governance. The results are based on an off-equilibrium phenomenon in which companies were obliged to alter their endogenously determined board structure. Thus, regulations to improve governance could backfire as the CEO might abuse them to extract private benefits.