Search results

The purpose of this study is to show that social relations in a corporate governance platform between members of supervisory boards and between members of supervisory and executive board tiers can serve as an alternative viewpoint for understanding mechanisms of social selection in corporate governance networks. The study shows that through the lenses of social network analysis, it is possible to identify and understand how the process of corporate governance member selection unfolds within companies and how that selection process may have been potentially influenced by the cross-board relations, such as interlocking directorships.

To estimate network parameters and attribute effects of network tie emergence, this study has used exponential random graph models (ERGMs) on corporate governance data of Danish publicly listed companies. Econometric models are applied to estimate parameter statistics which serve further to explain tendencies of tie emergence.

The results of this study reveal that the process of selection of both supervisory boards and executive directors is interdependent. Also, the study showed that board members are more likely to select popular supervisory board members and top managers who have their expertise gained through multiple companies affiliated with multiple industries. However, these conditions for CEO selection apply only to the extent to which they have their experience gained from multiple companies but not multiple industries.

On one hand, this study demonstrates that being a dynamic practitioner who is exposed to diverse corporate environments by being affiliated with different companies belonging to different industries generally increases practitioners visibility in the corporate governance network, and therefore their attractiveness to boards of directors. On the other hand, the results show that the research on board assemblage, nowadays, should be rather observed through the methodology of social network analysis as the method gives an opportunity to understand structures through relations, from which the executive tier should not be exempted as well.

The paradigm of the Chinese Box Puzzle served as the analytic framework for this study of school board member recruitment. It directed attention to the process of selection and elimination that narrows the population of a school system to the very few who are elected to the school board. In terms of the paradigm, between the largest box — the many who are governed — and the smallest box — the few who govern — are intermediate boxes that identify the social and political processes that successively narrow the population. The study did not advance specific hypotheses, but rather sought to trace the collective careers of sixty school board members and to draw implications from the modal patterns. The essential finding, that the recruitment process propels into office school board members who are different in many respects from those whom they represent, has important implications for educational governance.

This study aims to examine the effects of agency cost on auditor choice. This paper also deals with the moderating role of the board’s financial expertise (Bfe) and the status of the internal control (Intecon) system on the relationship between agency cost and auditor selection.

This study’s sample consists of 1,040 firm-year observations of Iranian nonfinancial companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2019. The information required for this research is mainly extracted from Comprehensive Database of All Listed Companies (in Iran Stock Exchange). Data from 130 companies were obtained during the research period. This study used logistic regression to test the hypotheses.

The findings indicate that companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from lower classes. As the proportion of financial expert members on the board increases, the intensity of this relationship will be reduced. Companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from the lower classes, but the higher the ratio of financial expert board members, the more these companies will choose high-quality auditors. However, findings showed that the status of the Intecon system has no moderating effect on the relationship between agency costs and auditor selection.

The results of this study can expand the existing literature on the relationship between auditor selection and agency costs and the factors affecting this relationship, especially the Bfe and Intecon. This research has significant suggestions for regulators, stakeholders, shareholders and analysts in emerging economies that may encounter similar contextual implications.

Identifying, attracting, and maintaining the engagement of the right composition of people for a non‐profit Board is a major challenge. Executives should ensure that their Boards accurately represent the stakeholders that matter, both from industry and the community. The purpose of this paper is to describe ways and offer propositions for effective non‐profit executives to identify, recruit, and motivate the continuing engagement of the members needed on their Boards in order to acquire resources critical to their sustained success.

The Convention and Visitors Bureaus (CVBs) are used as an example, since at least 93 percent of CVBs have a governance structure that includes a Board of Directors. Successfully attracting the right mix of stakeholders is a result of an extensive recruitment effort by the CVB executive. Prior research reports that successful executives take great care in making selection decisions that reflect the interests of the community in the Board's composition. Based on the literature on Boards and governance, the authors develop propositions regarding the composition of CVB Boards.

While the research is exploratory, it is found that CVBs with more diverse Boards are more successful than those with less diverse Boards. It is argued that effective CVBs use a thoughtful process for heterogeneous Board selection. It is also suggested that Board performance should be evaluated on an annual basis to recognize the need for active involvement in the Board selection process.

The successful selection of Board members is important because of the implications for Board effectiveness. While there is a large body of literature offering advice on Board selection, there is little on recruitment. Moreover, there is little discussion of Board composition strategy based on balancing access to critical resources of stakeholders.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

Director selection is an important yet under-researched topic. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to extant literature by gaining a greater understanding into how and why new board members are recruited.

This exploratory study uses in-depth interviews with Australian non-executive directors to identify what selection criteria are deemed most important when selecting new director candidates and how selection practices vary between organisations.

The findings indicate that appointments to the board are based on two key attributes: first, the candidates’ ability to contribute complementary skills and second, the candidates’ ability to work well with the existing board. Despite commonality in these broad criteria, board selection approaches vary considerably between organisations. As a result, some boards do not adequately assess both criteria when appointing a new director hence increasing the chance of a mis-fit between the position and the appointed director.

The study highlights the importance of both individual technical capabilities and social compatibility in director selections. The authors introduce a new perspective through which future research may consider director selection: fit.

The in-depth analysis of the director selection process highlights some less obvious and more nuanced issues surrounding directors’ appointment to the board. Recurrent patterns indicate the need for both technical and social considerations. Hence the study is a first step in synthesising the current literature and illustrates the need for a multi-theoretical approach in future director selection research.

In the wake of the recent accounting and financial scandals that have resulted in significant losses, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is viewed by many investors as an important criterion in their investment selection strategy. In addition, social responsibility is viewed by current employees as an important source of job satisfaction and by potential employees as an attractive feature in their decision process. Corporate governance, in the form of the board of directors, serves as the ultimate internal control mechanism by aligning firm insiders and outsiders. The strength and independence of the board of directors becomes a fundamental concern, as firms with strong boards may be more likely to survive and prosper in the long run. The selection of candidates to the board of directors involves both subjective and objective information. The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is a multicriteria decision model that can integrate both objective and subjective information. This study applies the AHP methodology to the identification of characteristics of candidates to the board of directors of socially responsible firms. The result is a dynamic model that can be used by socially responsible firms to efficiently select candidates to serve on their board of directors.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.