Search results

The use of models for detecting earnings management in the academic literature, using accrual and real manipulation, is commonplace. The purpose of the current study is to compare the power of these models in a United Kingdom (UK) sample of 19,424 firm-year observations during the period 1991–2018. The authors include artificially-induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample. The authors use two alternative samples, one with no reversal of manipulation (sample 1) and one with reversal in the following year (sample 2).

The authors include artificially induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample.

The authors find that real earnings manipulation models have lower power than accrual earnings manipulation models, when manipulating discretionary expenses and revenues. Furthermore, the real earnings manipulation model to detect overproduction has high misspecification, resulting in artificially inflating the power of the model. The authors examine an alternative model to detect discretionary expense manipulation that generates higher power than the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Modified real manipulation models (Srivastava, 2019) are used as robustness and the authors find these to be more misspecified in some cases but less in others. The authors extend the analysis to a setting in which earnings management is known to occur, i.e. around benchmark-beating and find consistent evidence of accrual and some forms of real manipulation in this sample using all models examined.

This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of misspecification of currently used models to detect real accounts manipulation.

Based on the findings, the authors recommend caution in interpreting any findings when using these models in future research.

The findings address the earnings management literature, guided by the agency theory.

The purpose of this study is to examine investors’ awareness in Amman Stock Exchange of the effects of earnings manipulation incentives on the earnings manipulation practices of managements through the usage of the available level of flexibility in the accounting standards, and to examine whether those investors are able to detect these practices. A self‐administered questionnaire of three sections was developed and used to achieve the purposes of this study. A sample of 144 respondents from four industries was selected using a stratified sampling method. The study found that investors in Amman Stock Exchange have enough awareness to the effects of earnings manipulation incentives on the practices of managements toward the manipulation of earnings. Moreover, this study concluded that investors in Amman Stock Exchange have the ability to detect those practices.

Accounts manipulation has been the subject of research, discussion and even controversy in several countries including the USA, Canada, the U.K., Australia, Finland and France. The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature and propose a conceptual framework for accounts manipulation. This framework is based on the possibility of wealth transfer between the different stake‐holders, and in practice, the target of the manipulation appears generally to be the earnings per share and the debt/equity ratio. The paper also describes the different actors involved and their potential gains and losses. We review the literature on the various techniques of accounts manipulation: earnings management, income smoothing, big bath accounting, creative accounting, and window‐dressing. The various definitions of all these, the main motivations behind their application and the research methodologies used are all examined. This study reveals that all the above techniques have common elements, but there are also important differences between them.

Prior research suggests that firms manipulate earnings through accruals to achieve certain reporting objectives. Recently, especially following the Sarbanes‐Oxley (SarbOx) Act, researchers have turned their attention to real account manipulation as an alternative. However, there is no evidence on whether the likelihood of being detected by outsiders is different for firms using these alternative manipulation methods. The purpose of this paper is to examine this research question in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).

First, the authors compare SEOs to a matched sample of non‐SEOs to document income‐increasing manipulation. Next, they identify SEOs that prompt lawsuits and compare sued and non‐sued firms to determine whether using a particular method of manipulation is more likely to be detected and associated with litigation.

The authors find evidence of income‐increasing accrual and real manipulation for SEOs in the year prior to the offering in the pre‐SarbOx period, and find some evidence of a shift to real account manipulation post‐SarbOx. The authors examine the subsequent litigation pattern of these SEOs, and find that firms that are subsequently sued have a higher prevalence of income‐increasing discretionary accruals when the lawsuit allegations involve accounting issues. Following SarbOx, investors are paying less attention to accrual manipulation through accounts receivable and there is more scrutiny of real account manipulation.

The implication in this paper is that firms that engage in income‐increasing earnings management are more likely to be sued when they engage in accrual manipulation while other forms of manipulation may be less understood. This finding is important to investors and regulators.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between managers’ short-term, quarterly earnings forecast characteristics and earnings management through real activities manipulation.

Using a propensity-score matched sample from 2000 to 2015, the author examines whether, compared to non-issuers, firms issuing short-term earnings forecasts exhibit abnormal levels of earnings management through the manipulation of real activities such as acceleration of sales, changes in shipment schedules and delaying R&D and maintenance expenditures.

The finding of this study suggests that firms actually engage in less real activities manipulation when they provide short-term management earnings forecasts. This result does not support the practitioners’ criticism that providing short-term management earnings forecasts increases earnings management. Instead, it suggests that providing management earnings forecasts can reduce information asymmetry between managers and external shareholders, thereby constraining managers’ opportunistic behaviors.

Practitioners have expressed concerns that issuing earnings forecasts may foster managerial myopia, therefore, increasing earnings management. However, recent empirical study found evidence that management earnings forecast mitigates accrual-based earnings management, which is inconsistent with practitioners’ view. This study hence aims to provide timely evidence to this debate by examining the relation between management earnings forecasts and real activities manipulation.

The purpose of this study is to examine the trade-off between accrual and real activity earnings manipulation by considering gender and punishment as one aspect of clawbacks.

To achieve the research objectives, experimental design research was used, involving 183 professional accountants in Indonesia. This was followed by interviews with board members of public companies in Indonesia.

After the adoption of clawbacks, the intention to manipulate accruals decreased more among women than among men. However, the possible unintended consequences of clawbacks, particularly an increase in real activity manipulation, did not differ between women and men.

There are still few studies that use experimental designs to examine the consequences of clawback. Our study is expected to provide a novel contribution to the literature on the consequences of clawbacks as we use an experimental method. Besides, previous research that tested the consequences of clawback, using both archival and experimental data, had not considered the gender aspect, thus prompting this study to fill the research gap related to the consequences of clawback adoption by including the gender variable.

This study contributes to the limited literature dealing with ethical perceptions of earnings management in developing capital markets by investigating the perceptions of managers, accountants, and investment analysts in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand, to ethical issues concerning the management of earnings. The results are compared to similar studies undertaken in the US and UK. The results show that East Asian managers, accountants, and analysts tended to be less willing to condemn situations as clearly unethical and use a narrower range of ethical responses than their US/U K counterparts. However, there was a remarkable overall consistency of perceptions between East Asian and US/UK managers, accountants, and analysts in relation to many issues.

The purpose of this paper is to check the impact of female directors on the board and foreign institutional investors on earnings manipulation.

The data sample includes Chinese listed companies on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. The data are collected from China Stock Market and Accounting Research database covering the period from 2010 to 2017. The authors use a dynamic generalized method of moments in the study.

The findings show that the presence of female director on the board has a significant negative impact on both discretionary accruals and real earning management. However, the authors obtain different results for foreign institutional investor investors. This may be the result of myopia as the foreign institutional stockholders in Chinese companies are looking for quick profit encouraging management to manipulate earnings. the findings survive several robustness tests.

The authors expect the research results provide ample evidence about how female directors affects earnings manipulation, and also hope the research helps to understand how, in China, institutional ownership affects earnings manipulation.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether earnings boosts before the year end trigger earnings management. It examines whether firms that substantially outperformed their last year earnings during the first three quarters push their earnings down to avoid reporting earnings boosts.

Regression analysis is used to compare earnings management of firms with earnings boosts and other firms.

The results indicate that firms outperforming their last year results by the end of the third quarter manipulate their earnings downwards by means of real activities manipulation, while they do not indicate income-decreasing accruals management. It is also found that consistent with the prominent shift from accruals management to real activities manipulation, accruals management is less costly which justifies why it is used for downward manipulation.

The results are limited to one single earnings benchmark i.e. last year earnings. Further research may individually or collectively examine other benchmarks including analysts' forecasts.

The findings suggest that users should be more vigilant of firms exceeding their last year interim results, as they could be involved in downward earnings management.

This study documents earnings management in a new setting where earnings boosts before the year end trigger downward manipulation of real activities.

This paper attempts to investigate the effect of corruption on the real and accrual earnings management of target firms in the process of mergers and acquisitions.

The sample includes target firms from the European area that participate in mergers or acquisitions announced during 2010–2020. The preliminary empirical part estimates the level of earnings management during the period two years before the deal's announcement to identify whether the sample follows the manipulation behavior that the literature suggests for target firms. The primary empirical analysis focuses on the impact of corruption on real and accrual-based earnings management proxies, employing regression models and two alternative proxies for corruption. The existing literature points out that the combination of low levels of corruption and an integrated legal system reduces earnings manipulation.

The findings provide strong evidence for systematic downwards accounting manipulation practices, whereas the findings for real earnings management are not significant. The findings of the main empirical part show that corruption is positively associated with accrual-based manipulation and negatively related to real earnings management. In essence, in economies with a high level of transparency, managers adopt the manipulation of operating activities as a less detectable practice of earnings management instead of engaging in accounting procedures.

This study contributes to the literature highlighting the diversification of these firms' manipulation strategies according to the national level's corruption status.