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The purpose of the study is to investigate strategies for enhancing pollution oversight by local governments while reducing government-enterprise collusion (GEC) levels. Additionally, the factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants are explored. Potential approaches to improving them and for effectively reducing waste incineration pollution are suggested.

The authors examined the most effective methods for mitigating incineration-related pollution and preventing collusion and developed a differential game model involving interactions between local governments and incineration plants. The findings of this work have significant policy implications for central governments worldwide seeking to regulate waste incineration practices.

The results indicate that, first, elevating environmental assessment standards can incentivize local governments to improve their oversight efforts. Second, collusion between incineration plants and local governments can be deterred by transferring benefits from the plants to the local government, while increased supervision by the central government and the enforcement of penalties for collusion can also mitigate collusion. Third, both central and local governments can bolster their supervisory and penalty mechanisms for instances of excessive pollution, encouraging incineration plants to invest more in pollution control. Finally, when the central government finds it challenging to detect excessive incineration-related pollution, enhancing rewards and penalties at the local government level can be a viable alternative.

This study stands out by considering the dynamic nature of pollutants. A differential game model is constructed which captures the evolving dynamics between local governments and incineration plants, offering insights regarding the prevention of collusion from a dynamic perspective. The findings may provide a valuable reference for governments as they develop and enforce regulations while motivating incineration plants to actively engage in reducing waste-incineration pollution.

The purpose of this paper is to study how the government stimulates incineration plants to participate in waste classification management, and how to adjust the subsidy strategy for them.

Considering that the classification behavior of residents will produce herd effect, and waste classification can reduce the disposal cost of incineration plants, the authors constructed a differential game model between the government and waste incineration plants, and analyzed the input strategy of the government and incineration plants when they cooperate in the management of municipal waste classification.

Increasing the input level of supervision or raising subsidy price, the government can promote incineration plants to increase the input level of incentive. Moreover, from a long-term perspective, increasing the input level of supervision is more effective. Compared with government supervision, the method of incineration plants incentive can more effectively increase the amount of waste disposal. Furthermore, the government supervision and the incineration plants incentive have a positive interaction effect on improving the amount of waste disposal. Increasing the input level of incineration plants incentive or the level of waste-to-energy technology can increase the amount of waste disposal, and from a long-term perspective, increasing the level of R&D investment is more beneficial to increasing the amount of waste disposal.

The results are helpful to improve the investment in the management of waste classification, and also provide a certain theoretical basis for the government's subsidy policy for incineration plants, so as to reduce the financial pressure of the government.