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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the operational decisions of a manufacturer who produces multiple products and the government's selection of cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations.

This paper explores the production decisions of a multi-product manufacturer under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations in a cap-dependent carbon trading price setting and compares carbon emission, the manufacturer's profits and social welfare under the two regulations. Game theory and extreme value theory are used to analyze our models.

First, the authors find that the optimal profit of the manufacturer (the optimal cap) increases and then decreases with the cap (the unit carbon emission of product). Second, if the environmental damage coefficient is moderate, the optimal cap of unit environmental damage coefficient is independent of the product carbon emission or other related product parameters. Ultimately, cap-and-trade regulation always generates more carbon emission than carbon tax regulation. And cap-and-trade regulation (carbon tax regulation) can generate more social welfare if the environmental damage coefficient is low (high), and the social welfare under the two regulations is equal to each other, or otherwise.

This paper contributes the prior literature by considering the inverse relationship of the allocated cap and the carbon trading price and discusses the social welfare under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations. Some important and new results are found, which can guide the government's implementation of the two regulations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze manufacturers' production decisions and governments' low-carbon policies in the context of influencer spillover effects.

This paper investigates the impact of the social influencer spillover effect on manufacturers' production decisions when they collaborate with intermediary platforms to sell products through marketplace or reseller modes. Game theory and static numerical comparison are used to analyze our models.

Firstly, under low-carbon policies, the spillover effect does not always benefit manufacturer profits and changes non-monotonically with an increasing spillover effect. Secondly, in cases where there are both a carbon emission constraint and a spillover effect present, if either the manufacturer or intermediary platform holds a strong position, then marketplace mode benefits manufacturer profits. Thirdly, regardless of business mode used when environmental damage coefficient is high for products; government should implement cap-and-trade regulation to optimize social welfare while reducing manufacturers’ carbon emissions.

This study offers theoretical and practical research support to assist manufacturers in optimizing production decisions for compliance with carbon emission limits, enhancing profits through the development of effective influencer marketing strategies, and providing strategies to mitigate carbon emissions and enhance social welfare while sustaining manufacturing activities.

This paper addresses the limitations of prior research by examining how the social influencer spillover effect influences manufacturers' business mode choices under government low-carbon policies and analyzing the social welfare of different carbon emission restrictions when such spillovers occur. Our findings provide valuable insights for manufacturers in selecting optimal marketing strategies and business modes and decision-makers in implementing effective regulations.

This paper investigates to find whether it is possible to align the interests of a small and medium manufacturing enterprise (SMME) with its raw material supplier in a manufacturing supply chain (MSC) to achieve a sustainable solution. To this end, current study examines the coordination of an MSC under cap and trade consisting of a raw material supplier and a carbon-emitting SMME confronting a stochastic demand.

The model is developed under both the decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios. Under the investigated model, the SMME decides on both production quantity and sustainability level simultaneously. To achieve coordination and align the interests of both MSC members toward sustainable economic development goals, a customized revenue-sharing contract is developed.

Although the centralized model is profitable for the MSC, it makes a loss for the SMME compared to the decentralized scenario. The revenue-sharing agreement is able to create coordination among the MSC members and optimize profitability and sustainability. The established revenue-sharing guarantees a Pareto-improving situation for both members. Applying the established contract not only reduces shortage occasions but also results in more sustainability levels, which in turn means movement toward attaining sustainable economic development goals.

Unlike previous studies, carbon emission is assumed as a nonlinear decreasing function of the sustainability level which is a more realistic case. In accordance with SMMEs business environments, the market demand is also assumed uncertain. In addition, instead of assuming an investment cost for sustainability, the authors assumed unit production/purchasing costs as functions of product sustainability level.

The importance of carbon reduction has become a global consensus, and more and more countries are implementing the cap-and-trade mechanism, including China. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal carbon emission allowances (CEA) purchasing decisions of supply chain members under the cap-and-trade mechanism in China.

An evolutionary game model is established to analyze the CEA purchase strategy choices of suppliers and manufacturers in the supply chain. The influence of the key parameters on the evolutionary game results is analyzed by numerical simulations.

The supply chain system always evolves towards neither supplier nor manufacturer purchasing CEA or both purchasing CEA. Illegal production behavior and excessive CEA costs are key factors that hinder parties from purchasing CEA. High revenue from purchasing CEA for production, high supply chain losses and high governmental penalties can promote parties to purchase CEA.

The results help supply chain members make better CEA purchasing decisions and also benefit the development of China’s carbon trading market and environmental protection.

Even during these tough economic times the current administration has proposed to revive the US “Cap and Trade” initiative and to see it through to passage. Many in the public are not aware that the idea of cap and trade is not new as similar programs have been successfully used in the US and other countries to “wind down” environmentally damaging emissions. The aim of this paper is to explain cap and trade and to project what form current proposals could take.

This paper explains cap and trade and goes on to project what form current proposals could take. It also examines the alternatives and the arguments both for and against cap and trade. Projected costs and benefits are examined, along with some examination of the actual mechanics by which the system is expected to operate.

The current US mood is that proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will be expensive and burdensome to businesses and consumers. In fact, this is what is preventing them from going forward. The consensus is now growing that in order to achieve the goals of cap and trade, proposals will have to be cost effective, expanded internationally, and include India, China and other emerging manufacturing economies. If this can be done, it appears that cap and trade will continue to be part of the landscape of US emission reductions, along with the use of alternative and other renewable energy resources.

The paper examines costs and benefits of cap and trade, along with some examination of the actual mechanics by which the system is expected to operate

With rising environmental concerns, recent years have witnessed a significant surge of academic and corporate interest in green supply chain coordination (GSCC). This is evident from the rise in channel coordination literature focused toward the elimination of sub-optimal in the green supply chain (GSC). This paper seeks to summarize the model-based research on coordination in GSCs with the help of a framework developed specifically for this paper. The purpose of this paper is to present an in-depth analysis of the widely used models in the area.

A review of literature is presented in this paper to examine the underlying concepts peculiar to GSCC. A classification framework is developed to present an exhaustive survey of commonly used concepts.

Around 90 percent of the papers on GSCC come from game theory (GT) application, which explicitly utilizes coordination through contracts. The review concludes prospective area of research in GSCC. The study posits that there exists a potential of creating a more rational and efficient coordination strategies to improve GSC’s operational performance, with the view of the optimum distribution of resources and better environmental management.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first state-of-the-art review of GSCC literature focused primarily on mathematical model-based literature. This review identifies various methodological and content-oriented characteristics of GSCC. The paper also opens avenues of future research.

Within a framework of supply chain (SC) coordination, this paper analyzes a green SC consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer, under government incentives and legislations and the consumer environmental awareness. To mitigate carbon emissions and promote the sustainability of the SC, a customized carbon emission trading mechanism is developed.

A game-theoretical decision model formulated determines the optimal sustainability level and the optimal quota of carbon credit from the ceiling capacity set by the government. In order to coordinate the SC and optimize environmental decisions, a novel combination of consignment and zero wholesale price contracts is proposed.

Analytical and numerical analyses conducted highlight that the proposed contract generates a Pareto improvement for both channel members, boosts the profit of the green SC, enhances the sustainability level of the channel and contributes to a reduction in the requested carbon emission credit by the manufacturer.

With the proposed mechanism, governments can protect their industries and, more importantly, comply with European Union (EU) rules on annually reducing emission ceilings allocated to industries.

Different from previous studies on cap-and-trade strategies, the proposed mechanism enables companies to select lower emission quota/allowances than the maximum amount set by the government, and in return, companies can benefit from several incentive strategies of the government.

A new financial asset (Allotment Trading Unit or ATU) that allows a firm to pollute was issued to a number of Chicago firms in 2000 as part of a cap‐and‐trade model to reduce emissions in the Chicago area. A model of this market was developed to enable us to: 1.) Estimate equilibrium tradable credit prices and quantities and calculate compliance costs for comparison with traditional environmental regulation; 2.) Estimate the consequences for prices and quantities of introducing changing emitter costs; and 3.) Estimate the impacts on prices and quantities of changing market features such as auctioning tradable credits instead of a free allocation, introducing spatial constraints, and changing the emissions cap. The model's results on the price determination of this new financial asset are of interest to accountants and financial analysts. A dated bankable ATU credit has a one‐year life expectancy, but future tradable credits can be bought or sold for use at the appropriate future date. It is an intangible asset that should be disclosed, measured and valued. The valuation to place on this asset is an important research topic in finance and accounting and various valuation approaches are discussed to handle the short‐term and long‐term price paths.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether truthful information sharing can be achieved via informal cheap talk in a competitive setting, and how carbon emission constraint and information-sharing modes (no information sharing, partial information sharing and public information sharing) interact with each other under cap-and-trade regulation.

This paper establishes an emission-dependent supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, an incumbent retailer who has superior demand information and a new entrant retailer. The manufacturer abates carbon emissions under the pressures of government environmental regulation and consumers’ eco-friendly concern. The research formulates a multistage game to explore every party’s decision and the implications of information-sharing modes.

The results show that truthful information sharing can be achieved when the manufacturer decides both the wholesale price and carbon emission abatement. The results also show that the incumbent retailer’s information-sharing decision highly depends on the manufacturer’s capacity in abating carbon emissions and the demand uncertainty.

The research adds value to information management and sustainable production literature. This work emphasizes the interaction between the information flow and material flow. Not only it investigates the factors that affect information-sharing modes from a new point of view when considering carbon emission constraint, but also provides operational strategies for manufacturers to make more profit when facing asymmetric information and emission regulation.

With refineries contributing 68% of CO₂ emissions from stationary combustion sources alone, smart technologies and the circular economy (CE) model for resource loop optimization can be a solution for carbon neutrality, especially within petroleum. Thus, this study aims to explore energy conservation by green technology improvement as a CE strategy for resource loop optimization and digital incorporation to maximize reprocessing lead ability rate and carbon-neutral benefits.

A game theory approach with Stackelberg equilibrium is considered under government cap-and-trade regulation to stimulate green technology improvement. The refinery acts as a Stackelberg leader and invests in green technology and the retailer as the Stackelberg follower, collects end-of-life lubricants against refund price and offers a two-part-tariff contract to the manufacturer having a significant role in smart technologies.

First, green technology improvement is directly influenced by the reprocessing capability and refund price and digital technologies are significant to consider. Second, a two-part-tariff contract coordinates the supply chain for limited reprocessing capability by the retailer. Lastly, the government can effectively manipulate the development of green technology by changing the permit price depending on the intentions.

The primary limitation is this study has focused on the petroleum sector and data was referenced from the oil refineries of a single country.

Overall, this study provides empirical guidance for policymakers on how to leverage energy-efficient smart technologies for lubricant reprocessing, enabling resource optimization as part of a CE strategy in the petroleum industry and advancing sustainable development goals.

The suggested model responds to the contemporary literature related to CO₂ emissions and CE initiatives across the petroleum sector with the extended role of smart technologies and government cap-and-trade regulations.