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This purpose of this article is to examine the Shari'ah scholars' perception of the Shari'ah governance system in Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) particularly of its six major areas, namely, issues of Shari'ah governance; internal framework; roles and functions of Shari'ah board; attributes of Shari'ah board members on independence, competency and transparency and confidentiality; operational procedures and assessment of the Shari'ah board's performance.

The study conducted semi-structured interviews with Shari'ah scholars who are members of the Shari'ah boards in various IFIs. All interview questions were generated, structured and arranged in a way that all the data could be analysed easily through a coding and thematic approach.

The study discovers the different points of view demonstrated by the Shari'ah scholars who were interviewed on several issues, and they have also conceded that there are serious gaps and weaknesses prevalent in all the six major areas of Shari'ah governance. This position acknowledges that there are shortcomings and weaknesses to the existing governance framework which need further enhancement and improvement.

The study offers a useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines to policymakers and practitioners for future development of Shari'ah governance practices in IFIs.

The study provides fresh data and significant information pertaining to the Shari'ah scholars' perspective on the Shari'ah governance system. This analysis of Shari'ah scholars' opinions of the Shari'ah governance system can also serve to enhance the literature on the topic.

The purpose of this paper is to understand current Shari'ah governance practices with the purpose of promoting greater understanding of some of the crucial issues and to provide relevant information in guiding the future development of Shari'ah governance system. The paper illustrates the state of Shari'ah governance practices in Malaysia, GCC countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and the UK by highlighting five main elements of good corporate governance that consist of independence, competency, transparency, disclosure and consistency.

Since the availability of secondary data on Shari'ah governance practices is very limited, a detailed survey questionnaire is generated for sourcing primary data from Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). The study utilizes descriptive analysis approach in extracting and analyzing the data and factual input derived from the questionnaire feedback.

The survey findings affirm that there are significant differences and diverse Shari'ah governance practices in the case countries. This position acknowledges that there are shortcomings and weaknesses to the existing governance framework which needs further enhancement and improvement.

The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in guiding the future development of Shari'ah governance practices in IFIs.

This paper provides fresh data and recent information on the actual Shari'ah governance practices of IFIs in three jurisdictions.

This chapter aims to explore and examine the extent of Islamic corporate governance practices in 35 Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) in Malaysia, Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the United Kingdom, particularly in its six major areas, namely approaches to Islamic governance, regulatory framework and internal policies, roles and functions of shari’ah board, attributes of shari’ah board members on independence, competency and transparency, and confidentiality, operational procedures and perception of IFIs of the shari’ah board’s performance. A questionnaire was developed by benefiting from the Islamic corporate governance standards identified by International Financial Services Board and Accounting and Auditing Organization for IFIs, which included mainly about 50 standards with sub-sections as questions. The study demonstrates the state of Islamic corporate governance practices in these countries. The survey findings affirm that there are significant differences and diverse Islamic governance practices amongst IFIs in the case countries. The study hence provides evidence that there are shortcomings and weaknesses to the existing governance framework, which needs further enhancement and improvement.

The most crucial challenge facing Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) is the full compliance of their activities with shari'ah principles. The complexity of IFIs requires Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK, Indonesian Financial Services Authority) to adopt a good shari'ah governance framework to address shari'ah risks of Islamic banking and financial institutions (IBFIs). However, the current shari'ah governance structure in Indonesia is far from ideal compared to the international best practice. This chapter proposes a new shari'ah governance framework by involving shari'ah supervisory board authority (Otoritas Dewan Pengawas Syariah) under the commissioners of OJK to oversight, regulate, and supervise the shari'ah matters for IBFIs in Indonesia. The chapter discusses the challenges in adopting this new framework. The chapter concludes that the current shortcomings of the proper shari'ah governance framework for shari'ah supervision and regulation requires a new shari'ah board authority under the commissioners of OJK who has full authority over shari'ah matters.

The prime difference between conventional and Islamic financial institutions (IFIs)is the compliance with shari'ah. Hence, shari'ah is a very crucial pillar, rather a main pillar of Islamic finance. In order to ensure shari'ah compliance by the IFIs at all levels, central banks of different countries crafted and implemented shari'ah governance framework. This chapter focusses on the cross-country comparison of shari'ah governance framework. The countries included in this chapter are Malaysia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Bahrain. The result shows that Malaysia and Pakistan are leading in terms of comprehensive shari'ah governance framework whereas Bahrain comes next and the United Kingdom is the last in terms of comparison.

This chapter highlights the variations of agency theory in the unique and complex context of Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. The results provide an insight into agency structures in the context of Islamic banking that may lead to trade-offs between shari'ah compliance and mechanisms for protecting the rights of investors. This empirical study finds that most of the surveyed Islamic banks appear to recognize the value of governance and have implemented some basic mechanisms. Certain flaws in governance pertaining to audit, control, and transparency were also noted. The situation gets worse in cases where the investment account holders do not have any representation on the board or any voice for control or monetary rights. Other peculiar models balancing the two key requirements may be effective regarding agency dynamics. This study should motivate the policy makers to tailor the regulations to safeguard the interests of all investors without violating the principles of shari'ah.

The purpose of this study is to gather the perceptions of the Shari'ah committee members on what and how they safeguard and strengthen their independence in fact and independence in appearance during the discharge of their duties.

Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews with 13 Shari'ah committee members from 13 different Islamic financial institutions (IFIs).

Based on the Islamic worldview and agency theory, the findings suggest that safeguard measures within the context of the Shari'ah committee are strengthened by the following factors: presence of competencies, personal characteristics of the Shari'ah committee members, board engagement, role of the chairman in the Shari'ah committee and accountability to God. Based on the agency theory, it can be suggested that the characteristics of the Shari'ah committee and the presence of an effective governance structure are able to minimise threats to the independence of the Shari'ah committee and enhance its effectiveness.

The insights from this study highlight that proper and fit criteria need to be enhanced to ensure the independence of the Shari'ah committee members when performing their roles for IFIs. Moreover, it shows that board engagement and chairman involvement in overseeing the Shari'ah committee in the discharge of its duties is able to improve the independence of the Shari'ah committee both in fact and in appearance.

This study contributes to the evidence on safeguard measures in the Malaysian context, which is highly regulated in relation to the Shari'ah governance practices in IFIs. This evidence could be considered by other Shari'ah committees in different contexts.

The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of audit report lag and its association with governance mechanisms in the Islamic banking institutions in Malaysia.

The extent of audit report lag is defined by the number of days from a company’s financial year-end to the signature date on its audit report. The sample of the study comprises 112 observations of Islamic banking institutions’ financial reports for the period 2008-2014. A balanced panel data analysis is performed to analyse the association between the extent of audit report lag and governance mechanisms.

The findings show that the extent of audit report lag for the sample selected ranges from a minimum period of 7 days to a maximum period of 161 days, and the extent of audit report lag is approximately two months on average. A fixed effects analysis indicates that audit committee expertise and audit committee meeting have significant association with the extent of audit report lag. On the other hand, board independence, audit committee size and Shari’ah board expertise have insignificant association with the extent of audit report lag. In addition, one control variable (Islamic bank size) is found to be significantly associated with longer audit report lag.

The findings provide useful feedback for Malaysian policymakers on the past and current practices of financial reports and of governance mechanisms. The findings of the study would help the policymakers in monitoring the Islamic banking institutions’ compliance with financial reports submission requirements. The policymakers perhaps could relook into governance mechanisms that reduce the extent of audit report lag in the Islamic banking institutions and implement regulations to strengthen them.

Unlike the majority of prior studies that investigated the association between the extent of audit report lag and governance mechanisms, this study provides two contributions. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first piece of research that examined the association between governance mechanisms and the extent of audit report lag in Islamic banking institutions. Second, the study examined the association of new governance variable, namely, Shari’ah committee expertise which has not been previously examined in the literature of audit report lag.

This chapter aims to explore the Shari’ah governance rules applied in the Malaysian Islamic banking arena and the effect of Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 on it.

This is a legal exploratory study primarily focused on library research.

Shari’ah governance is a concept that has been developed and applied gradually in Malaysia and the new Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 has taken it to the next level. However, this does not mean that it has resolved the problems in Shari’ah governance that existed before the enactment of the act.

Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 is a new statute that repealed Islamic Banking Act 1983. As such, not many have reviewed this new piece of legislation. This chapter will give insight into the evolution of Shari’ah governance as part of corporate governance of Islamic banks in Malaysia and will help explain the most recent developments in this arena along with the challenges.

This paper aims to examine the impact of Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSBs) on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs). It also tests whether SSBs’ attributes affect the performance of IBs. Based on a sample of 1,803 Islamic bank-year observations from 82 banks in 15 countries over the period 1993-2014 and controlling for factors known to affect bank performance, this study reveals a robust and significant positive relationship between SSBs and Islamic bank performance. This study also shows that the characteristics of SSBs affect the performance of IBs. This research reveals how SSBs influence the performance of IBs, as well as the processes and roles SSBs use to ensure Shari’ah compliance in business transactions.

The purpose of this study design is to relate SSB presence, size and diversity to financial performance using three techniques. The first technique is a multivariate data analysis that analyzes data arising from more than one variable. The second technique is a clustered regression (clustering by bank), which corrects for serial correlation and produces unbiased t-statistics. Because this sample is drawn from panel data, it is expected serial autocorrelation of the independent variables and error term within banks. In cases where within-company correlation exists, t-statistics based on average regression coefficients from year-by-year regression are upwardly biased and potentially severe (Peterson, 2009). Therefore, this study uses a technique that agrees with Stock and Watson (2002), who show that the standard method of calculating heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the fixed-effects estimator generates inconsistent variance estimates. Thus, using the clustered regression is consistent with the fixed-effects estimator. The third technique is a two-stage least-squares regression that helps build an instrumental variable for robustness tests purposes.

The findings suggest that large corporate boards and large SSBs are more efficient in dealing with different monitoring and advisory roles than small SSBs. Consequently, this suggests that increasing the size of corporate boards and SSBs should improve monitoring and advisory functions, management behavior and organizational performance.

It is possible that there is an upper limit to this benefit, however; we do not explore this limit, which therefore provides opportunities for additional research. Because Shari’ah compliance relates only to a rational legal framework of negative screening relegated to interest prohibition and limiting uncertainty. The interest prohibition and limiting uncertainty have not been investigated between the two samples due to data unavailability. In addition, limited accounting-based measures of financial performance may not accurately portray IB performance; hence, an additional market measure is implemented, which is Tobin’s Q.

Ultimately, these findings could help IBs improve their financial results by enhancing their internal and external governance mechanisms (Walsh and Seward, 1990). They provide a basis for developing larger, more diverse SSBs that are more focused on complying with Shari’ah and corporate governance. The results also have significant policy implications for improving firm-level corporate governance versus improving country-level institutional factors. Both views have their advocates. However, it is very difficult to reform the legal system in a short time. Still, this study shows that struggling IBs have a way to improve their corporate governance and simultaneously improve their financing environment.

This research contributes to the literature on the effects of SSBs on IBs’ organizational financial performance, processes and roles. It is the first to examine empirically the underpinnings of how SSBs affect organizational financial performance via agency theory and contingency theory.