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In spite of escalating efforts to curb abuse, fraud, and corruption in Congress, members of Congress persist in violating the norms, rules, and laws that aim to ensure they behave ethically. This chapter combines qualitative and quantitative analysis to describe congressional corruption in the modern era. Case studies illustrate consequential financial scandals while also differentiating four categories of corrupt financial practices.

Existing datasets on congressional scandals span the time period from 1972 to 2010, and this chapter extends the dataset to 2018. The analysis next uses the dataset to answer important questions empirically. Which types of scandals occur more often? Have these scandals grown more common or less common over time? What are the consequences of financial scandals for representatives' careers as public servants?

This chapter, against studies on success history, puts its attention on the firm's behaviour facing a critical socio-political problem. The specific question is how the relationship between business and socio-political actors in an emerging market under a scandal develops and how these actors manage such a situation. To reach this aim the study concerns with the Roche Scandal in Turkey and discusses the reactions of business and socio-political actors before and after the scandal, and further, how Roche subsequently managed these relationships. The theoretical framework for analysis of the Roche Turkey Scandal is constructed on relationship elements of trust, legitimacy and learning. The analysis provides some answers to the question of how Roche Turkey in the face of reactions given by the network actors managed the aftermath of the scandal and how the legitimacy loss was recovered by learning and adaptation. Conclusions enhance our knowledge on the behaviour of firms under critical condition.

Are public officials held accountable for political scandals? Existing scholarship typically focuses on voters' response to scandals showing politicians are often punished at the polls for scandals. Specifically, they are more likely to be punished for the abuse of public office for personal gain than for scandals involving personal affairs. That said, not all politicians implicated in scandals seek reelection. Although difficult to observe, many politicians may be pushed out of office by their political party before they have an opportunity to stand for reelection – resigning or retiring before the next election. Others are appointed and consequently never stand for election. We collect a new dataset to understand how scandals affect politicians' careers and whether public officials are held accountable at other junctures. We trace the pathways of politicians implicated in scandals. We document the type and onset of scandals, individuals' reactions to scandals, and whether and when they leave office. Our novel data contribution provides rich descriptive statistics on corruption in the US Congress over time, with new insights into the conditions under which scandals end politicians' careers. The common patterns and significant differences revealed in these data suggest that the impact of scandals on public officials' careers may have less to do with the nature of the scandal or the specific actions undertaken by those implicated and may depend more on the actions of political parties.

Scandals regularly sweep through organizational fields: they wreak havoc in markets, vaporize billions of dollars in firm value, bring down giant corporations, get CEOs fired, alter the evolution of technologies, and trigger major changes in society. In spite of their significance for organizational life, scandals have received remarkably limited attention in management research. I build on the social sciences’ sparse but growing stream of research on scandals to explore the concept beyond its usual representation as a discrete event. I propose that an organizational scandal may be understood as an interactional process associated with the disclosure of alleged organizational misconduct that involves: a public struggle between alleged perpetrators and social control agents over the framing of organizational misconduct; moralizing by audience members; collective effervescence at the societal level; and the potential rewriting of the moral rules applicable to organizations and their members.

This chapter explores the evolution of the media framings of a corporate corruption scandal over time. Our analysis focuses on the evolution of media frames used by the English and French Press in the coverage of the corruption scandal involving SNC-Lavalin, a Quebec-based multinational engineering firm. We reveal how media coverage shifted from balanced and nuanced coverage of a complex phenomenon that facilitated debates on the appropriate consequences of corruption to a selective (re)construction of events to serve partisan agendas when the company’s legal plight was politicized. Our study contributes to the literature on media framings of corporate corruption by highlighting how the politicization of a corporate corruption scandal led to a dual climate of opinion across the English and French Press.

Members of Congress become involved in scandals on a regular basis. These range from personal imbroglios, like sexual affairs or substance abuse, to professional scandals like embezzlement of campaign funds, abuse of office, or insider trading. As a common feature of congressional life, scholars have shown that scandals frequently disrupt the electoral and legislative trajectories of representatives' careers.

However, it must be remembered that congressional offices are comprised of more than just an individual member. Congressional offices are legislative enterprises, and a representative's staff are integral to his or her political and lawmaking activities. Accordingly, studying how scandals relate to the careers of congressional staff is an important but overlooked topic.

In this chapter, the authors investigate the relationship between members' malfeasances and the careers of the staff around them. The authors combine a list of congressional scandals with a dataset that captures the turnover of staff in congressional offices. The chapter proceeds in four parts. First, the authors describe the structure of a congressional office and the relationship between members and their staff. Next, the authors provide an overview of scandals in Congress and what previous literature has uncovered about their effects. Third, the authors examine staffing patterns and turnover in offices hit by scandal, uncovering evidence that scandals are associated with staff departures. The authors end by considering how Congress as an institution could help to protect and support employees who are caught up in a member's poor choices.

The research uncovers an increase in the disapproval of Congress and a drop in public trust in government associated with exposed congressional corruption in the post-Watergate era. The tools Congress holds to punish members caught up in scandal are discussed and the chapter considers five major scandals to rock Congress since the 1970s. Importantly, we uncover evidence that government institutions and actors are somewhat resilient and can bounce back after experiencing negative public sentiment for a period of time. Yet, it seems in the aftermath of exposed corruption, the corresponding drop in public support has policy implications. We determine that movement in public disapproval of Congress and overall trust in government help explain public law output and the ability of Congress to pass its contemporary legislative agenda.

The vast majority of political scandals reported in the news center around male politicians. Yet, when women are involved, the nature of the scandals and coverage are sometimes different. Whereas powerful men are rarely, if ever, accused of “sleeping their way to the top,” powerful women frequently are. What happens when women politicians are involved in a scandal that blurs the lines between corruption – i.e., abuse of public authority for private gain – and a simple moral transgression? We designed an original survey experiment to assess participants’ responses to a Congresswoman having an extramarital affair with someone who has the power to advance her career. We find that participants are less likely to suggest they will punish Congresswomen at the polls for involvement in a simple “morality” scandal than for the scandal that blurred the line between a sex and corruption scandal. Moreover, we observe that political conservatives are more likely than liberals to punish the hypothetical Congresswoman, indicating that some voters' negative reactions to women politicians are motivated by concerns about sexual morality, and not necessarily by a perceived abuse of power for professional gain.

Scandal is the disruptive publicity of alleged misconduct and it is important for organizations because of its severe consequences. Distinguishing between single-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct by a single actor, and multiple-actor scandals, i.e., scandals that result from publicity of misconduct of a similar type by multiple actors, we develop a framework for studying scandal dynamics that draws a distinction between how scandals start (single-actor or multiple-actor) and how they end (single-actor or multiple-actor). We focus specifically on spillover scandals (from single to multiple actors) and scapegoating scandals (from multiple to single actors) and identify several mechanisms that affect the likelihood of these two important types of scandals. We conclude by developing a research agenda that builds upon the central contribution of our framework: the distinction between single- and multiple-organization scandals and the transitions that result in spillovers and scapegoating.

This research aims to examine and understand the rationales and modalities behind the use of disclosure before, during and after a corporate governance scandal involving CPA Australia (CPAA).

Data beyond CPAA's annual reports were collected, such as news articles, media releases, an independent review panel (IRP) report, and the Chief Operating Officer's letter to members. These disclosures were manually coded and analysed through the word counts and word trees in NVivo. This study also relied on Norbert Elias' conceptual tool of power games among networks of actors – figurations – to model the scandal as a power game between the old Board, the press, concerned members, the IRP and the new Board. This study analysed the data to reveal a collective and in fieri power balance that changed with the phases of the scandal.

A mix of voluntary, involuntary, requested and absent disclosures was important in triggering, managing and ending the CPAA scandal. Moreover, communication and disclosure fulfilled a constitutive role since both: mobilised actors, enabled coordination among actors, contributed to pursuing shared goals and influenced power balances. Such a constitutive role was at the heart of the ability of coalitions of figurations to challenge and restore the powerful status quo.

This research introduces to accounting studies the collective and in fieri dimensions of power from figurational theory. Moreover, the research sheds new light on using voluntary, involuntary, requested and absent disclosures before, during and after a corporate crisis.