Search results

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the existing literature on the relationship between firm-level risk and returns and to explore other ways of measuring firm risk-taking. Literature overwhelmingly shows a negative relationship between firm-level risk and returns based on accounting data, which is counter-intuitive from the rational perspective of risk-aversion. This paper revisits this so-called Bowman’s paradox by examining the wealth of literature on the topic and empirically tests alternative measures of firm risk-taking that could provide a counter-argument on the existence of the paradox.

After formulating the criteria for such a measure, potential measures of firm risk-taking were developed based on variability of some key financial ratios and empirically tested using US listed companies’ data for several time periods from 1992 to 2016. Literature has explored the use of these financial ratios (e.g. R&D expenses as percentage of sales) based only on their magnitude. This paper is novel in that it examines the variability and not just the magnitude of these parameters.

Results showed the same counter-intuitive negative relationship between firm risk-taking and returns but the paper was able to identify an area for future theory development that hopefully will lead to a firm risk-taking measure that would exhibit the elusive positive relationship with returns.

The literature review of this paper brought together and provided a succinct classification of the various explanations for Bowman’s paradox that allowed the identification of a potentially rich area of research. It identified a gap in the literature which is the formulation of suitable measures of firm risk-taking and made investigations in this area.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate if Bowman’s Paradox (negative association between risk and return) is caused by managerial myopia. It also attempts to disentangle whether results are more consistent with one or more potential explanations.

The paper uses univariate statistics and OLS regressions. Empirically examines the relationship between four risk and return proxies, across a wide ranging time period and utilizing a number of model specifications. Results hold after using three-way clustered errors and using a more robust rolling five year, fixed regression methodology measure.

Confirms the existence of the Paradox. Also documents that the association between risk and return is positive in “winner” firms and negative in “loser” firms. Upon further analysis, the earlier negative risk-return relationship is found to entirely be due to the volatility of the (short term) income statement component of the performance terms. Results imply that executives of winner (loser) firms are less (more) likely to manage earnings or engage in other value destroying activities.

The study is confined by the typical archival study limitations; including potential endogeneity, selection biases and generalizability of the results.

Anecdotal evidence indicates that the business community makes extensive use of these performance measures. These performance measures are also pervasive in academic research. Given the importance of controlling for both managerial and firm performance, a good performance proxy is quintessential.

Although over 30 years have passed since Bowman (1980) first observed the negative correlation, to date, no consensus explanation exists. Findings suggest that Bowman’s Paradox, is potentially a manifestation of managerial myopia. Thus, this result contributes to several existing research streams.

To date, the validity of the empirical tests that employ the mean‐variance approach for testing the risk‐return relationship in the research stream named Bowman’s paradox is inherently unverifiable, and the results cannot be generalized. However, this problem can be solved by developing an econometric model with two fundamental characteristics: first, the use of a time‐series model for each firm, avoiding the traditional cross‐sectional analysis; and, second, the estimation of a model with a single variable (firm’s rate of return), whose expectation and variance are mathematically related according to behavioral theories, forming a heteroskedastic model similar to GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity). The application of this methodology for Bowman’s paradox is new, and its main advantage is that it solves the previous criticism of the lack of identification. With this model, we achieve results that agree with behavioral theories and show that these theories can also be carried out with market measures.

This study aims to extend Bowman's risk–return paradox to Asian emerging markets and explain its causes under the prospect theory.

The study is conducted on a cross-sectional sample of 4,609 firms across nine Asian emerging countries. The two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation technique is used to evaluate the three objectives of the study, i.e. Bowman's risk–return paradox, significance of firm-specific risk and prospect theory explanation of Bowman's paradox.

The authors challenge the two basic financial economics arguments that higher risk is rewarded with higher return, and firm-specific risk is diversifiable. The empirical findings confirm the negative impact of firm-specific and systematic risk on firm return, thus, corroborates the Bowman's explanation of risk–return trade-off. However, the authors did not find empirical evidence to support prospect theory's explanations of Bowman’s paradox in Asian emerging markets.

A holistic approach is adopted to analyze the various aspects of Bowman's paradox and its causes for the same time period, variables and sample. The authors also rectified several methodological limitations observed in previous studies, i.e. the use of same proxies for firm return and risk, endogeneity and survivorship issues. Furthermore, the findings of this study will enable managers to formulate critical viewpoint on firm-specific risk and systematic risk and take informed strategic decisions regarding optimum utilization of their firm's key resources in Asian emerging markets.

This chapter introduces empirical studies of firm performance and related risk outcomes conducted in the management and finance fields presenting underlying theoretical rationales as they have evolved over time. Early finance studies of market-based returns predominantly found positively skewed return distributions that conform to assumptions about higher returns associated with more risky investments. Subsequent studies found that performance outcomes measured as accounting-based financial returns generally display left-skewed distributions that reflect negative risk-return relationships. This artifact was first observed by Bowman (1980), thus often referred to as the “Bowman paradox” because it contravened the conventional assumptions in finance. The management studies have largely confirmed the inverse risk-return observations but often following rather confined research streams. A contingency perspective inspired by prospect theory and behavioral rationales have investigated the lagged effects of performance on risk outcomes and vice versa. Another stream has focused on the spurious relationships between negatively skewed performance distributions and the inverse risk-return associations. A third approach considered the performance and risk outcomes as deriving from the firms responding in distinct ways to exogenous changes. These studies reach comparable results but underpinned by very different rationales. The finance studies observe deviations from the pure doctrine of positive risk-return associations embedded in the widely adopted capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and note deficiencies with alternative interpretations that even question the validity of CAPM. A more recent strain of studies in behavioral finance observes how many (even professional) investment managers have biases that lead to inverse relationships between perceived risk and return outcomes. While these diverse fields of study have different starting points, they uncover an increasing number of interesting commonalities that can inspire the ongoing search for explanations to observed left-skewed financial returns and negative risk-return correlations across firms.

In this chapter, we perform more detailed analyses and present the distribution characteristics and risk-return relationships of accounting-based financial returns (ROA) across different industry contexts and between periods with different economic conditions. We first display the frequency diagrams of the return measure (ROA) and its two components, net income and total assets, that show entirely different contours in the density graphs that must be reconciled. This is partially accomplished by analyzing the skewness, kurtosis, cross-sectional, and longitudinal risk-return characteristics of each of the three variables. The analyses further considers potential effects of accounting manipulation, and different organizational and executive traits, that identifies significant effects on the accounting-based return measures. We find extremely left-skewed return distributions with high negative correlations between the average return and risk measures, which reproduces the “Bowman paradox” as originally conceived. The same analysis is performed on net income and operating cash flows, the latter being less susceptible to accounting manipulation, which should display similar effects even though these performance distributions show positive skewness. We find negative but insignificant cross-sectional risk-return relations that nevertheless reappear in analyses performed within the specific industry contexts. The study further uncovers effects from prevailing economic conditions where left-skewness and kurtosis as well as negative risk-return correlations are much more significant during periods of high economic growth and business expansion where competition is more pronounced.

This chapter outlines the major analytical efforts performed as part of the overarching research project with the aim to investigate the organizational and environmental circumstances around the extreme negatively skewed performance outcomes regularly observed across firms. It presents the collection and treatment of comprehensive European and North American datasets where subsequent analyses reproduce the contours of performance distributions observed in prior empirical studies. Key theoretical perspectives engaged in prior studies of performance data and the implied risk-return relationships are presented and these point to emerging commonalities between empirical findings in the management and finance fields. The results from extended analyses of more fine-grained data from North American manufacturing firms uncover the subtle effects of leadership and structural features, and computational simulations demonstrate how the implied adaptive processes can lead to the empirically observed performance distributions. Finally, the findings from the analytical project activities are set in context and the implications of the observed results are discussed to reach at a final conclusion.

This study aims to examine the phenomenon of the risk–return paradox from the resources side of the firm. The authors emphasize the moderating role of risk-taking capabilities in investigating the relationship between risk-taking and performance.

Building on the disciplines of the resource-based view, the moderating effects of risk-taking capabilities on performance were tested by using Taiwan listed companies' data from information technology and electronics industries. Based on the data from 216 firms for periods from 2003 to 2007, this study runs a hierarchical moderated regression analysis to test the hypotheses in the context of diversification.

The results of this study emphasize that risk-taking and its relationship with performance are context-specific. Significantly, it is contingent on the firm's risk-taking capabilities endowment. The findings also indicate that some aspects of risk-taking capabilities moderate the relationship between risk-taking and performance.

This paper emphasizes that risk-taking capability is an essential factor in investigating the risk–return paradox. It constructs the dimensions of risk-taking capability in terms of absorptive capacity, network resources and organizational slack. Firms equipped with a high level of risk-taking capabilities benefit from risk-taking activities and should, therefore, embrace risk.

In view of a disruptive environment, the authors consider theories that explain left-skewed performance outcomes and inverse risk–return relationships where some rationales imply causal dependencies with slightly differing outcomes while others refer to spurious artifacts. These literatures are briefly outlined and dynamic response capabilities introduced as an alternative perspective expressed as strategic responsiveness where commonly observed performance outcomes derive from heterogeneous response capabilities among firms that compete in dynamic environments. Financial performance outcomes are analyzed empirically based on a comprehensive corporate dataset where computational simulations of adaptive strategy making among firms generate comparable outcomes from a simple strategic responsiveness model. The findings demonstrate how diverse adaptive strategy-making processes can generate a substantial part, if not all, of the commonly observed artifacts of firm financial performance. The implications of these results are discussed pointing to propitious approaches of analyzing the impact of dynamic adaptive strategies.

The relationship between risk and return has been widely analysed in the scope of listed companies. However the present literature leaves uncovered an important study area with regards to privately held firms. In order to cover this gap, this study analyses the risk-return trade-off in the context of private enterprises. Furthermore, the authors incorporate the contingent effect of being a family firm on the abovementioned relationship.

Using information from the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) database, a sample of 2,297 private manufacturing firms were analysed for the period of 2009–2016. So as to ascertain the proposed hypotheses, dynamic panel data methodology was applied. Specifically, the authors estimated the two-step general method of moments (GMM).

The obtained findings reveal that, according to prospect theory arguments, privately held firms adopt a conservative attitude toward risk when results are higher than a target level, while becoming risk seeking when results are lower than a target level. Moreover, the fact of being a family firm softens the risk-return relationship both when performance is above the target level and also when firms find themselves in the lowest performing case.

This article is, to the best of the authors' knowledge, one of the first studies dealing with the risk-return relationship in a privately held firm context. Moreover, the inclusion of being a family firm as a contingent factor in the abovementioned link is a complete novelty.

La relación riesgo-rentabilidad ha sido ampliamente analizada en el ámbito de las empresas cotizadas. Sin embargo, la literatura existente deja al descubierto una importante área de estudio en relación con las empresas no cotizadas. Para cubrir esta brecha, el presente estudio analiza el binomio riesgo-rentabilidad en el contexto de empresas privadas. Adicionalmente, incorporamos el efecto contingente de ser una empresa familiar sobre esta relación.

Utilizando información de la base de datos SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos) se analizó una muestra de 2.297 empresas manufactureras privadas para el período 2009–2016. Para comprobar las hipótesis propuestas se aplicó la metodología de datos de panel, específicamente, utilizamos el Método de los Momentos Generalizado (GMM).

Los resultados muestran que, de acuerdo con la Teoría Prospectiva, las empresas no cotizadas presentan una mayor aversión al riesgo cuando su nivel de rentabilidad es superior al valor de referencia establecido, mientras que presentan una mayor propensión al riesgo cuando su rentabilidad es inferior al valor de referencia. Además, el hecho de ser una empresa familiar suaviza la relación riesgo-rentabilidad en ambos escenarios.

Este es uno de los primeros estudios en abordar la relación riesgo-rentabilidad en el contexto de empresas no cotizadas. Además, la inclusión de ser una empresa familiar como factor contingente es completamente novedosa.