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The mass exodus of the professional healthcare workforce has become a cankerworm for a developing nation like Nigeria, and this worsens the already depleted healthcare systems in underdeveloped nation. This study investigated the rationale behind medical workers' brain-drain syndrome and the quality healthcare delivery in the Nigerian public healthcare sector.

To stimulate an understanding of the effect of the phenomenon called brain drain, the study adopted a diagnostic research design to survey the public healthcare personnel in government hospitals. The study administered a battery of adapted research scales of different measures to confirm the variables of interest of this study on a probability sampling strategy. The study surveyed 450 public healthcare sector employees from four government hospitals to gather pertinent data. The study used a structural equation model (SEM) and artificial neural networks (ANNs) to analyse the collected data from the medical personnel of government hospitals.

The findings of this study are significant as postulated. The study discovered that poor quality worklife experienced by Nigerian medical personnel was attributed to the brain-drain effect and poor healthcare delivery. The study further demonstrated that job dissatisfaction suffered among the public healthcare workforce forced the workforce to migrate to the international labour market, and this same factor is a reason for poor healthcare delivery. Lastly, the study discovered that inadequate remuneration and pay discouraged Nigerian professionals and allied healthcare workers from being productive and ultimately pushed them to the global market.

Practically, this study has shown three major elements that caused the mass movement of Nigerian healthcare personnel to other countries of the world and that seems novel given the peculiarity of the Nigerian labour market. The study is original and novel as much study has not been put forward in the public healthcare sector in Nigeria concerning this phenomenon.

The present paper aims to question the rationale of paying a high remuneration to executives who are presiding over loss-making companies. The neoclassical wage model asserts that the remuneration of executive directors is positively related to their company’s financial performance. However, evidence suggests that executives can obtain a higher level of personal compensation regardless of how the company performs.

The relationship between executive remuneration and performance for viable but loss-making Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)-listed companies has been studied for 2009-2011. The paper examines the determinants of the level of executive remuneration as well as discerns the strength of the remuneration–performance relationship, both at the overall and across various board hierarchical levels, using the JM sensitivity and HL elasticity models.

Results for univariate and multivariate analyses highlight that both the remuneration–performance sensitivity and elasticity are weak. Further, factors such as ownership structure, risk and industry class moderate the remuneration–performance elasticity. It seems that it is only the lower rung of executive directors whose cash remuneration gets adversely affected with the performance of the company.

The paper offers valuable insight into the complexities relating to the remuneration performance relationship by putting forth a multi-theoretical perspective. The fact that executives are drawing a whopping remuneration while their companies continue to report disappointing results suggests that a catalytic role has to be played by the government so as to ensure that executive remuneration policies and practices are consistent with the company’s long-term objectives and control environment.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The purpose of this viewpoint is to comment on the implications of the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Review and Consultation Documents expected to update regulation governing the determination/reporting of executive remuneration in UK stock market listed companies. Practical points from actors involved in executive remuneration decision-making/reporting are presented, set within the context of neo-institutional theory.

This qualitative research systematically analyses UK Corporate Governance Codes, the FRC’s recent Review/Consultation and peer-reviewed published studies of executive pay determination based on in-depth interviews with non-executive directors, institutional investors, executive pay advisers and human resources (HR) professionals.

Further regulation, while providing coercive influence over executive remuneration decision-making, is likely to lead to only limited change in processes and reporting due to benchmarking, the make-up of Remco membership and shareholders' preferences. Mimetic and normative isomorphic forces work against coercive isomorphism leading to resistance to change as decision-makers strive to safeguard their social status/reputations.

Reviewing executive remuneration package components and paying attention to company strategy, sustainability and values in pay determination are welcomed but recognised as difficult to achieve. Drawing upon a wider range of information sources/voices can assist in broadening the discussion. HR professionals can help widen stakeholder input to executive remuneration decision-making.

The authors’ viewpoint is grounded in peer-reviewed empirical data that draws directly upon the views/experiences of executive remuneration decision-makers to identify problems in adhering to FRC recommendations for change. The authors extend the meta-theoretical perspective of neo-institutional theory – specifically institutional isomorphism – as providing explanatory and predictive power to understand executive pay decision-making.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

To help companies find ways of reducing costs when an executive director leaves an organisation because of poor performance or at the end of a contract.

The author has conducted research in organizations that have executives on contracts for three to five years, identifies how executive directors are heavily rewarded when their contract ends voluntarily or involuntarily. Researches in organisations have shown that if you sign a contract as an executive director there is no incentive for excellent performance because most contracts of executives are designed in such a way that poor performance can be rewarded indirectly.

Very few executives in Zimbabwe work through their contracts up to the end especially in parastatals due to what is perceived as poor performance but they are always met with a “golden handshake” as they call it though they have not contributed much except the demise of the organisation.

Ways are provided for organisations to follow and try to mitigate the costs of paying executives when they leave organisations unceremoniously or when their contracts end without renewal.

This paper gives practical advice from situations in organizations and helps organisations to take into account the costs implications involved when an executive director leaves the organisation before the end of contract or poor performance.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the various proposals to regulate executive pay in the UK. Situated within a corporate governance context, it focuses on using shareholder empowerment as a mechanism to formulate a regulatory strategy to quell the continued furore that surrounds the issue.

Using an expansive array of different academic materials, the paper adopts the approach of using critical analysis to provide an original insight into the popular and contentious issue of executive remuneration.

The paper finds that the UK Government’s current proposal to regulate executive remuneration, via the shareholder empowerment device of a binding vote on remuneration, will primarily consist of symbolic rather than practical significance.

The paper provides important social implications, as it provides a new prospective and insight into the well-covered issue of executive remuneration.

The paper draws on a host of traditional and modern academic materials to create a new viewpoint on the issue of remuneration. Moreover, the paper is original insofar that it ties the issue of shareholder empowerment into the conceptual design and formulation of company law and corporate law theory.

As a result of the Australian Government Productivity Commission's recommendation to mandate remuneration committee independence for ASX300 companies, this study aims to investigate whether voluntary remuneration committee independence aligns chief executive officer (CEO) total pay and bonuses with firm financial performance.

A series of hypotheses test the research question using multiple regressions for a sample of 143 ASX300 companies during 2001. This time was prior to strengthen corporate governance regulation, but after mandated executive remuneration disclosure, thus capturing varying levels of voluntary remuneration committee independence.

This study shows firm size is an influential factor in the relationship under investigation. ASX300 large firm remuneration committees link CEO total remuneration and bonuses to firm financial performance. Smaller ASX firm remuneration committees do not link either type of CEO remuneration to performance despite remuneration committee independence. Findings are mixed for medium-sized ASX300 firms.

Limitations include the necessary time restriction to 2001 for sampling the ASX300 firms. The implication of this study's findings is that the proposed public policy for mandatory remuneration committee independence is not universally effective in linking CEO remuneration to firm financial performance for ASX300 firms.

This study contributes to the limited research on voluntary remuneration committee independence in relation to CEO remuneration and firm financial performance in the Australian context.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of directors’ remuneration on the firm’s intrinsic and extrinsic value.

The paper provides a brief review of the literature on directors’ remuneration and identifies the current knowledge on the relationship between profit sharing or directors’ remuneration and the firm’s performance. In addition, correlation analysis between the directors’ compensation and various parameters measuring the firm’s performance is done.

From an investor’s viewpoint, the performance indicators indicated no significant relation of the increase in the firm’s performance with the increase in directors’ remuneration. But, from the accounting viewpoint, there exists a positive correlation between the two. Therefore, the directors’ remuneration adds to the intrinsic value of the firm, but does not contribute significantly to the extrinsic value of the firm.

Future research could encompass a larger sample of companies. Also, a comparison could be done for the companies for periods before and after the modification of Clause 49 post-Satyam fiasco. The present study is done after a short period of the modification to the Clause 49.

The study provides a unique examination of remuneration of the board of directors and the firm’s performance. It studies the impact of the directors’ remuneration and its impact on firm’s performance. The study encompasses an exhaustive analysis for the emerging market, namely, India. The research studies 40 companies, which are unique from each other and explores the relation. It explores four parameters studying both the intrinsic and extrinsic values of the firm.