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The paper seeks to understand the implications of partner opportunism for project relationships.

Based on the theoretical literature, the paper presents a conceptual model considering the perspective of the organization impacted by partner opportunism.

The model proposes that partner opportunism lowers willingness to engage by creating perception of loss. The undesirable impact of opportunism on perceived loss is less if the partner has made high relation-specific investments. Also, the negative impact of perceived loss on willingness to engage is less if the partner is difficult to substitute.

The model can be tested in the context of information technology (IT) relationships because of scope for opportunism in IT project relationships. Data can be collected through experimental vignettes.

The model contributes by investigating novel aspects of governance, behavioral consequences of opportunism and relation-specific investments in project relationships. The paper suggests that organizations can protect themselves against the ill effects of partner opportunism by enabling their stakeholders to invest substantial time and effort in the relationship and fortify relational quality and bonding.

The purpose of this study is to enhance the comprehensive understanding of the roles of resource investments, explicit contracts and three components of guanxi (i.e. renqing, ganqing and mianzi) in asymmetric research and development (R&D) partnerships. Treating dependence asymmetry as a multidimensional construct, this study examines the moderating effects of these elements on the relationships between resources and information asymmetry and opportunism.

The study was executed by issuing questionnaires to R&D managers participating in R&D projects and collaborations in the Shanghai and Jiangsu provinces via e-mail and face to face surveys. A multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The empirical test generally supported the conceptual model and produced the following findings: first, resources and information asymmetry significantly and positively affect opportunism. Second, the partner’s resource investments can weaken the effect of resources and information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism. Third, explicit contracts can reduce the impact of information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism. Fourth, renqing and ganqing but not mianzi can weaken the influence of information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism.

This study provides a comprehensive and clear understanding of how opportunism can be curbed by jointly considering resource investments, explicit contracts and guanxi in asymmetric R&D cooperative relationships. Moreover, dependence asymmetry and guanxi are measured as a multidimensional construct and reveal their underlying structure, which expands previous understandings of risk management in R&D collaborations.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual model for examining the effects of trust (competence trust, goodwill trust) and cooperation on partner opportunism and for exploring the moderating effects of guanxi on the relationships among trust, cooperation and opportunism in joint ventures.

The sample for this paper comprises 981 manufacturing joint ventures from various industrial sectors. A total of 354 valid questionnaires were collected, representing a 36 per cent response rate. The conceptual model is tested with structural equation modeling adopting AMOS software.

The empirical findings indicate that both competence trust and goodwill trust reduce partner opportunism in a joint venture through fostering cooperation. Competence trust also exerts significant influence on preventing opportunism, whereas opportunistic behavior is not greatly affected by goodwill trust. Additionally, the results reveal that guanxi helps strengthen the negative relationship between cooperation and opportunism.

This paper makes a threefold contribution: First, it investigates empirically the direct influence of two types of trust on partner opportunism. Second, it tests indirect influence of trust on partner opportunism through the path of cooperation. Third, it explores the moderating effects of guanxi in relationships on trust, cooperation and partner opportunism. Implications offers suggestions for management practice to reduce partner opportunism in joint-venture manufacturing.

A successful relationship between manufacturer and supplier is vital for the pursuit of mutual benefits, which can be affected by one of the partners’ opportunistic behavior, causing disequilibrium in the existing relationship. The extant research has mainly focused on opportunism as a single phenomenon rather than the detectable strong form and unnoticeable weak form of opportunistic behavior in an exchange relationship that affects the relational outcomes in various ways. This study aims to contribute toward explaining the effect of economic and social forces on a strong and a weak form of opportunism and, in turn, its impact on relational outcomes in manufacturer-supplier relationships.

A sample of 361 manufacturers was drawn randomly using a sampling frame from the western part of India. The authors used covariance-based structural equation modeling to support the proposed model empirically. The authors examined the effect of social capital and transaction cost dimensions on different forms of a supplier’s opportunism.

All three dimensions of social capital have a different impact on both the forms of a supplier’s opportunism in the relationship. The authors found that social capital moderates the relationship between transaction-specific investments on a weak form of opportunism, while social capital is more valuable in curbing opportunism due to the effect of environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. The authors found that the supplier’s weak form of opportunism than the strong form has a more amplifying effect on governance costs.

This research contributes in three different ways. First, it inquires about the direct effect of transaction cost dimensions and social capital dimensions on a supplier’s multifaceted opportunism (strong form and weak form) in the manufacturer-supplier relationship. Second, it investigates the moderating effect of social capital on the relationship between transaction cost dimensions and forms of supplier opportunism. Third, the weak form of a supplier’s opportunism affects more significantly than the strong form of opportunism on governance costs.

Transaction‐specific investments are often required in marketing channels in order to improve channel efficiency. However, such investments often increase the risk of opportunistic behaviors being sparked off. This paper aims to analyze the role of partners' investments in specific assets and the development of relational norms as safeguarding mechanisms against opportunism.

Three hypotheses are developed in line with transaction cost economics and relational exchange theories. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 479 manufacturer‐distributor relationships in the food sector in Spain.

The paper finds that partner‐specific investments and relational norms are effective mechanisms against opportunism. However their efficacy differs depending on which opportunism (supplier's or distributor's) is to be avoided.

The paper focuses on two mechanisms, yet there are other safeguards that firms can employ.

The partner's investments in specific assets are an effective safeguard for suppliers as well as for distributors. Companies should aim for balanced investment in this field, as it is the optimum way in which to avoid opportunistic behavior. Relational norms have shown to be effective only for distributors.

The study adopts a bilateral approach analyzing the effects of the governance mechanisms on both supplier and distributor opportunism. The paper provides new evidence on the role of the partner's specific investments as a safeguard against opportunism. They do not directly act against opportunism, but they act as variables that moderate the causal relationship between the specific investments of the firm and the partner's opportunism.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the variation in the relationship between governance mechanisms and the effect of the relationship on contract performance, especially in controlling partner opportunism.

This study conducts a comparative case analysis of contract governance of “National Health Insurance Program” in India. The data are collected using field research through in-depth interviews and direct observation across three states in India.

The authors find that the governance mechanisms continue to complement and substitute, both in a dynamic manner, but until aligned with the nature of transaction, they are ineffective to mitigate opportunism, a critical dimension of contract performance. Inappropriate governance mechanisms inflate the gaps in incomplete contracts, resulting in partner opportunism.

The study draws findings from healthcare context and service-based contracting; therefore, the applicability of this study may vary in other contexts.

The paper highlights the need for building flexibility in the governance structure while designing contracts. Further, managers need to combine both governance mechanisms dynamically to align with the nature of the transaction to control partner opportunism.

The authors contribute to the existing debate on the conundrum of the relationship between governance mechanisms and provide a new explanation. The authors propose that it is not the specific governance mechanisms but the alignment of the governance mix with the nature of the transaction that determines the contract performance, especially control of partner opportunism.

Controlling partner opportunism in public-private partnership (PPP) requires effective adaptation of governance mechanisms over life-cycle. This paper proposes a process framework of effective governance adaptation for controlling partner opportunism in case of PPP.

Using in-depth interview data and extensive secondary data, a comparative case analysis of governance adaptation for controlling partner opportunism in two provinces in the “National Health Insurance Program” in India was conducted. The study uses contextual analysis and critical incident technique to identify the opportunistic behaviors and use processing tracing to map the adaptation of governance mechanisms for effective control of partner opportunism.

The paper makes several propositions and proposes a three-stage framework for effective governance adaptation for controlling partner opportunism. The study proposes that governance adaptation begins with the iterative process of discovering governance needs, followed by the dynamic interaction between governance mechanisms shaping the adaptation process. The process ends with two-dimensional alignment–alignment of partner's goal and alignment of governance mix with governance needs resulting in effective governance.

The paper contributes to the existing debates on governance mix and its effectiveness in PPP by proposing two-dimensional alignment for optimal governance adaptation leading to effective PPP governance.

Existing research presents contradictory findings about the effectiveness of governance mechanisms to control partner opportunism. The proposed process-view of governance adaptations tries to address this conundrum to some extent.

Retailers are increasingly forced to enter negotiations with new suppliers and have less time to develop trusting relationships prior to awarding sourcing contract. Such supplier negotiations are often guided by self‐interest‐seeking behavior. However, not all exchange partners behave opportunistically when given the opportunity and little is known about how and when opportunism actually occurs. This research seeks to develop a multidimensional perspective of exchange partners' Machiavellianism that reveals different types of opportunistic motivations in exchange relationships and to extend knowledge of socialization as a safeguard by investigating the efficacy of signaling trustworthiness as a means of reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior in exchanges with partners with different moral standards about opportunism.

The data consist of a sample of 259 purchasing professionals who are members of the Institute of Supply Chain Management and report on their negotiation behavior. Moderated regression analysis is used to analyze the research model.

The results show that opportunistic behavior originates from a multidimensional set of moral convictions held by an exchange partner. Interestingly, signaling a trusting relationship only reduces opportunistic behavior that is due to deceit, but is not effective against cynicism or flattery.

To date, retail managers have addressed potential partner opportunism by designing contractual agreements or by implementing structural and social safeguards. Little is known about how these approaches address partner‐specific causes of opportunism. The study demonstrates the extent to which trust, a popular socialization mechanism in retailing, moderates the degree to which an exchange partner's moral conviction leads to opportunism.

This study aims to investigate impacts of classic transaction cost-related factors (i.e. partner selection cost, specific asset investment and extorting rent cost) on joint venture (JV) partner’s cooperative and opportunistic behaviour, from the perspective of transaction cost economics.

Item measurements, based on which the questionnaire was developed, were derived according to a thorough search and review of related literature. In all, 226 valid responses from manufacturing enterprises in China were collected. A structural equation modelling approach was used to analyse the data and examine the fitness of the proposed model.

This study shows that partner selection cost, specific asset investment and extorting rent cost are positively related to a JV partner’s cooperative behaviour. Specific asset investment exerts the most significant influence on partner’s cooperative behaviour. The results also reveal that partner’s opportunistic behaviour is not significantly affected by specific asset investment but is negatively influenced by extorting rent cost. Both partner selection cost and extorting rent cost show positive impacts on specific asset investment.

The investigation focused on only manufacturing enterprises in one country. Future research could be directed to investigating other countries to increase the generalizability of the findings.

The findings suggest that increasing the extorting rent cost to promote the probability of specific asset investment is a core element to enhance JV partner cooperation.

The study not only empirically investigates the relative importance of classic transaction cost-related factors on JV partner opportunism and cooperation, but also enables a deeper understanding of the interrelationship among the classic transaction cost-related factors and their influences on partner cooperation and opportunism.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how tension management as a means of achieving compromise and overcoming minor conflicts reduces the effects of the opportunism and bargaining costs of relationships on the evaluation of business partners. The paper proposes and tests a theoretical model with a full-information approach using structural equation modeling.

The data set was based on 312 observations from a unique survey based on a business-to-business relationship sample in Sweden. The measurements reflect the effects of partner opportunism, bargaining costs, and tension management on partner evaluations.

The findings corroborate that partner opportunism and bargaining costs have a negative impact on partner evaluation. In addition, the model shows that tension management weakens the negative effects of opportunism and bargaining costs on the evaluation.

This study offers evidence on how negative effects are reduced through intervening constructs. With most studies focusing on the positive side of relationships, this paper makes an important contribution to the literature through not only describing negative effects, but also how these can be decreased.