Search results

In a globalised economy, the EU, being self-confident, could shape international standards by defending and promoting its own socioeconomic model. Social democratic parties rhetorically confess the need for a ‘European social model’, but meanings and ways to achieve it differ largely. In a comparative case study on the programmatic positioning of the German Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands and the Spanish Partido Socialista Obrero Español, the parties' perspectives on the integration mode and their handling of the Economic and Monetary Union framework and its crisis over the last decade are traced. Although similar paths from neoliberal convictions of the ‘third way’ to a positive integration process in a fiscal union setting are found, the scope and levels vary, illustrating the abilities of both parties to meet new transnational challenges. The crisis of the Eurozone was a definitive turning point for the positioning of the Social Democrats in Spain in favour of more political and fiscal integration. In contrast, their German comrades already advocated increased social integration of the EU since 2005 but remained very cautious regarding reforms of the economic framework established by the Eurozone.

How are we to make sense of the attitudes of Social Democratic parties towards decentralisation? What do they think about what is a legitimate territorial allocation of power? What factors shapes this view? And what makes Social Democratic parties change their minds? This article addresses these questions by way of competing ideological traditions, the external strategic incentives and internal constraints. Empirically, the article presents a comparative case-study analysis of Social Democratic parties in four countries (Belgium, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom). On the basis of this analysis, I argue that the positioning of Social Democratic parties on decentralisation is influenced by strategic incentives created by the structure of political competition, whereas the policy shifts are more often produced by factors that are internal to the party. A decentralist policy shift is always associated with the capacity of regionalist parties to set the agenda by exerting pressures on Social Democratic parties. In addition, Social Democratic parties tend to shift their policy while in opposition to distinguish themselves from their centralist mainstream rival in government. The dominant mechanism found across four countries was one in which regional branches persuade the central party leadership to adopt a pro-decentralist position. This chapter illustrates how Social Democratic parties have an instinct for ‘adaptation and control’ in the face of social-structural changes, and it demonstrates that the prevalence of different ideological traditions will vary according to external strategic incentives and, crucially, by the party's internal ability to follow those incentives.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the influence of the environment on the financial performance in public sports agencies at the local level.

The influence of the socio-demographic, socio-economic and political environment on the financial condition of municipal sports agencies in Spain from 2003 to 2011 was studied by several regression models.

The results show a negative influence of the size of the population and a positive influence of the municipal taxes per capita. The influence of the political context is not demonstrated. However, the set of variables only explain a small percentage of the variance.

The main limitation of this study is the possible existence of other non-controlled environmental variables. However, this study approaches genuinely the effect of the environment on municipal sports agencies, which has important research implications as it shows additional information to be contrasted with other researches in different countries or regions.

The information provided in this study will be of great importance for managers to select more objectively other entities in benchmarking development.

Finally, this study uses a non-exploited database and redirects performance management studies to other areas of service provision such as sport.

El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar la influencia del entorno sobre el rendimiento financiero de las agencias de servicios deportivos municipales.

Se ha analizado la influencia del entorno socio-demográfico, socio-económico y político sobre la condición financiera de las agencias de servicios deportivos municipales en España, del 2003 al 2011, a través de diversos modelos de regresión.

Los resultados muestran una influencia negativa del tamaño de la población y una influencia positiva de los impuestos municipales per cápita. La influencia del contexto político no queda demostrada. Sin embargo, el conjunto de variables utilizadas solo explica un pequeño porcentaje de la varianza.

La principal limitación de este estudio es la posible existencia de otras variables del entorno que no han sido controladas. Sin embargo, este estudio es pionero al analizar la influencia del entorno en agencias deportivas, lo cual conlleva implicaciones de investigación ya que muestra información para ser contrastada con nuevos estudios en otros países.

La información proporcionada en este estudio será de utilidad para los gestores, al poder seleccionar de forma más objetiva otras entidades para el desarrollo de actividades de benchmarking.

Por último, este estudio utiliza una base de datos no explotada, redireccionando los estudios de gestión del rendimiento a otras áreas de servicios concretas como la deportiva.

In recent international debates on auditing regulation, Spain has assumed a real prominence as a claimed practical example of where a policy of mandatory audit firm rotation did not work and was duly abolished. This study aims to provide an analysis of the implementation and subsequent removal of mandatory audit firm rotation in Spain in the 1990s.

This takes the form of historical analysis; the evidence in the paper derives from congressional hearings, financial newspapers and documents produced by the professional associations of auditors in Spain.

This paper demonstrates that at no stage was mandatory rotation of audit firms ever enforced on Spanish auditors. Further, the revision and subsequent removal of the Spanish law on mandatory audit firm rotation emerge as a rather politicized process, with no evident reference being made in the process of legislative reform to Spanish auditing experiences. The analysis also reveals that at the very time that Spain was being cited internationally for rejecting mandatory audit firm rotation, Spanish political parties and regulators were debating whether to “re‐introduce” such a regulation.

The clear implication of the paper is that considerable caution needs to be taken in today's international‐auditing arena, when analyzing the standpoints and claims made by professional associations and the evidence they provide to support their arguments for and against regulatory reform.

Applies an established strategic framework of competitive market positioning to political parties, suggesting that political scientists who are currently analysing political marketing without reference to the marketing discipline, could benefit thereby. If the marketing paradigm is to influence another discipline, it must first be tendered in broad, generic terms, and address matters at the strategic level. Presents examples from many electoral contexts (or markets). The analysis requires that political parties in a democratic system be regarded as analogous to commercial organizations in industrial markets. In doing so, it eschews traditional political ascriptions such as left‐ and right‐wing. The labels used to describe the parties are leader, challenger, follower and nicher. This framework offers a competitive positioning map of the market that will inform marketing and campaign decisions, and guide strategic direction. Shows how fundamental issues such as competitive analysis, party/candidate positioning, and relevant strategies are brought to the political marketing context.

The purpose of this paper is to quantify to what extent the housing bubble in the early-to-mid 2000s in Spain exacerbated land planning corruption among Spain’s largest municipalities.

The authors exploit plausibly exogenous variation in housing prices induced by changes in local mortgage market conditions; namely, the rapid expansion of savings banks (Cajas de Ahorros). Accounting for electoral competition in the 2003–2007 and 2007–2009 electoral cycles among Spanish municipalities larger than 25,000 inhabitants, the authors estimate a positive relationship between housing prices and land planning corruption in municipalities with variation in savings bank establishments using instrumental variables techniques.

A 1% increase in housing prices leads to a 3.9% points increase in the probability of land planning corruption. Moreover, absolute majority governments (not needing other parties’ support) are more susceptible to the incidence of corruption than non-majority ones. Two policy implications to address corruption emerge: enhance electoral competition and increase scrutiny over land planning decisions in sparsely populated.

First empirical evidence of a formal link between the 2000s housing bubble in Spain and land planning corruption.

The study aims to show how the public interest has been argued to justify the political interference in the accounting of financial entities as a tool to face a critical financial situation in a country. And to offer a different perspective of the publicness notion that focuses on the field of financial accounting for private entities.

The paper draws on legal and political arguments referred to the public interest that consider the balancing approach, and so goes beyond the traditional agency framework, to explain politicians' influence on financial reporting. The behavior of the newly elected Spanish government, which issued accounting impairment rules for banks is described, and the accounting practices of a highly politically connected financial entity—Bankia—are used to illustrate the consequences of that intervention.

The paper evidences that the government intervention, which implied non-compliance with IFRS, was in line with its economic goals, led to the financial sector bailout and avoided the rescue of the country. This is what we call “breaking rules to achieve the public interest”, which is also consistent with a big-bath behavior to justify the bailout and legitimate the decision to breach IFRS. The silence of enforcers is consistent with the balancing approach that suggests compliance costs from a breach of rules are perceived less relevant after a high-level decision.

This is a country-specific study based on a single case study that limits the generalizability of the findings.

This research provides a new angle to consider the political motivations to intervene in accounting in the private sector, as well as the enforcers' motivations to allow it. From an interdisciplinary perspective, it shows how politicians have argued the “public interest” to use (and abuse) to intervene in accounting rules, as well as to influence the accounting practice of a highly politically connected bank. It also highlights the potential long-term unintended consequences of these actions.