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This study investigates how disclosure of the board of directors’ leadership and role in risk oversight (BODs oversight disclosure) influences investors’ judgments when information on risk exposures is disclosed. The theoretical lens through which we examine this issue involves negativity bias. Sixty-two stock market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of stocks on a regular or professional basis participated in our study. Our results reveal that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure (positive information) does not carry significant weight on investor judgments (i.e., attractiveness and investment) when financial statement disclosures indicate a high level of operational and financial risk exposures (negative information). In contrast, under the condition of a low level of risk exposures, BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to assess higher risk in terms of worry, catastrophic potentials and unfamiliarity about risk information and, in turn, make less favorable investor judgments. Our findings add to the literature on negativity bias and contribute to the debate on the usefulness of disclosures about risk.

This paper analyses the establishment and evolution of a public oversight body (POB) – the Egyptian Audit Oversight Unit (AOU) – and its implications for local auditing firms and practices.

Primary data were gathered from 34 semi-structured interviews (including follow-up ones) between 2014 and 2020. Secondary data was obtained through publicly available documents and internal memos. Drawing on Debord's (1967) Society of the Spectacle, the insights focus on the POB's conception, materialisation and evolution in a context characterised by weak regulatory structures.

Through a series of acts, the findings reveal how the AOU first accepted the image of “international best practice” oversight (the “metaphorical”), followed by the construction of the local structure and décor replicating a United States (US) style POB archetype (the “transformational”) by primarily relying on visible processes/procedures. Yet, these mechanisms emphasised the spectacular nature of oversight, with little improvement for practice and limiting itself to “cracking down” on smaller local firms. A final stage (the “performative”) reveals how the AOU seeks to expand its activities beyond its original mandate without challenging the image-driven nature of its oversight.

The paper offers two key contributions. First, it reveals how actors, through a combination of symbolic and tangible measures, create a new performative reality of public oversight. Second, it advocates Debord's “spectacle” to complement other theoretical lenses, with a view to illuminating the materialisation stages that bridge the gap between proclaimed oversight policies and actual practices (including conscious and unconscious omissions) within a given political economy context.

This study's aim was to systematically review available literature related to the establishment, purpose, operation, and effectiveness of civilian police oversight entities in the United States and to gain a deeper understanding of support, opposition, academic, public, and police expectations concerning their utility.

A Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) was used to analyze police civilian oversight literature published between 1992 and 2022.

The authors find racially biased policing, political investment, police resistance, oversight structure, scope, and authority are key components that determine how oversight is perceived.

Based on the methodology, the results may not be generalizable. Future researchers should consider expanding public oversight research beyond the parameters, which constrained this paper.

This article contains implications that should be considered by jurisdictions seeking to develop, restructure, or eliminate public oversight entities and for recognizing the concerns of advocates and opponents of public oversight.

Civilian oversight has long been considered a potential method for public inclusion if not a means for greater public control of police. Over the past few decades, a resurgence of interest in civilian oversight has emerged.

This article synthesizes literature that spans 30 years of research on public oversight.

The purpose of this paper is to involve interviews with civilian oversight of law enforcement (COLE) directors from throughout the USA with the purpose of obtaining their perspectives on what it takes to create and sustain successful COLE programs.

The project involved 24 semi-structured interviews with experienced COLE directors. The interviews were transcribed and coded and this paper presents these perspectives according to patterns identified during analysis.

The research identified themes and patterns in the attitudes of the oversight directors which included numerous conditions necessary for success of an oversight agency. Amongst the most important conditions included agency independence, director job security, the need for professional qualified staff, unfettered access to information, the ability to publicly report on the agency’s work and a willingness on the part of government officials to tolerate criticism of the police.

This is the first study to identify the challenges and impediments to sustainable COLE mechanisms from the point-of-view of experienced agency directors. The findings can be used by future practitioners to learn from past experiences.

Independent audit oversight is a prerequisite for restoring public confidence in financial reporting and auditing after the past accounting scandals and the financial crisis. By analysing and comparing the independence of the audit oversight boards of 27 European Member States and the USA, this study aims to provide insights into the question of how independent “independent” audit oversight boards are.

Independence is measured in terms of the organisational compositions and regulatory competences of the audit oversight authorities. The data were collected through an e-mail questionnaire that was sent to all European oversight authorities, and by analysing legal provisions of various regulators. The results are analysed and visualised by a Partial Order Scalogram Analysis with Coordinates, which allows conclusions about the similarities of various systems and their relative levels of independence. Both measurements are then equally combined into one value of material independence, which is used to rank the oversight authorities.

Although all countries encounter similar pressures to establish profession-independent oversight systems, this study identifies how differently “independence” has been translated in regulatory outcomes. While all countries claim to possess formal independent oversight bodies, there is a visible gap between countries with comparatively strong independent oversight authorities and systems in which accounting bodies still maintain far-reaching regulatory influence. At the same time, the results question the role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as the globally perceived benchmark of an entirely independent regulator.

This study focuses on formal independence rather than de-facto independence. Future research has, therefore, to address how these formal arrangements have evolved in regulatory practice.

Policy makers around the world perceive independent oversight as one of the essential elements of regulatory reforms aiming at restoring public confidence in the aftermath of past accounting scandals. This study enables the comparison and benchmarking of national specific regulatory designs with other forms of independent oversight.

Although the role of independent regulation is a recurring theme in accounting research, a systematic and encompassing comparison of the intertwining of audit oversight authorities and the accounting profession has not yet been provided. This study takes a first step towards providing a quantifiable measure of the formal independence of audit oversight authorities by mobilizing concepts, methods and prior findings from the field of public policy research.

The purpose of this article is to describe an innovative research methods framework designed to address some of the persistent challenges to a social scientific understanding of civilian-led police oversight commissions.

The project design begins by acknowledging that oversight commissions take multiple and varied forms, which are contingent on local histories, institutional dynamics and discursive strategies for indexing racial inequality. The authors find such variation not to be an impediment to insightful research design. Rather, the methodological frame makes use of multi-sited ethnographic methods, organized at the county level across three research clusters (in this example, Milwaukee Co, WI; San Diego Co., CA; and Washtenaw Co, MI), to draw attention to the effects of such multiplicity to complicate, localize and render visible the specific practices of policing and its critique through civilian oversight.

Amongst an increasing national concern with the racialized nature of police violence, one evolving strategy for police reform among municipalities is to establish civilian oversight boards that can monitor, make recommendations for, and potentially direct police policy. However, there is very little research on such commissions, leaving many unanswered questions for proponents of evidence-based criminal justice policy. One reason for this lack is that the tremendous variability of such commissions has led some researchers to abandon hope for a comparative analysis which might offer generalizable conclusions beyond individual case studies. Lessons learned from previous reform efforts suggest that without a solid evidentiary basis, such reform efforts can easily succumb to institutional inertia or even failure. This danger is especially present when policy and practice recommendations are not based on research designs particularly attuned to making audible the experiences and concerns of the most marginalized targets of police attention.

The value of this method rests in its ability to provide comparative insights into the ways in which oversight commissions operate within a broader pluralized security landscape that both makes possible and constrains democratic participation along racial lines. The method contextualizes and renders audible ways of understanding, evaluating, and practicing democratic community as it is articulated through the issue of police and its oversight.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the existence of a professional oversight body and certain country‐specific education regulations in auditing are associated with a country's perceived level of corruption.

Drawing on data from the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) database, the authors used the Mann‐Whitney U analysis technique to test the difference between countries' perceived level of corruption based on whether they have or have not developed professional oversight bodies and licensing regulations.

Results suggest that countries that have established an audit profession oversight body are, indeed, perceived to be less corrupt. Similarly, countries that require practical experience, academic study, and a licensing examination in order to practice auditing are perceived to be less corrupt. On the other hand, the analysis shows that requiring auditors to fulfil continuing education requirements is not significantly related to a perception of lower levels of corruption.

The paper provides important insights for policy makers, business leaders, education and the audit profession as a whole.

This paper provides some of the first empirical support for the relationship between corruption and the use of oversight bodies and licensing regulations in professional auditing at a country level.

Through a case study on the governance structures of the UN, the purpose of this paper is to develop a critique of Public and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics (PPBTCE) (Williamson, 1999) as a theoretical lens to analyze internal oversight structures.

The authors explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative case-based research to answer the question – Why did numerous attempts to strengthen the governance of UN internal oversight structures not relieve “probity” hazards?

The analysis shows that at the UN increasing and strengthening the governance of oversight structures, i.e., incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics hazards as predicted in PPBTCE. Secretaries-General and UN General Assembly, entities charged with oversight powers, systematically trumpeted the UN Charter, breaching probity/ethics and disregarding the supervisory independence prerogative of internal oversight structures, hence failing to contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission.

This paper is the first application of PPBTCE to internal oversight transactions within an International organization context testing probity and independence attributes. The authors find that “independence” outweighs the “asset specificity” attribute whenever decisions on the governance of internal oversight arise. As far as sourcing decisions are concerned, the authority of the sovereign and the independence of the judiciary as well as quasi-judiciary transactions are not transferable attributes and, thus, cannot be contracted along with the actors’ ethics. PPBTCE should be modified to include, e.g. “virtues ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory framework for “probity” hazards, abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the new Budget Act (2015) and the new budget cycle influence and were influenced by the contextual environment of the Tanzanian parliament and how this changed parliamentarians’ (MPs) budgetary oversight roles.

The paper employed analytical concepts explained in the contextual framework proposed by Alsharari et al. (2015) to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms. Interviews, video clips and document review were employed in the data collection. Data were analyzed using the thematic approach.

The values of the new Budget Act and the new budget cycle were in conflict with the prevailing institutions, political and power aspects. The MPs modified a few provisions in the new Budget Act and in the new budget cycle. Legitimating budgetary oversight roles as a result of institutional pressure emerged but stopped. Although there was a change in MPs formal powers and MPs involvement in budgetary oversight, there was stability as the change was ineffective.

The paper only extracted relevant aspects of the contextual framework, which were sufficient to achieve the objective of the paper. Moreover, the study was conducted only a few years after the implementation of the reforms. Therefore, it might be too early to reach conclusions. Yet, the paper serves as the basis for further studies investigating changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms.

In order for the parliament to hold the government accountable to the electorate, there is a need for reforming the nature of the government system, improving MPs capacity, harmonizing Budget Act with prevailing constitution and demonstrating the political will to use MPs’ formal powers. The findings suggest that effective change in budgetary oversight by focusing on formal institutions only is unlikely.

This paper provides a more robust explanation on how the integration of institutional, political and power aspects shape budgetary oversight roles in parliaments. It is the first paper to explore accounting change using the contextual theoretical framework in an organization of a parliamentary nature. The paper responds to Kim’s (2018) call for conducting case studies to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles by investigating potential attributes of institutions when operating in practice.

Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.

The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a focus group session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology.

Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.

Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection.

Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.