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This paper provides household lifetime inequality indexes derived from representative U.S. labor market data. We obtain this result by using estimates of the household search model proposed by Flabbi and Mabli (2012). Inequality indexes computed on the benchmark model shows that inequality in utility values is substantially different from inequality in earnings and wages and that inequality at the cross-sectional level is significantly different from inequality at the lifetime level. Both results deliver original policy implications that would have not been captured without using our approach. In particular, we find that a counterfactual policy experiment consisting in a mean-preserving spread of the wage offers distributions increases lifetime inequality in wages and earnings but not in utility. When comparing inequality at the individual level between men and women, we find inequality in wages and earnings to be higher for husbands than wives but inequality in utility to be higher for wives. A counterfactual decomposition shows that the job offers parameters are the main source of the gender differential.

We expect to provide a complete theoretical framework and large sample evidence on the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the efficiency of labor investment. We also hope to provide micro-evidence based on labor investment behavior for the two-sided impact of corporate CSR behavior.

This paper measures labor investment efficiency by estimating the difference between actual and expected net hiring of enterprises. CSR is measured on the basis of the CSR score of Chinese listed companies published by Hexun.com. A regression model is constructed to analyze the relationship between CSR and labor investment efficiency. Possible endogeneity problems are controlled by lagging independent variables, propensity score matching method and difference-in-difference method.

Results show that CSR can improve labor investment efficiency by reducing over-hiring and under-hiring in emerging markets. The existence of the mediating effect of agency cost, information disclosure quality and employment fluctuation confirms that CSR improves labor investment efficiency through two mechanisms of corporate governance and labor market friction. The improvement effect of CSR on labor investment efficiency is more significant in non-state-owned, high CEO shareholding ratio and high-average urban wage enterprises.

In conclusion, our study is an important supplement to the existing research on the factors affecting labor investment efficiency. Our research conclusions will be helpful for enterprises in developing countries or enterprises in labor-intensive industries to improve labor investment inefficiency. The conclusion of the mechanism analysis in this paper provides more complete and reliable microscopic evidence for accurately identifying the specific path of CSR's impact on labor investment efficiency. This paper verifies the positive impact of CSR from the perspective of labor investment efficiency in the context of a developing country, which provides evidence for the theoretical conflicts related to CSR based on the effectiveness of enterprise labor investment decisions.

Governments in both developing and developed economies play an active role in labor markets in the form of providing both formal public sector jobs and employment through public workfare programs. The authors refer to this as employment targeting. The purpose of the paper is to consider different labor market effects of employment targeting in a stylized model of a developing economy. In the context of a simple search and matching friction model, the authors show that the propensity for the public sector to target more employment can increase the unemployment rate in the economy and lead to an increase in the size of the informal sector.

The model is an application of a search and matching model of labor market frictions, where agents have heterogeneous abilities. The authors introduce a public sector alongside the private sector in the economy. Wage in the private sector is determined through Nash bargaining, whereas the public sector wage is exogenously fixed. In this setup, the public sector hiring rate influences private sector job creation and hence the overall employment rate of the economy. As an extension, the authors model the informal sector coupled with the other two sectors. This resembles developing economies. Then, the authors check the overall labor market effects of employment targeting through public sector intervention.

In the context of a simple search and matching friction model with heterogeneous agents, the authors show that the propensity for the public sector to target more employment can increase the unemployment rate in the economy and lead to an increase in the size of the informal sector. Employment targeting can, therefore, have perverse effects on labor market outcomes. The authors also find that it is possible that the private sector wage falls as a result of an increase in the public sector hiring rate, which leads to more job creation in the private sector.

What is less understood in the literature is the impact of employment targeting on the size of the informal sector in developing economies. The authors fill this gap and show that public sector intervention can have perverse effects on overall job creation and the size of the informal sector. Moreover, a decrease in the private sector wage due to a rise in public sector hiring reverses the consensus findings in the search and matching literature which show that an increase in public sector employment disincentivizes private sector vacancy postings.

This paper seeks to study gender wage differentials in Italy using first‐order predictions of monopsony‐search models. It compares empirical predictions of these models against other competing ones of wage determination in non‐competitive settings.

The paper looks at the empirical relevance of the model in terms of third degree wage discrimination among men and women by estimating the labour supply elasticity to the individual firm. It also tests the monopsony model using a “natural” experiment. Italian administrative longitudinal data from INPS are used.

Women have lower elasticity of labour supply to the individual firm: employer size regressions indicate larger effects (and consequently lower elasticity) for women as predicted by the monopsony model. Using the theoretical dynamic monopsony‐search model of Burdett and Mortensen, wage elasticity of separations and recruits confirm this result. Using relative men/women employment effects resulting from institutional changes in wage indexation mechanism (Scala Mobile), it is found that relative male employment responded differently in the two periods to the exogenous relative increase in the wage differential, as predicted by the monopsony model. Search frictions explain about 50 per cent of the gender differential.

No role for discrimination. Better controls for rents and union status would be needed. More rich firm data would be needed.

The paper is one of the few attempts of testing implications of monopsony models in unionised labour markets, such as Italy, after some important reforms in wage bargaining agreements. The change in institutional agreements is an interesting test for different theories of wage determination.

Economic theories on structural change focus on factors such as fluctuations in relative prices and income growth. In addition, China’s reform and opening up has also been accompanied by increasing openness, significant fluctuations in investment rates, and frictions in the labor market. Existing literature lacks a unified theoretical framework to assess the relative importance of all these determinants. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

To incorporate all of the potential determinants of China’s structural change, the authors build a two-country four-sector neoclassical growth model that embeds the multi-sector Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of international trade, complete input-output structure, non-homothetic preference and labor market frictions. The authors decompose the sectoral employment shares into six effects: the Baumol, Engel, investment, international trade, factor intensity and labor market friction effects. Using the data of Chinese economy from 1978 to 2011, the authors perform a quantitative investigation of the six determinants’ effects through the decomposition approach and counterfactual exercises.

Low-income elasticity of demand, high labor intensity, and the existence of the switching costs are the reasons for the high employment share in the agricultural sector. Technological progress, investment and international trade have comparatively less influence on the proportion difference of employment in the three sectors.

Therefore, to examine the impact on China’s structural change, in addition to Baumol effect and the Engel effect, it is also necessary to consider the impact of three more factors: international trade, investment and switching costs. Therefore, the authors decompose the factors that may influence China’s structural change into the Baumol, Engel, investment, international trade, factor intensity effect and switching cost effects. The authors evaluate these six effects using the decomposition approach and counterfactual exercises.

The existing literature on aid for trade (AfT) tends to support the effectiveness of AfT in improving trade capacities and enhancing the export performance of recipient countries. While aid directed at trade-related infrastructure (e.g. ports and roads) is reported to drive the overall effect of AfT, the increasing importance of labor market flexibility and informal labor in export environment has been largely overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to test two hypotheses regarding the relationship between labor market flexibility, exports and AfT. First, flexible labor regulation promotes exports by reducing adjustment costs related to the export process. Second, for informal labor-intensive export sectors, AfT effectiveness may be compromised by the contraction of the informal sector due to labor deregulation as it deteriorates comparative advantage that supports recipients’ export competitiveness.

Since first introduced by Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has been widely used to analyze bilateral trade, and its usefulness has been verified in several prominent empirical studies (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman et al., 2008). However, despite the empirically successful framework of the gravity model, the standard gravity equation may not be appropriate for estimating the effect of AfT in the paper. The main interest lies in whether aggregate AfT flows enhance the export “performance” of individual recipients, that is, whether they improve the recipients’ total exports rather than their bilateral exports. For this purpose, the authors took aggregated approach to the gravity model from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).

The findings suggest that while both AfT and labor market flexibility are positively associated with higher export levels, the export-promoting effect of AfT is marginally reduced by the contraction of informal workforce. These findings, however, only hold for export sectors that heavily rely on informal labor force, that is, primary commodities and resource/labor-intensive goods. The authors also find that these effects are stronger in low-income countries, indicating that the AfT initiative has been effective where it is needed the most.

This paper is the first attempt to analyze the relationship between AfT and exports with consideration of labor market flexibility. Using the data for 85 recipient countries, the authors test the following hypotheses. First, labor market flexibility promotes exports by reducing adjustment costs related to the exporting process. Second, the contraction of the informal sector due to labor deregulation deteriorates developing countries’ comparative advantage in certain export sectors. Hence, while both AfT and labor market flexibility are expected to enhance the export volume of developing countries, the loss from weaker comparative advantage in a form of smaller informal labor force can exceed the gains from AfT in certain sectors.