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In recent years, numerous studies have investigated whether individual executives and their characteristics relate to financial reporting choices. In this article, we review archival, experimental and survey research on the influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting and use upper echelons theory as our organizing framework. Our review of 60 studies shows that research consistently finds that top management executives exert significant influence on financial reporting decisions, particularly on disclosure quality. Empirical research has developed promising approaches to investigate executives' psychological attributes and character traits. The results of studies examining the influence of demographic characteristics of individual executives are, however, sometimes contradictory and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the overall empirical results we review are supportive of upper echelons predictions. Additional research in this field is needed to clarify the influence of unexamined upper echelon characteristics, important moderator variables, and adverse selection effects. We also suggest that future research more closely investigates the magnitudes of managerial influence and adopts a more holistic perspective on financial reporting outcomes.

In the context of sustainable development goal 5 of the United Nations 2030 Agenda: “Achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment”, where gender equality is not only a matter of justice but also essential to achieve sustainable development, this paper aims to examine the gender pay gap in executive director compensation and the influence of female board representation and participation in nomination and remuneration committee (NRC) on this gap in Spanish listed firms over the period 2012–2022.

The analysis is conducted using a data set created by the authors, which includes executive director compensation data for 164 unique firms. This data set comprises 128 distinct observations for a given firm and year for women, and 2,333 observations for men. The authors estimate ordinary least squares models, clustering standard errors by executive. The authors use Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to decompose gender differences in compensation into differences in the characteristics of men and women and differences in the return on the same characteristics.

The authors find evidence of pay penalty for female executive directors compared to male counterparts. After controlling for firm, board and executive characteristics, the authors find that women earn 27% less than comparable men. The penalty is lower in companies with a higher share of women on the compensation committee, suggesting that women’s participation plays a role in setting a more equal remuneration policy. The gender gap in executive compensation narrows over time due to a substantial reduction of the differences between men and women in both characteristics and the return on these characteristics.

This study is one of the few analysing the gender gap in executive director compensation and its evolution in Spain. It specifically explores how gender diversity on both the board and the NRC impacts this gap. The analysis is focused on the most recent period characterized by important efforts to promote gender diversity.

This paper aims to provide a systematic review of literature pertaining to how executive behavioral characteristics relate to financial reporting decisions.

The authors review 44 papers published between 2001 and 2021 in top journals that are nested in leading business, economic and accounting journals.

Through the systematic review, the authors provide a framework for the emergence of narcissism and how it relates to decision making and hence, firm performance. Additionally, this paper identifies different measures of measuring narcissism with their pros and cons and suggest that different measures lead to different outcomes in prior literature.

The study contributes to a growing stream of research on executives' attributes influence on decision making. The authors recommend that future research may focus more on the chief financial officer (CFO) role as the majority of literature in CEO based. Additionally, the authors suggest that different settings may moderate the outcomes, and the authors propose that future research may be conducted to show how the regulatory environment affects or moderates narcissism effect.

The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

Executives exert a pervasive influence on the organizations they lead. As such, scholars have long considered how to calibrate the risks inherent in executive decision making, often relying on incentives and compensation to calibrate executive risk behavior. However, there are shortcomings that reduce the efficacy of this approach, largely because incentives and compensation do not alter the work environment itself, which play a significant role influencing executive risk behavior. Consequently, in this chapter, we propose a conceptualization that integrates executive risk-taking with work design, framing three central features of the strategic leader job and work environment that may be manipulated to channel and shape executive risk-taking. Specifically, accountability, discretion, and relationships are proposed as the key higher-order characteristics of the executive work context, and they are examined with respect to optimal calibration in order to maximize both executive performance and well-being, as well as organizational coordination and control. Implications of this conceptualization and directions for future research are discussed.

Consistent with the board of directors and top executive management’s role in ensuring and promoting investments for economic development, this paper aims to examine Omani executive management’s role in helping goals achievement in firms. This paper examines the relationships among the study variables, which are top executive management characteristics and corporate performance in the context of Omani listed firms, with the help of two control variables.

The study focused on a unique context, a developing nation, Oman and its exchange market for the past seven years (2011-2017). In addition, the data were collected from annual report according to board of directors and top executive management variables, and the financial data were obtained from DataStream. The study used the panel data approach to test the relationships characteristics of board of directors, top executive management and corporate performance.

Based on the obtained results, showed positive and significant positive relationships between some characteristics of top executive management and corporate performance, and significant negative relationships between others and the same. Specifically, board size, non-executive directors, general experience and account experience were in the former category, while board meeting was in the latter category. Finally, size and professional certificate of top executive management did not have a significant relationship with corporate performance.

This study, like previous studies has some limitations such as sample, country, variables and years; therefore, at the end of this study, many limitations and suggestions for future research studies are provided. Moreover, the study findings can be used by the market to assist managers to enhance corporate weaknesses.

The focus of the study was placed on the top executive management and corporate governance of Omani listed firms that has implications for practitioners particularly concerning the top executive management role. Added to this, the study conducted an investigation of the integration between board of directors and top executive management, with corporate governance among Omani listed firms. The study also provided information that has implications to academics when it comes to board of directors and top executive management strategies to encourage consideration of the relationship to develop best practices.

The real estate industry has experienced frequent changes in corporate executives in recent years. A total of 147 A-share listed firms witnessed a total of 191 corporate executives' departure. This wave of corporate executive departures is significantly different from previous waves. This study aims to examine whether industry evolution influence the characteristics of corporate executives? If so, then how?

Drawing on upper echelons theory, this study analyzed the effects of industry life cycle on the characteristics of corporate executives. The data of A-share listed companies in the textile, real estate and computer industries in China from 1992 to 2014 were collected.

There are significant differences in the characteristics of corporate executives that match the life cycles of different industries. Companies at the growth stage in the life cycle of an industry were more likely to select and appoint younger corporate executives with political capital, peripheral functions and output functions, whereas companies at the maturity stage were more likely to select and appoint older corporate executives with throughput functions.

By using the upper echelons theory as a starting point, this study analyzed the effects of industry life cycle on corporate executive's characteristics. The research findings offer theoretical implications for the upper echelons theory and provide managerial implications.

This paper aims to study the impact of external fairness of executive compensation on M&A premium, and examine the moderate role of institutional investors. The high M&A premium is the main factors that induce the huge impairment of listed companies’ goodwill and the plummeting performance. Executives are the decision-makers of M&As, and their decision-making process is inevitably affected by the psychological factors. In recent years, institutional investors have become an important external force that can affect the governance of listed companies.

The authors use M&A data of listed companies from 2008 to 2018 and use OLS regression to test the relationship between executive compensation fairness and M&A premium.

The results show that the lower the external fairness of executive compensation, the greater the M&A premium. Institutional investors can effectively reduce the impact of external compensation unfairness on M&A premiums. The mechanism tests show that executives' psychological perception of fairness induced by external unfairness reduces their motivation to work and prompts them to use high premium to seek alternative compensation incentives. Further examinations of executive characteristics and corporate characteristics show that the role of external unfairness in executive compensation in driving M&A premiums is more pronounced in companies with longer executive tenure, weaker executive reputation incentives and private property.

This paper enriches the research on the pre-factors of M&A premiums from the perspective of executives’ psychological perception of fairness, provides evidence that institutional investors play a positive governance role and provides decision-making references for companies to take corresponding measures to reduce M&A premium risks.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

This study aims to investigate the association between executives with foreign backgrounds and the audit fees paid by the Chinese-listed firms over the period from 2010 to 2020.

To examine the association between executives’ foreign experience and audit fees, this study constructs the following empirical model: Lnfee_i,t = β₀ + β₁Foreign background_i,t + ∑β_j Control_i,t + YearFE + IndFE + ε_i,t (1).

This study finds that auditors charge higher fees for firms hiring more executives with foreign backgrounds. The results are robust to a battery of robustness checks, including fixed effects, alternative measures of independent variable, controlling for other characteristics of executives and auditors and entropy balancing method.

This study sheds light on how executives’ foreign backgrounds affect audit fees, enriching the literature on executive heterogeneity and audit fees and providing important implications for audit practitioners.