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Board faultlines, which reflect intrinsic divisions of board members into relatively homogeneous subgroups, are associated with poor firm performance. This paper aims to extend the existing board faultline research by examining how acquisition deal size moderates the negative implications of board faultlines.

This paper uses a sample of acquisitions and a quantitative research approach to conduct statistical analysis.

Using a sample of acquisitions announced between 2007 and 2016, this paper finds evidence suggesting that strong faultlines are associated with poorer acquisition outcomes in the long-term, but not in the short term. Further, this paper finds that the effect of faultline strength on long-term acquisition outcomes is weaker for larger acquisition deals than smaller acquisition deals. The findings are consistent with deal size moderating the relation between faultlines and acquisition outcomes.

This paper addresses possible endogeneity through firm fixed effects and instrumental variable analysis. Although this paper provides evidence on the moderating role of deal size in the context of faultlines, future research could examine the role of additional moderators, such as pro-diversity, trust, board leadership and board and task characteristics.

The findings suggest that boards need to be aware of situations where the negative effects of faultlines are more likely to come to the fore. For example, faultlines are more likely to play a role in more routine, obscure monitoring than for high-profile strategic decisions.

The study is multidisciplinary as it draws on the management, organizational behaviour and psychology and finance literature. It contributes to the developing literature on faultlines in several important ways. First, this paper supports their view that faultlines have adverse effects on board performance by showing that faultlines negatively impact discrete strategic investment decisions. Second, this paper provides evidence that deals size moderates the faultline-acquisition performance relation, indicating that the role of faultlines is contextual. Third, this paper finds evidence that suggests investors do not factor in board faultlines when responding to acquisition announcements.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of CEO narcissism in corporate acquisitions with a focus on frequency and size and furthermore to examine the subsequent stock market reaction.

The authors investigate 751 acquisitions made by 158 UK nonfinancial firms and 202 CEOs in the 10-year period 2007–2016. The authors use the ratio of first-person singular pronouns to total first-person pronouns in CEO speech as the main proxy for CEO narcissism but the results are robust to the use of signature size and picture as alternative measures.

The authors find that increased CEO narcissism is associated with an increase in M&A expenditures, an increase in deal size and a decrease in deal frequency. Thus, the authors find that narcissistic CEOs favor size over frequency (“go big”). Furthermore, the authors find that the stock market reacts less favorably to acquisitions announced by firms run by narcissistic CEOs.

The paper contributes to upper echelon research by investigating the association between CEO narcissism and corporate decisions in a UK setting. More specifically, the paper contributes to the existing literature by investigating how CEO narcissism is associated with corporate acquisitions in terms of the size and frequency of deals and how such irrational behavior is penalized by the stock market. Previous literature has focused on the more broad association between CEO narcissism and M&A expenditures.

We consider conditions under which firms hire an intermediary advisor in acquisition deals. Although acquirers pay large advisory fees to investment banks for their assistance in acquisitions, we know little about the conditions under which acquirers form a relationship with an investment bank for an acquisition deal. Specifically, we examine the role of overall acquisition experience, acquisition experience specific to the target’s industry, prior relationship-specific experience, and deal size in relationship formation and continuation. We test their hypotheses using a dataset of US-based acquirers and targets between 1991 and 2015. Our findings provide nuanced insights into the role of acquisition experience for acquirer–investment bank pairing up on acquisition deals.

The aim of this paper is to consider the short‐run performance of UK firms acquiring foreign target firms over a period of 1994‐2003 and to explore the impact of deal size and other firm‐specific factors on performance. Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions have witnessed a substantial growth worldwide, with the UK being one of the top acquiring nations in the global market for corporate control.

The paper first uses event study methodology to analyse short‐run share price performance. Then a univariate analysis to examine the factors influencing the short‐run performance based on a sample of 373 acquisitions over the period of 1994 to 2003.

The study finds that the UK acquirers do not earn statistically significant positive abnormal returns in the short‐run. Univariate analysis shows that short‐run performance of UK acquirers is influenced by the form of target, acquisition strategy, geographical origin of target firm and the payment methods. However, the study finds no support for size of acquisition deal as a determinant of performance of acquiring firm.

The paper attempts to shed more light and extend existing research in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions by examining short‐run performance and factors influencing performance.

This chapter examines the effect of creditors’ monitoring role on the profitability of firm acquisitions. We use the shares retained by the lead arranger of a syndicated loan as a proxy for monitoring level. We find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to the shares retained by the lead arranger. The effect of the lead arranger’s shares on the acquirer’s return becomes pronounced in cash acquisition deals, and when there exist financial covenants. Our results suggest that lead arrangers are important not only for monitoring loans but also for successful acquisitions by borrowers. An important policy implication of the main findings of this chapter on bank monitoring is that policy makers should design financial covenants to improve the efficiency of monitoring activities by lead arranging banks in syndicated bank loan deals.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to M&A literature by explicitly investigating whether cross-border acquisitions involving emerging markets, either as acquirers or as targets, create value and how is the performance outcome in such acquisitions impacted by deal-specific characteristics.

This study uses industry-adjusted operating performance to measure acquisition gains, the Wilcoxon signed rank test to examine value creation potential and OLS regression to evaluate the impact of deal characteristics on acquisition gains.

The authors find very pronounced value destruction when emerging market firms acquire targets in developed markets, the adverse outcome being further aggravated when the mode of acquisition is “tender offer” rather than a “negotiated deal”. On the other hand, when developed market firms acquire targets from emerging markets, there is an even chance of value creation, the outcome being favourably influenced by the pre-acquisition performance of the two firms, relative size of the target and cash (not stock-swap) as the mode of payment.

The findings from this paper offer an important, statistically significant explanation on the value creation potential and the impact of deal characteristics on post-acquisition operating performance in cross-border acquisitions involving emerging market firms. This finding assumes immense significance, given the rapidly changing landscape of global M&A, witnessed through a continuous rise in the volume and value of cross-border acquisitions involving emerging market firms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the existence of a diversification discount in the Australian takeover market. A sample of 446 Australian publicly‐listed firms involved in the market for corporate control was observed between 2000 and 2007. The authors examined two pre‐announcement and four post‐announcement periods, predominantly around the immediate event date, but also examined activity out to one year following the announcement.Design/methodology/approach – An event study, in this case, is used to examine abnormal returns around the announcement of a merger or acquisition. The timeframe this study intends to focus on is the period from announcement date to a time one year down the track which, although some studies may deem it “long‐term”, is still a relatively short‐term measure of performance. While many variables in acquisitions have been looked at in depth over the years, such as outcome, nature, payment method and size of deal, one area which has had considerably less attention is the area of specialisation and diversification. That is, do focus increasing (or non‐diversification) deals have different return patterns relative to focus decreasing (or diversification) deals?

The overall findings of this paper are fairly mixed, barring a few exceptions, and there does not appear to be a great deal of variation in return patterns based purely on whether the announced acquisition is non‐diversifying or diversifying in nature.

The paper is of particular value in Australia. Most of the research of diversification to date has taken place in the USA. Australia is similar to the USA in that it has a well‐developed economy based on common law principles and an active equity market, however, the existence of institutional and regulatory differences suggests that US results may not hold in Australia.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the long‐term post‐acquisition share performance of Malaysian acquiring firms over the period 2000‐2004.

The authors use the event‐type methodology to analyse acquirer returns in relation to target status, method of payment and other firm characteristics, using both univariate and multivariate analyses. In total three performance measures are used to identify the long‐term share performance of acquiring firms: cumulative market‐adjusted abnormal returns, the buy‐and‐hold market‐adjusted and buy‐and‐hold matched‐sample abnormal returns.

The results show the existence of negative abnormal returns to acquirers over two‐ and three‐year periods after acquisition. The study also finds that acquirers of private targets earn negative returns, while acquirers of public targets earn insignificant returns. It is also found that under‐performance is limited to the small size acquirers and to large relative‐size acquisitions. Furthermore, the results indicate that acquirer's long‐term performance is not related to the method of payment and book‐to‐market ratio of the acquirer.

The Malaysian stock market is relatively small compared to the US and UK markets where most previous research has been carried out. The current study allows us to assess the robustness of the models and whether the findings in developed markets may be generalized to the smaller developing markets. This paper contributes to the present body of knowledge by offering evidence of acquirer's post‐acquisition performance from a developing market.

The capital markets witness phenomenal shifts of corporate control. With the shift of world economy into a global one, there has been a rapid increase in the volume of acquisitions. The previous studies shed light on the motives behind acquisition and impact of acquisition on both bidding and target firms. The purpose of this study is to bridge a gap in literature by exploring the factors affecting the acquisition ability (AA) of the firms. The study has analyzed the role of financial strength, corporate governance and regulatory influence on AA of acquiring firm.

Cross-sectional data has been analyzed with respect to Pakistan stock exchange for a period of 2004-2017 by using logit regression.

Analysis indicates that firm-specific variables are important determinants in firm’s decision to acquire. Chief Executive Officer duality and presence of institutional shareholders on the board contribute to this important phenomenon in the life of the acquiring firms. Bidding firm’s financial strength is also another important consideration while going for corporate control transfer transactions. The empirical results indicate the better AA for firms characterized by minimum capacity usage, lower level of intangible assets, lower debt levels and lower advertising expenses. However, the regulatory factor has no significant role in firms’ AA. The findings of the study are helpful for managers, regulators and policymakers.

Analyzing the role of financial strength, corporate governance and regulatory influence on AA of acquiring firm is a rare study, especially in an emerging country such as Pakistan.

The purpose of this paper is to better understand the constraints related to developing small-scale public-private partnerships (PPPs) and how to reduce them.

The paper provides a general review of the characteristics of small-scale PPPs and identifies overarching concerns.

The paper finds for small-scale PPPs constraints with respect to the definition, government processes and procedures, transaction costs, public capacity and institutional structure; important issues of transaction costs, minimum size requirement and increasing popularity and recommendations for further development.

Since most small PPPs are conducted by cities and regional governments, many local bodies would benefit from a better understanding of small-scale projects, helping to develop standard documentation, which is especially relevant for small-scale projects given their relatively large transaction and bid costs, supporting the long-term growth of small PPPs.

Small-scale PPPs have different characteristics compared with large projects and these characteristics should be studied separately. Although the benefits of small-scale projects are undeniable, relatively few have been undertaken relative to the substantial requirement. A more thorough understanding of the constraints related to developing small-scale PPPs and how to reduce them would help the subset of small projects to reach its full potential. This paper serves as a first step, clearing the ground for further research in specific areas.