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This paper aims to investigate the impact of the implementation of the critical audit matters (CAMs) disclosure requirement and the subsequent relationship between CAM disclosures and audit report lag, as well as audit fees in the USA.

This study used difference-in-differences analyses to investigate the impact that the implementation of the requirement for auditors to report CAMs on their audit report has on the audit process. It also used levels regression models to examine the relationship that CAM disclosures have with audit report lag and audit fees.

This study found that the implementation of the CAM disclosure requirement in the USA reduced audit report lag while not significantly affecting audit fees. This suggests that the CAM disclosure requirement may increase the cooperation between auditors and managers and improve the efficiency of the audit process.

This study’s results are informative for assessing the economic impact of requiring CAM disclosures, which should be of importance to regulators, auditors and accounting researchers.

This study used different approaches to investigate two aspects of the CAM disclosure requirement – the effect of the implementation of the disclosure requirement and the subsequent effects related to CAM reporting outcomes. Unlike many previous studies investigating CAM disclosures, which relied on experiments and questionnaires, this study used actual CAM disclosure data in the USA to investigate the impact on audit report lag and audit fees.

This study aims to address the following four research questions: first, whether auditors report critical audit matters (CAMs) to shield themselves against possible litigation; second, whether reporting quality affects auditors’ propensity to report CAMs; third, whether auditors’ tenure length – reflecting familiarity with clients’ financial reporting – affects their likelihood to report CAMs; and fourth, whether auditors’ conservatism increases the likelihood of CAMs reporting.

Data are manually collected from audit reports including CAMs in 10-K, then financial data are collected from the Capital IQ database, and market data are collected from the CRSP database. Using propensity score matching, the initial sample of companies with CAMs is matched with companies without reported CAMs. Performance adjusted discretionary accruals, real earnings management proxy, Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score, propensity to issue a going concern opinion, Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-Score, Rogers and Stocken’s (2005) model and Houston et al.’s (2010) model are used to measure reporting quality, auditor conservatism, misstatement risk and litigation risk, respectively.

The results do not show that auditors report CAMs opportunistically to shield themselves from litigation risk. However, the results do suggest that auditors have a greater tendency to report CAMs when reporting quality is low and when they are more conservative. On the other hand, they have less tendency to report CAMs in their first year of engagement.

The findings of this study have important implications for the auditor behavior literature as it shows that, when it comes to reporting CAMs, auditors actually behave objectively and do not report in a trite way. This study also provides early archival evidence on a standard that relates to the first major change to the auditor’s report in decades. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first to provide evidence on the association between auditor conservatism and auditors tendency to report CAMs and the first to triangulate prior research on auditor litigation risk by providing the first archival evidence on the auditors “litigation-shielding” concern.

This study examines whether auditors attempt to meet the stated objective of reporting CAMs by signaling information about reporting quality. This study demonstrates that reporting CAMs is not a “boilerplate” communication. This study has implications for standards setters, as it shows that CAMs are reported in a way consistent with the objectives of the new standard, namely, via signaling information in the audit report on the quality of the financial statements.

In terms of originality, this paper uses a manually collected sample and, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to focus on auditor’s behavior rather than on investors or clients reactions to CAMs. Also, this paper addresses a recently issued standard using US data and archival approach, rather than experimental. This paper also provides relevant evidence related to concerns raised earlier but were not empirically examined, such as reporting CAMS as “boilerplate” expectations. This paper provides new evidence on the auditors’ behavior with regard to litigation risk.

Key audit matters (KAMs) in International Standard for Auditing, 701 seek to enhance the value of the auditor’s report by increasing the transparency of how the audit was performed. The purpose of this study is to investigate how professional auditors themselves perceive the impact of KAMs on audit quality and audit effectiveness.

Statistical analyses of an electronic survey of certified public auditors (CPAs) in Finland.

Regarding the perceptions of KAMs, the authors found two dominant views on auditing: quality and efficiency. In general, the respondents did not consider that KAMs improve audit quality. However, auditors focusing on efficiency considered that KAMs make the audit process more fluent. Further, the use of KAMs may facilitate audit effectiveness and cooperation between auditors and managers. The authors also found three factors related to the KAMs processes and auditing work: effectiveness, risks and workload.

Auditors may use KAMs to provide focus in their work. This facilitates balancing between the demands for added value while keeping the workload and audit risks at a tolerable level.

This study contributes to the emerging literature on KAMs as well as to the literature examining practitioner views of changes in auditing regulation. It is, as far as we know, the first study to report survey evidence on how CPAs themselves perceive KAMs and the effects of KAMs on audit work in an European Union country context.

This study aims to identify the intellectual structure of expanded audit reporting (EAR), offers a quantitative summation of prominent themes, contributors and knowledge gaps and provides suggestions for further research.

This research uses various bibliometric techniques, including co-word and co-citation analysis for EAR science mapping, based on 123 papers from Scopus Database between 1991 and 2022.

The results show EAR research is focused on Audit Quality; Auditor Liability and Litigation; Communicative Value and Readability; Audit Fees; and Disclosure. Regarding EAR research, Brasel et al. (2016), article is the most cited paper, Bédard J. is the most cited author, Laval University is the most influential university, The Accounting Review is the most cited journal and USA is the leading country. Furthermore, the results show that in common law countries, in which shareholder rights and litigation risk is high, topics such as disclosure quality and audit litigation have been addressed more; and in civil legal system countries, which usually favor stakeholders’ rights, topics of gender diversity or corporate governance have been more studied.

This research has practical implications for standard setters and regulators, who can identify important, overlooked and emerging issues and consider them in future policies and standards.

This paper contributes to the literature by providing a more objective and comprehensive status of the accounting research on EAR, identifying the gaps in the literature and proposing a direction for future research to continue the discussion on the value-relevance of EAR to achieve more transparency and less audit expectation gap.

This rich descriptive study examines auditors' client risk assessment (i.e. “key audit matters”/critical audit matters) disclosures in expanded audit reports of 328 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies. The study compares auditor-identified client risks with corporate risk disclosures identified in audit committee reports, in terms of number and type of risks. The research also compares variation in auditor-identified client risks between individual Big 4 audit firms. In addition, the study examines auditor ranking of their client risks disclosed.

The study manually content analyses disclosures in audit reports and audit committee reports of a sample of 328 FTSE-350 companies with 2015 year-ends.

Audit committees identify more risks than auditors (23% more risks). However, auditor-identified client risks and audit-committee-identified risks are similar (80% similar), as are auditor-identified client risks between the individual Big 4 audit firms. Only ten (3%) audit reports rank the importance of auditor-identified client risks.

Sample is restricted to one year, one jurisdiction, large-listed companies and companies audited by Big 4 auditors.

The study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.

The paper mobilises institutional theory to interpret the findings. The findings suggest that auditor-identified client risks in expanded audit reports may demonstrate mimetic behaviour in terms of similarity with audit-committee-identified risks and similarity between individual Big 4 audit firms. The study provides important insights for regulators, auditors and users of financial statements by identifying influences on disclosure of auditor-identified client risks.

This study aims to investigate how external auditors properly classify the requirements of ISA 701 for key audit matters (KAM) compared with an emphasis of matter or other matters (EOM) in ISA 706 and going concern (GC) in ISAs 706 and 570. Such investigation is important to assess whether the explanatory matters included in ISAs 701, 706 and 570 are appropriate for external auditors so they can properly classify identified audit matters as either KAM, EOM or GC matters and considering the relationship among them.

The research used questionnaires sent to a sample of external auditors in five audit firms with international affiliations including two of the Big 4 audit firms. The Z-test for two proportions is conducted to assess whether external auditors were confused when interpreting the explanatory matters included in the ISAs.

The research suggests that the current ISA 701 explanations may not adequately help some auditors in their aim of properly identifying all KAM from among the different matters they reach during their audit. When classifying EOM and GC, most of the external auditors misclassified them as KAM.

This is a timely study. The results have implications for standard setters and regulators through revising the explanations included in the different audit reporting standards including ISA 701 and considering the relationships among them.

According to the authors’ knowledge, this study is considered among the first that surveyed the appropriateness of the explanations included in ISAs for KAM, EOM, GC and how auditors perceive such explanations when forming their opinion about their clients’ financial statements.

This paper aims to investigate how auditors’ characteristics affect key audit matters (KAMs) in the new audit report. It also provides an understanding of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on different audit reporting decisions and audit quality in specific industries.

The paper uses a survey based on actual audit case studies extracted from the management letters of clients in an audit firm with international affiliation to test the proposed hypotheses. Kruskal–Wallis and Mann–Whitney tests are conducted to analyze variance in responses among different groups of auditors regarding their selection of audit report sections required for each audit matter. The Wilcoxon signed rank test analyses difference in the auditors’ responses pre- and post-COVID-19 implications.

Most of the developed hypotheses were only partially accepted where industry specialization, professional qualifications of the auditors and the effects of COVID-19 had some effects on the ability of auditors to recognize and disclose KAMs. Auditor position is the most factor that significantly influenced the recognition of KAMs in the new audit report resulting in higher audit quality. This was specially the case with auditors specializing in manufacturing and financial institutions.

The current research illustrates that during the pandemic, auditors were more effective in recognizing KAMs compared to other audit matters, thus enhancing users’ confidence in both the audit and the financial reporting processes. The results are useful to regulators and auditors as they provide a better understanding of the factors that may impact communicating KAMs in the new audit report under COVID-19.

Using China’s key audit matters (KAMs) data, this study aims to examine whether negative press coverage alleviates boilerplate KAMs.

This study uses Levenshtein edit distance (LVD) to calculate the horizontal boilerplate of KAMs and investigates how boilerplate changes under different levels of the perceived legal risk.

The findings indicate that auditors of firms exposed to substantial negative press coverage will reduce the boilerplate of KAMs. This association is more significant for auditing firms with lower market share and client firms with higher financial distress. Additionally, the authors find that negative press coverage is more likely to alleviate the boilerplate disclosure of KAMs related to managers’ subjective estimation and material transactions and events. Furthermore, the association between negative press coverage and boilerplate KAMs varies with the source of negative news.

The findings suggest that upon exposure to negative press coverage, reducing the boilerplate of KAMs has a disclaimer effect for auditors.

This paper aims to ask whether the implementation of the expanded auditor’s report, which included a requirement to disclose key audit matters (KAMs) in Thailand since 2016, has improved audit quality.

To answer this question, the authors examined audit quality two years before and two years after its adoption by analysing 1,519 firm-year observations obtained from 312 companies. The authors applied logistic regression analyses to the firm-year observations.

The authors found some weak evidence that KAMs disclosure improved audit quality because of auditors putting more effort into their audits and audits being performed thoroughly after the implementation of KAMs. Interestingly, the number of disclosed KAMs and the most common types of disclosed KAMs are not associated with audit quality. Only disclosed KAMs related to acquisitions are more informative because the presence of this type of disclosed KAMs signals the greater likelihood of financial restatements being made in a later year.

Unlike previous studies on the impact of KAMs disclosure on audit quality, which used discretionary accruals as proxy for audit quality, this study used the occurrence of financial restatements.