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The purpose of the research is to study how Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) ownership, CEO’s structural and expertise power and underwriters’ reputation affect the initial public offering (IPO) lockup period.

The study uses the multivariate regression method to test the hypothesis on a sample of 1,071 US IPOs, which comprise 80 per cent of the total population of IPOs over the 1998-2002 period.

It was found that CEO equity ownership had a direct positive impact and two indicators of CEO positional power (CEO duality, founder status) and underwriter reputation had a direct negative impact on the length of the lockup period that results from IPO negotiations between the issuing firm and the underwriter. It was also found that underwriter reputation negatively moderates the impact of equity ownership (likely due to a substitution effect) and positively moderates the impact of CEO duality on lockup period length (by offsetting the impact of CEO positional power).

Previous studies have exclusively studied the affect of economic factors on IPO lockup. This paper extends the extant literature by studying the insider’s characteristics like CEO’s power and underwriter’s reputation on IPO lockup periods.

This paper seeks to investigate the roles of small and large projects in the development and evolution of a commercial company and why companies with a history of taking on large projects tend to eventually fail with large projects.

In terms of small and large projects, analytic models are established to: describe investors' behaviors; depict the dynamics between CEOs and their boards of directors; and reveal how profit ceilings exist for large projects.

After making the concepts of small and large projects precise, the paper establishes several analytic models for the investigation of the behaviors of various market participants. Then, it develops an explanation for why some decision makers like to take on large projects and why most new startups fail because of a lack of funds. A theory is given to show how investors value small projects more than large projects and why the current trend of moving manufacturing operations from industrialized nations to third world countries does not seem reversible in the foreseeable future, as long as international transportation costs stay low and the global economic system stays open and competitive. Among other results, it is also shown that: the higher the level the CEO's initial ability is, the more likely he would initiate and manage small projects, and the more labor effort he will devote to these projects; the CEO's additional effort spent on the small projects helps him gain non‐pecuniary benefits, which he can use to gain additional bargaining power over the board; to realistically maximize his private utility, the CEO would spend more of his time and effort on small projects; each large project has a glass ceiling for its maximum level of profits; companies taking on large projects cannot afford to devote much of their scarce resources to expand their market share and appearance; and to increase their profit potential, these companies have to control their spending so that their profit can be maximized by lowering their unit selling price p_s; for small projects, the profit potential for the company is unlimited.

This work is the first to employ models of human behaviors to research the interactions and dynamics between projects of different scales. It provides a theoretically reliable distinction between small and large projects.

The effect of corporate governance on firm performance has long been of great interest to financiers, economists, behavioural scientists, legal practitioners and business operators. Yet there is no consensus over what constitutes an effective corporate governance mechanism that induces agents or managers to consistently act in the interest of share value optimisation. The purpose of this study is to develop a model to resolve an on‐going issue in financial economics: how can CEOs be effectively monitored by the board of directors?

A survey of the literature on corporate governance and the relationship between board composition and financial performance leads to the development of the proposed model, which is based on a framework which takes into account the probability of success representing a CEO's ability, and the active monitoring function (which is represented by the numbers of control visits) carried‐out by the directors.

The design of the model is aimed at identifying an optimal level of monitoring, which will maximise share value, to guide internal and independent directors.

The model has limitations: it does not address the input of other directors and it focuses solely on the monitoring function, even though boards also play important roles in providing information and advice to management.

The finding of this study contributes to the Agency Theory debate, in essence that the board monitoring of CEO will improve the performance of the CEO and avoid possible conflict of interests.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance (CG) on chief executive officer compensation (CEO COMP) and pay–performance relationship (PPR) in Indian listed firms.

A sample of 196 companies listed on the S&P BSE 500 (Standard and Poor's Bombay Stock Exchange 500) Index has been analyzed using the panel (random effects) regression technique over the period 2010–2019. In addition, the system GMM technique was used to deal with the endogeneity issue.

The study found that block ownership and ownership concentration negatively impact COMP measures and PPR. Board size also had a negative direct and moderating impact on CEO COMP; however, the linkages were generally insignificant, especially for total pay. Similarly, outsider blockholders were found to be playing an insignificant role. Further, board independence positively influences COMP levels and PPR, though the results were mixed with respect to significance. Finally, CEO duality positively and significantly influences CEO COMP and PPR. A comparison before and after the new Indian Companies Act 2013 also revealed similar results, particularly in the after period. It suggests that the new legislative initiative was not effective enough in improving the CG and, hence, the alignment of pay with performance.

This study investigates the direct and moderating impact of CG on CEO COMP in the context of emerging economy India. Further, it makes a comparison before and after the introduction of the new governance reform, that is, the Indian Companies Act, 2013. Moreover, providing support to the entrenchment effect, the study reveals that large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth by not aligning CEO pay with performance, making agency problems graver in emerging economies like India.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between gender diversity and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) score/index. Specifically, the study describes extant research on theoretical perspectives, and the impact of women on corporate boards (WOBs) on carbon emission issues in the global perspective.

This study uses the carbon disclosure scores of the CDP from 2011 to 2013 (inclusive). A total observation for the three-year periods is 1,175 companies. However, based on data availability for the model, the sample size totals 331 companies in 33 countries with firms in 12 geographical locations. The authors used a model which is estimated using the fixed-effects estimator.

The outcomes of the study reveal that there is a positive relationship between gender diversity (WOB) and carbon disclosure information. In addition to establishing a relationship between CDP score and other control variables, this study also found a relationship with Board size, asset size, energy consumption and Tobin’s Q, which is common in the existing literature.

The limitations of the study mostly revolve around samples and the time period. To further test the generalizability and cross-sectional validity of the outcomes, it is suggested that the proposed framework be tested in more socially responsible firms.

There are increasing pressures for WOBs from diverse stakeholders, such as the European Commission, national governments, politicians, employer lobby groups, shareholders, Fortune and Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) rankings and best places for women to work lists. The study offers insights to policy makers implementing gender quota legislation.

The study has important implications for putting into practice good corporate governance and, in particular, gender diversity. The outcomes of the analyses advocate that companies that included women directors and had a smaller board size may expect to achieve a higher level of carbon emission performance and to voluntarily disclose the level of carbon information assessment requested by the CDP.

Develops an original 12‐step management of technology protocol and applies it to 51 applications which range from Du Pont’s failure in Nylon to the Single Online Trade Exchange for Auto Parts procurement by GM, Ford, Daimler‐Chrysler and Renault‐Nissan. Provides many case studies with regards to the adoption of technology and describes seven chief technology officer characteristics. Discusses common errors when companies invest in technology and considers the probabilities of success. Provides 175 questions and answers to reinforce the concepts introduced. States that this substantial journal is aimed primarily at the present and potential chief technology officer to assist their survival and success in national and international markets.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the crucial question of whether gender diversity in boardroom is associated with CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link.

The authors used the data of companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange for a sample consisting of KSE-100 index companies for the period of five years. The authors used the ordinary least square regression technique to test the developed hypotheses. The authors also used the two-step Heckman selection model, two-stage least square regression and propensity score matching method to control the problem of endogeneity.

The authors find reliable evidence of a negative association between gender diversity and CEO pay and of board gender diversity’s strengthening the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. The authors also find that women director are more effective in setting the optimal contract in non-family-owned firms and firms with dispersed ownership structure as compared to family-owned firms and firms with concentrated ownership structure. Moreover, results also reflect that the influence of board diversity on both CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link is stronger when gender diversity goes beyond tokenism.

The findings have implications in terms of providing the basis for policy makers to accord the same level of importance to gender diversity in the boardroom as well as contributing to the current debate on the desirability of mandating or recommending gender diversity on boardrooms.

This study is among the few studies which investigate the moderating role of boardroom gender diversity on the CEO pay-performance link. In addition, this study contributes to the institutional theory by providing the empirical evidence that the effect boardroom gender diversity on CEO pay and CEO pay-performance link varies by type of ownership.

The recent collapse of the corporate giant Steinhoff in South Africa (SA) has highlighted the risks of a dominant Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and an ineffective governing board. For this reason, the purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the influence of CEO power attributes and independent governing boards on the growth of a Johannesburg stock exchange-listed firm.

The purpose of this paper is to answer the research question “Under the monitoring role of the board, what CEO attributes, theoretically and in practice preeminent successful firm growth strategies?” This question was answered by examining 130 companies over six years using the econometric methodology of generalized least squares and ordinary least squares with the specific inclusion of generalized method of moments estimation due to its efficiency in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, amongst others. The proxies for CEO power are CEO tenure, turnover and professional skills as well as the explanatory variable of board vigilance. The response variable was firm growth.

This study found that CEO tenure is negatively correlated with firm growth indicating that long-tenured CEOs may stagnate the firm's growth. Furthermore, CEO turnover was positively correlated with firm growth indicating that a new CEO may bring innovative strategies that link to this study's finding on CEO tenure. The membership of CEOs to accounting professional bodies and board vigilance are also positively correlated to firm growth.

SA firms' growth policy does not solely depend on the neoclassical fundamental determinants of profitability, net worth, and cash flows. Since the value relevance of assessing CEO attributes as well as board vigilance in the SA market has proved to be very significant and will contribute to future decision making on growth strategies. This study innovatively illustrates the different drivers of firm growth, which is distinct from the normal macroeconomic indicators. The practical contribution of the study lies in the fact that organizations now discern which CEO attributes contribute to sustainability and profitability.

The current depressed economic environment has several negative implications for the citizens of SA. The rising unemployment levels and inflation has deteriorated living conditions. For the economy to recover, SA needs its listed companies to remain strong performers to protect stakeholder interests and attract investments. The people responsible for steering the companies through this difficult time are the CEOs with the governing board protecting the public interest. This study examines these two important constructs concerning firm growth.

This study uniquely used a firm growth variable as opposed to the multitude of studies that used firm performance variables. Furthermore, this study's robustness was bolstered by an extensive theoretical framework employed to examine the value of a CEO as a firm growth stimulator. The period of this study is also unique as it examines firms in the aftermath of the global recession of 2008. This study provides a fresh perspective on firm growth indicators and has key implications for policymakers, stakeholders and regulatory establishments.

The theory presented suggests that underwriters are both advisors and independent agents in the issuerʼs attempt to send “signals” of quality to investors by making pre-IPO organizational changes. These pre-IPO gambits are intended to increase IPO proceeds, and preemptively address potential investor concerns that would deter them from subscribing. These organizational changes initially can financially benefit founders, early investors and underwriters. But they can also have a longterm impact that some issuers, especially founders, would prefer to avoid. Utilizing signaling and resource-based power, we find that underwriter power is significantly associated with making pre-IPO gambits and lower levels of underpricing.

The upper-echelons model of Hambrick and Mason ((1984). Academy of Management Review, 9, 193–206) launched a new area of research and provided the first overall theoretical framework for use in understanding how the experiences, backgrounds, and values of senior executives in organizations can influence the decisions that they make. The model is typically assumed to be what Rousseau ((1985). In: B. M. Staw, & L. L. Cumming (Eds), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 7, pp. 1–37). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press) calls “multi-level,” as it describes how both individuals and top management teams (TMTs) make decisions in line with their preferences, biases, and values; the same model is applicable to both individuals and groups. However, the levels issues in the model have never been subjected to rigorous analysis. This chapter juxtaposes levels concepts and theories on the upper-echelons model, in an effort to highlight its strengths as well as its weaknesses. While the majority of researchers use the model to describe team-level decision making, the analysis presented here reveals that the model is inherently individual-level in focus, and several important limitations must be overcome before the model will provide a full explanation of team-level decision making.