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The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation, and to further explore in depth the impact of executive shareholding on corporate innovation under different industries.

This paper uses the panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample to empirically study the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation based on multiple linear regression models and panel fixed effects.

The research shows that: on the whole, the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation presents an inverted “U” shape; institutional investors will negatively regulate the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation; the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation will show obvious industry differences in different industries.

The empirical results not only enrich the research on the effects of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice, but also provide targeted experience for promoting enterprise innovation. Due to the limitations of innovation indicators and industry sample selection, it is necessary to be cautious when extending the results to other fields.

Enterprises should fully consider the impact of executive shareholding on innovation and formulate a scientific executive incentive system according to the differences of their industries. The government should be aware of the important role of institutional investors in enterprises, improve the channels and ways for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, and improve the basic system of capital markets.

On the one hand, this paper empirically tests the regulatory role of institutional investors' shareholding and the relationship between executive shareholding and enterprise innovation, which enriches the research on the effect of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice. On the other hand, the research by industry is more targeted to provide experience for promoting enterprise innovation.

This paper discusses whether institutional investors change the shareholding ratio of listed companies through research meeting, and whether this active investment mode can really improve the investment efficiency of institutional investors.

Using empirical research method, this study designs and conducts an empirical research according to empirical research's basic norms. Thus, we acquire needed and credible empirical data. This study analyzes whether institutional investors seek their private interest in researched companies by analyzing their research meetings and the shareholding ratios of different types of institutional investors using Shenzhen Stock Exchange data on listed firms from 2014 to 2018.

This study finds that the research meetings of institutional investors provide participants with reliable information which supports the decision of institutional investors to change their shareholding ratio. The stock price growth rate strengthens the positive correlation between the research meetings of institutional investors and the shareholding ratio of institutional investors. Additionally, transactional institutional investors increase the shareholding ratio, while holding institutional investors do not.

This paper combines the behavior of institutional investors with the holding status of institutional investors, and discusses the impact of institutional investors' behavior on investment decisions. At the same time, it classifies the institutional investors and discusses the attitude of different types of institutional investors towards this active investment mode.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings and leverage manipulation and the moderating effects of internal and external supervision.

The authors draw on a sample of Chinese non-financial A-share-listed firms from 2013 to 2020 to explore the effect of ESG ratings on leverage manipulation. Robustness and endogeneity tests confirm the validity of the regression results.

ESG ratings inhibit leverage manipulation by improving social reputation, information transparency and financing constraints. This effect is weakened by internal supervision, captured by the ratio of institutional investor ownership, and strengthened by external supervision, captured by the level of marketization. The effect is stronger in non-state-owned firms and firms in non-polluting industries. The governance dimension of ESG exhibits the strongest effect, with comprehensive environmental governance ratings and social governance ratings also suppressing leverage manipulation.

Firms should strive to cultivate environmental awareness, fulfil their social responsibilities and enhance internal governance, which may help to strengthen the firm’s sustainability orientation, mitigate opportunistic behaviours and ultimately contribute to high-quality firm development. The top managers of firms should exercise self-restraint and take the initiative to reduce leverage manipulation by establishing an appropriate governance structure and sustainable business operation system that incorporate environmental and social governance in addition to general governance.

Policymakers and regulators should formulate unified guidelines with comprehensive criteria to improve the scope and quality of ESG information disclosure and provide specific guidance on ESG practice for firms. Investors should incorporate ESG ratings into their investment decision framework to lower their portfolio risk.

This study contributes to the literature in four ways. Firstly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is among the first to show that high ESG ratings may mitigate firms’ opportunistic behaviours. Secondly, it identifies the governance factor of leverage manipulation from the perspective of firms’ subjective sustainability orientation. Thirdly, it demonstrates that the relationship between ESG ratings and leverage manipulation varies with the level of internal and external supervision. Finally, it highlights the importance of governance in guaranteeing the other two dimensions’ roles by decomposing overall ESG.

The authors empirically investigate the impact of the existence of a stand-alone risk committee (RC) and its characteristics on the likelihood of stock price crash risk in listed financial firms on the Bursa Malaysia. The authors also test whether the effect of RC on crash risk is attenuating or amplifying by the level of institutional ownership.

The authors use a principal components analysis (PCA) to aggregate and derive a factor score for risk committee characteristics (i.e. independence, qualification, and size) as a proxy for the effectiveness of RC. The study also employs two distinct stock price crash risk measurements to corroborate the findings and partition institutional ownership into dedicated and transient to examine the potential impact of institutional shareholding on RC-stock price crash risk association.

Regression analysis reveals that only RC qualification has a significant negative impact on stock price crash risk. However, when RC characteristics are aggregated into one composite factor, the authors find that firms with effective RCs exhibit lower risk of stock price crash. The authors also find that firms with high level of institutional shareholdings and effective RCs are less likely to experience crash risk likelihood. The additional analyses indicate that the complementary moderating effect of institutional ownership on RC-crash risk nexus is likely to be driven by dedicated institutional ownership. The results are robust across two measures of stock price crash risk and regression specifications for a longer run window.

The study, to the best of the researchers' knowledge, is the first to provide evidence in an emerging market financial sector companies' perspective suggesting that effective RCs are individually and aggregately associated with lower stock price crash risk, which is further strengthened by dedicated institutional investors. These findings are unique and contribute to a small but growing body of literature documenting the need for effective RCs and specific institutional investors and their consequences of improvements in stock price crash risk environment. Results of our research in this area provide important insights to financial and capital market participants, investors, regulators, and policymakers in Malaysia.

Common institutional ownership is a phenomenon that has extended throughout the capital markets in recent years and has a significant impact on business strategy decisions. The study intends to investigate the effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization and potential functioning mechanisms.

Using panel data from Chinese-listed companies over the period of 2003–2021, the authors conduct regression models which controlled year-, industry- and regional fixed effects to explore the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization.

This study concludes that corporate over-financialization may be prevented via common institutional ownership. The mechanism test suggests that common institutional ownership inhibits corporate over-financialization by improving internal control quality and enhancing financial flexibility. Besides, heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibiting effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization is more pronounced in stability-oriented institutional investors and high financing constraints firms.

This paper makes a valuable contribution to the current studies on effective strategies to prevent enterprises from becoming overly financialized by recognizing common institutional ownership. Furthermore, this paper adds to the research on common institutional ownership’s economic consequences. Finally, this study provides management implications for how to optimize corporate governance structures, curb the financialization of entities in practice and promote the development of the real economy.

This study focuses on listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. It found that an increase in the ownership proportion of institutional investors (INs), including foreign investors, investment trusts, and dealers can enhance the informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between these factors follows an inverted U-shaped pattern, indicating that excessively high ownership ratios can actually lead to a decrease in the informativeness of stock prices. Additionally, increasing the ownership proportions of foreign investors and investment trusts can reduce the risk of stock price collapse, while dealers show no significant relationship in this regard. This study also reveals that the technical variable of the price deviation rate is an important explanatory factor for post-collapse returns. It is positively correlated with the magnitude of the price decline after a collapse, meaning that stocks with weaker pre-collapse performance experience larger post-collapse declines. When the data during the 2020 pandemic period are excluded, changes in foreign ownership ratios show a significant positive correlation with postcrash returns in both the long and short term. The significant correlation in the short term may be due to a high proportion of foreign ownership. Any reduction in this could put pressure on stock prices, and retail investors may follow suit and sell-off, using foreign investors as a reference. The significant correlation in the long term might be due to foreign investors themselves possibly also trying to avoid the pressure that their own short-term sell-offs could exert on stock prices. The changes in the ownership ratios of investment trusts and dealers indicate that medium and long-term changes have a significant impact on postcrash returns, while the changes in the major players' ownership show no significant correlation. When data from 2020 are included in the analysis, the significance of all INs decreases.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between earnings quality and corporate cash holdings in an emerging economy. Existing literature posits that earnings quality is a result of information asymmetry and firms with lower earnings quality increases cash holdings, to shield the firm from future uncertainties. In this paper, the authors propose a ‘private benefits hypothesis’, which suggests that lower earnings quality is an indicator of opportunism and expropriation of resources in the firm, through tunneling or excessive executive compensations. As a result, firms with lower earnings quality increase cash holdings in their control, to increase their private benefits and to avoid the scrutiny of the external stakeholders. The authors further examine the monitoring role played by institutional investors on cash holdings, with varying degrees of earnings quality.

This study uses an unbalanced panel data sourced from Prowessdx, from 2000 to 2019. The analysis employs 20,231 firm-year observations from 2,421 firms. Earnings quality is calculated following Dechow and Dichev (2002).

Empirical analysis confirms that the firms with higher earnings quality reduce cash. Further, institutional investors reduce the cash holdings in firms with higher earnings quality. Institutional investors effectively reduce the cash only in firms with at least 10% of equity shareholding. The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings quality and endogeneity concerns.

This study diverges from the information asymmetry hypothesis in the existing literature on earnings quality and cash holdings and highlights the underlying private benefits hypothesis, that will impact cash holdings. Next, the 10% institutional shareholding is important in the Indian context as it represents the minimum threshold at which block holders can request extraordinary general meetings (Section 100 of the Companies Act 2013) or the involvement of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) (Section 213 of the Companies Act 2013). This study highlights that unlike in Anglo-Saxon economies, institutional investors or other minority shareholders are empowered by the Companies Act 2013 to play a vital role in corporate governance with a mere 10% equity.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether financial institutions, which are highly regulated entities, experience fewer sanctions and have lower penalties (mandatory and regulatory) if they have better corporate governance performance (voluntary).

This study uses unique corporate governance data endorsed by the authorities and sanction information for financial institutions in Taiwan from 2014 to 2020 to examine whether regulatory compliance is associated with corporate governance for financial institutions. This study also examines the moderating effects of shareholding concentration, governmental shareholding and foreign institution shareholding on this relationship.

The positive association between compliance and governance is found. In addition, partial results show that the positive relationship is less profound when the shareholder concentration is higher and more profound when government shareholdings are higher.

The findings of this study support the premise that a well-structured, non-mandatory corporate governance evaluation mechanism, that is actively established and monitored by the appropriate authorities, may influence the compliance performance of financial institutions which is mandatory and minimum social requirements.

This study aims to examine the effects of local tournament incentives on environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure and the quality of such disclosures among Chinese A-share listed companies. Furthermore, it seeks to investigate the moderating roles of CEO duality, institutional investors’ shareholding and product market competition in this relationship.

This study uses a quantitative approach, and data from A-share listed companies in China spanning from 2012 to 2021. To test the proposed hypotheses, the authors conduct hierarchical regression analysis along with a series of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our findings.

The findings of this study indicate that local tournament incentives have a positive impact on companies’ propensity to disclose ESG information, yet they negatively influence the quality of these disclosures. Additionally, the presence of CEO duality and product market competition attenuate this relationship, whereas the shareholding of institutional investors serves to strengthen it.

This study’s findings can aid policymakers and regulators in China and other emerging economies in policies that promote high-quality ESG information disclosure, taking into account local tournament incentives. Furthermore, the study underscores the importance of maintaining robust corporate governance structures within firms to ensure that CEOs’ self-serving motivations do not undermine ESG disclosure.

This study adds to the ongoing discourse on the significance of ESG disclosure in emerging economies by analyzing the influence of executive promotion incentives on ESG disclosure from an external labor market standpoint. By exploring the potential self-serving motivations of CEOs in promoting ESG values and practices within organizations, this paper addresses a gap in the existing literature.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between tax avoidance and earnings persistence in the light of a developing economy, with the main focus on China.

In the analysis, the author conducts a survey on the tax avoidance situation of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2020. Then, a multivariate regression analysis is performed in order to analyse the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and earnings persistence.

The findings of the present study show that tax avoidance has a significant positive effect on earnings persistence. However, when the degree of tax avoidance is high, the “risk effect” of tax avoidance exceeds the “value effect”, and tax avoidance will reduce the persistence of earnings. This conclusion is even more prominent when the company is non-state-owned. Further research shows the increase of institutional investors’ shareholding ratio can improve “value effect” of tax avoidance, lessen “risk effect” of tax avoidance, and positively affect the relationship between tax avoidance and earnings persistence.

This study provides evidence for investors to understand the dual effect of tax avoidance on earnings persistence. The results may have implications for regulatory bodies. They can provide a better understanding of the corporate governance role of institutional investors in curbing opportunistic tax avoidance.

This study enriches the research on tax avoidance effects by analysing the impact of tax avoidance on earnings persistence. This study also compensates for the shortcomings of analysing earnings persistence mainly from the perspective of tax differences in the past, and promotes the study of the corporate governance effects of institutional investors under different levels of tax avoidance.