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Following the traditions of stakeholder salience theory, this paper aims to contend that some institutional investor activists and tactics have more power, legitimacy and urgency than others.

The author undertakes an empirical test of a saliency table looking at the effects of institutional investor heterogeneity on portfolio firm responses using ordinal logistic regression.

This study found heterogeneity for institutional investor type to drive firm responses but not tactic type raising the importance of the attributes of each type of investor activist. The author found a rank ordering of public pension plans, hedge funds and then private multiemployer funds in saliency to portfolio firms. In addition, the use of proxy-based tactics did not help or hurt each investor type. Both findings challenge prior empirical work.

The rank ordering based upon the heterogeneity of institutional investor activists and their tactical interactions are tested providing empirical evidence of the most influential activist investors and tactics in one study, which is rare in the literature.

This study investigates the economic outcomes of the strategic deviation (SD), the fundamental and crucial question in institutional theory and strategic management. Previous studies have yielded contradictory findings. This study reconciles conflicting results by distinguishing the effects of the SD on financial and market performance, examining the mechanism of financing constraints and the boundary condition of institutional investor heterogeneity.

This research collected data from Chinese A-shares listed manufacturing firms from 2009 to 2021 from the CSMAR and Wind databases. This study conducted empirical tests using OLS models with Stata 15.

Empirical results demonstrate that the SD has different impacts on different dimensions of performance. The SD negatively impacts financial performance while positively impacts market performance. Financing constraints mediate the main effects. Moreover, transactional institutional investors positively moderate the negative effect of the SD on financial performance, whereas stable institutional investors negatively moderate the positive effect of the SD on market performance.

By systematically revealing how the SD has different effects on financial and market performance, this study reconciles the debate on the SD between institutional theorists and strategy scholars. This research makes contributions to the research stream by providing reasonable explanations for conflicting conclusions. Furthermore, by introducing the overlooked perspective of financing constraints, this research identifies crucial mediating mechanisms and highlights the double-edged effect of financing constraints, enriching our understanding of financing constraints. Finally, this study investigates the moderating effects of institutional investor heterogeneity, thereby making valuable contributions to the comprehension of boundary conditions.

Purpose – Study the impact of the heterogeneity of institutional investors, evident in their investment horizon, on firm credit ratings.

Methodology/approach – Use a large sample of U.S. firms over the period from 1985 to 2006 (20,670 U.S. firm-year observations) to empirically investigate the relationship between institutional investment horizon and firm credit ratings. Test whether institutional investors with long-term investment horizon are associated with important monitoring and informational roles and thus higher credit ratings.

Findings – Stable shareholdings and relationship investing of institutional investors contribute to their monitoring and informational roles and result in higher firm credit ratings. Namely, ownership stakes of long-term institutional investors are associated with higher firm credit ratings than those of short-term institutional investors. In addition, the predominance and number of institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon affect firm's agency costs and information quality.

Social implications – Institutional monitoring incentives seem to be susceptible to the heterogeneity of institutional investors. The results point to the benefits of the long-term investment horizon of institutional investors (beyond their shareholdings) that seem to be associated with more efficient monitoring and thus reduced managerial myopia and opportunism.

Originality/value of the chapter – This is the first work to provide evidence on the extent to which the heterogeneity of institutional investors, evident in their investment horizon, alters firm's credit ratings.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

Although investigating the factors influencing technological diversification is essential to understanding research and development (R&D) strategies, studies from the perspective of corporate ownership structure are limited. This study examines the effect of heterogeneous institutional investors on technological diversification strategies.

The sample consists of 33,124 firm-year observations of USA manufacturing firms from 1981 to 2008. Data were extracted from US Patent Data, Thomson Reuters' 13f and the Compustat database. A panel regression analysis was used to test the hypothesis. Moreover, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach using instrumental variables (IVs) and generalized method of moments (GMM) were also applied to address the endogeneity issue.

The empirical findings indicate that short-term (long-term) institutional investors positively (negatively) affect technological diversification. That is, short-term institutional ownership hampers R&D diversification, suggesting that firms are forced to make myopic investments to meet short-term goals instead of diversifying corporate R&D projects. Meanwhile, long-term institutional ownership enhances technological diversification to achieve long-term value.

By differentiating between institutional investment horizons, the authors produce empirical evidence that institutional investors with short-term and long-term perspectives have different views on technological diversification. This study is based on data between 1981 and 2008, due primarily to patent data availability and data on institutional investors. However, this limitation does not diminish the importance of the empirical findings, as the study's focus is on discovering antecedent evidence of corporate technological diversification rather than addressing recent trends in firm decisions.

In finding that long-term institutional investors are likely to encourage technological diversification at firms, the paper carries an important practical implication that can help inform decision-making by policymakers and investors.

This research contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of institutional investors' role in technological diversification strategies. Additionally, by challenging the assumption that all institutional owners share the same perspective, this study is the first to confirm the existence of heterogeneous effects of institutional investors on technological diversification strategies.

The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation, and to further explore in depth the impact of executive shareholding on corporate innovation under different industries.

This paper uses the panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample to empirically study the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation based on multiple linear regression models and panel fixed effects.

The research shows that: on the whole, the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation presents an inverted “U” shape; institutional investors will negatively regulate the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation; the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation will show obvious industry differences in different industries.

The empirical results not only enrich the research on the effects of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice, but also provide targeted experience for promoting enterprise innovation. Due to the limitations of innovation indicators and industry sample selection, it is necessary to be cautious when extending the results to other fields.

Enterprises should fully consider the impact of executive shareholding on innovation and formulate a scientific executive incentive system according to the differences of their industries. The government should be aware of the important role of institutional investors in enterprises, improve the channels and ways for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, and improve the basic system of capital markets.

On the one hand, this paper empirically tests the regulatory role of institutional investors' shareholding and the relationship between executive shareholding and enterprise innovation, which enriches the research on the effect of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice. On the other hand, the research by industry is more targeted to provide experience for promoting enterprise innovation.

The purpose of this paper is to look at the association between different ownership categories and corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending of selected Indian firms.

Random-effects Tobit panel regression is performed on a panel of 4,388 firm years of 1,722 unique firms over a three-year period (2014-2016).

Different categories of institutional investors have different preferences for CSR spending of a firm. Promoters of business-group affiliated and unaffiliated firms also behave differently towards CSR activities of their firms.

Heterogeneous behavior of institutional investors is revealed through the study. Foreign institutions and domestic banks are supportive of CSR investments of a firm. Promoters of family firms and group affiliates also diligently plan CSR activities.

Managers cannot ignore the heterogeneities of institutional investors in their investment decisions. Individual investors can align their philanthropic preferences with those of different types of institutional investors or firms.

Family-owned firms play a significant role in CSR activities of emerging economies, while individual promoters are not as attracted by the reputational prospects of CSR.

This paper considers the role of heterogeneities of institutional investors in influencing CSR spending of emerging-economy firms. This heterogeneity has not been previously studied in this context.

This paper aims to examine the monitoring role of institutional investors in corporate decision-making by classifying financial institutions based on geographical proximity and investment horizon from 1980 to 2014.

By using unique data sets on firm and institution location and investor horizon measure (Gaspar et al., 2005), the authors categorize institutional investors into six proximity-horizon classifications. This method captures the heterogeneity of investors. The corporate decisions assessed include firm investment, financing, payout policy, misbehavior, takeover defenses and profitability.

Both geographical proximity and investment horizon are directly related to institutional investors' monitoring cost. As a result, the effectiveness of institutional monitoring may vary based on geographical proximity and investment horizon. This paper collectively examines both dimensions of financial institutions and provides evidence that institutional investors present different preferences for corporate policies. Given stronger information advantage, both local and nonlocal investors that are long-term oriented fulfill better roles in monitoring corporate decisions but from different perspectives.

Different from previous studies that treat institutional investors homogeneously, this paper provides empirical support that investors are indeed different in influencing firm policies.

To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study that classifies investors based on two dimensions, geographical proximity and investment horizon, and examines their joint effects on corporate policies. This proximity-horizon classification allows the authors to better disentangle the effects of institutional ownership structure on the monitoring outcomes.

This paper examines how the board of directors' attributes in terms of educational and professional backgrounds –that is board capital-, and demographics influence institutional ownership across listed companies in Latin America.

Based on unique hand-collected information of directors' educational and professional attributes across 427 firms in Latin America, the authors analyze the effects of directors' educational attainment, professional experience and demographic diversification on institutional investors' holdings.

Results show that grey investor ownership favors directors with graduate studies and diverse boards regarding gender and nationality. Independent investors value the directors' professional experience like former founders of a firm. Grey investors are more concerned with firm corporate governance mechanisms, consistent with the agency view. In contrast, independent institutional investors focus on business opportunities following the board of directors' resource-based view.

This study shows that board capital becomes a key determinant for institutional ownership in emerging markets.

This study extends previous literature on institutional investor preferences by providing empirical evidence that firm board capital becomes a collective asset that is central for institutional investors' investment choices for an emerging market case.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the audit pricing literature by examining whether institutional investors and political connection are associated with higher audit fees.

Both descriptive and multivariate analyses are employed to address the research objectives. In addition, the authors use panel data to control for both heterocedasticity and contemporaneous correlations in each cross‐section.

Based on a panel analysis of 390 Malaysian firms from 1999 to 2003, a positive relationship between institutional ownership and audit fees is found, although the economic impact is minimal. Further, the authors find that audit fees are higher for politically connected firms.

A thorough examination on the role of political connection is much warranted to provide a better understanding on such connection influences the audit market.

This paper provides an alternative view on the role of political connection, and on how they influence the audit market.