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Peacebuilding is often premised on international intervention in post-conflict situations. This epilogue extends the concept to address preventative peacebuilding in pre-conflict societies. Social movement organizations that spring from democratically oriented movements can either reproduce dominant and dominating leadership styles, or they can cultivate democratizing leadership (Klein, 2016) by developing democratic practices, structures, and cultures within and between organizations. Democratizing leadership promotes leadership as a verb more than a noun: as the operation of power in relationship between people, rather than as positional power grounded in an authority figure. In democratizing leadership, democratic decision-making is preceded by the development of individual and collective voice and followed by responsible collective action. In addition to these processes, democratic values are also essential, including: freedom (differentiated from autonomy), justice (procedural, social, and restorative justice), and equity (more than equality), which underlie structural processes and inform practices. When social movement organizations find creative tension between ad hoc leadership and the tendency toward bureaucratization, they can cultivate a democratic culture through organizational practices and structures for preventative peacebuilding work. Leadership in such organizations recognizes and utilizes creative conflict to sustain agonistic pluralism and promote conflictual consensus (Mouffe, 2013). This epilogue provides examples of democratizing leadership from social movement organizations, including: In the Heart of the Beast Theater, Minnesota Alliance of Peacemakers, Neighborhood Leadership Program, and the Higher Education Consortium for Urban Affairs, that illustrate how democratizing leadership can be developed in pre-conflict preventative peacebuilding organizations by integrating democratic practices, structures, and cultures.

The importance of the security-political strategies of Africa's subregional organisations was accentuated in 2002 with the launching of the African Union's Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), which will include, among other things, the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System and an African Standby Force. From that point on, subregional organisations were to be the building blocks of an all-African approach to security politics. The strategies of these organisations range from the top-down approach of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the bottom-up approach of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Taking into account the particular characteristics of Africa's regional conflicts, this article examines the relevance for the CADSP of the approaches to conflict prevention and resolution of the latter two organisations. It analyses, first, the challenges facing the African Standby Force through an examination of ECOWAS's security-political strategy, and, second, the challenges facing the Continental Early Warning System through a look at IGAD's strategies. It suggests that two main issues are of critical relevance for the success of the CADSP. First is the lack of compatibility between the all-African strategy and the strategies of the various subregional organisations. Second is the lack of compatibility between formal processes of integration and trans-state regionalism within the continent. Although formal processes of integration are important, informal processes often play a much stronger role, undermining much of the progress made by the formal processes.

The 2006 General Assembly adoption of the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-terrorism strategy marked the first time all member states ratified a collective counter-terrorism (CT) agenda. Building on the 2000 Millennium Development Goals, the strategy incorporated Amartya Sen's capability-based approach to development. This promised human-oriented and holistic methods for countering terrorism and violent extremism, in contrast to the post-2001 ‘hard security’ context of the United States–led Global War on Terror (GWOT). Although the first pillar of the strategy emphasised human rights and social progress over isolated economic growth, poverty, violence and retrogression in conflict zones since 2006 have led to the deaths of millions. Combined with resource scarcity and environmental devastation, insurgency-related conflicts have resulted in 70 million people displaced worldwide in 2019, while the politically violent phenomena of extreme right-wing nationalism and neo-jihadism remain prevalent. Reflecting on the social and economic outcomes of the GWOT, this chapter evaluates development-related discourses and activity in UN-led initiatives to counter and prevent violent extremism and terrorism. In doing so, it accounts for the impacts of UN CT measures on contemporary patterns ‘in phenomena described in policy arenas as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, including ‘neo-jihadism’ and right-wing extremism, in Global North and Global South contexts.

Thomas E. Boudreau graduated Phi Beta Kappa, summa cum laude from Boston College. He completed his PhD in the Social Science Program in 1985 at the Maxwell School of Citizen and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. While at the Maxwell School, Boudreau was the research assistant for Donald T. Campbell, the Schweitzer Chair of the Humanities at Syracuse University. He also worked as Project Director of the Crisis Management and United Nations Research Projects at the Carnegie Council in New York City. He taught at the School of International Service at American University and the University of Pennsylvania before coming back to the Maxwell School where he currently teaches in the Political Science Department. He is also a research fellow at the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, MA, where he has specialized in issues of global governance, global climate change, and nonproliferation. Boudreau has written two books: Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary-General and the Prevention of International Conflict and Universitas: The Social Restructuring of Undergraduate Education in the United States. He is currently working on a third book, The Law of Nations: Legal Order in a Violent World. He has a special interest in interdisciplinary inquiry, especially competing epistemologies and how they contribute to interpersonal, intergroup, and international conflict.

Structural violence (SV) is related to the uneven distribution of resources which then leads to social exclusion and marginalisation of people. Johan Galtung (1969) also refers to it as social injustice and it is characterised by unequal access to education, health, water, food, shelter and other basic services. SV manifests itself through different forms of exclusion supported through both public and private institutions. Without support to address economic and educational opportunities, Zimbabwean youth continue to experience SV and high levels of social inequality (Chimucheka, 2012). Conflict transformation (CT) can help address SV since it provides processes and ways to build something desired thus altering the manifestation of the conflict (Waldman, 2009). CT involves action between parties that leads to both social change and justice (M. Evans, 2016). Social entrepreneurship (SE) can be used as a CT tool because it (i) identifies an unjust equilibrium that perpetuates exclusion and marginalisation, (ii) identifies opportunities and innovatively challenges the status quo to add social value and (iii) provides a better future for the marginalised communities through creating a new and stable alternative equilibrium (Baporikar, 2016). This chapter discusses the SV transformation model which the author tested to address the disparities faced by youth in an urban area in Zimbabwe. The action research, which took place between January and May 2017, was carried out in combination with capacity building, social support systems and community participation to address some of the SV indicators prevalent in the community. Whilst SE showed great potential in tackling SV in the community study, findings also reveal contestations between theory and practice. Some of the barriers identified in the field include the community’s failure to self-organise, lack of financial resources and buy-in from the local government. Future research could test the model in multiple settings and over longer periods to see its effectiveness.

Purpose: National business groups in conflict countries may mitigate the civil war or do the converse. When the economy is mainly point-sourced, which means it mainly exports mineral-based products and/or narcotics, the business community (apart from small-businesses associated with services) is likely to be more pro-war, particularly, if the other side may gain control of the lootable commodities, as in secessionist wars. This tendency will be reinforced the closer are business and political ties, shorter the time horizons are and more difficult it is to make credible commitments to peace. If the economy exports mainly agricultural products excluding those mentioned above or manufactures (diffuse or manufacturing) the commercial case for peace is stronger because of the diffused nature of the core business activity. Even so, there will be some groups who profit from war contracts and arms deals. The peace lobby is likely to dominate in societies where business and political actors are more sharply separated, as well as in countries that have longer time horizons and better institutions of commitment. The pro-peace business lobby may have a stronger case in secessionist wars compared to rebellions, as the former are more likely to be longer and more intractable to purely military solutions.

As Africa strives to catch up with the rest of the world at the economic, political and sociocultural fronts, there is an increasing coalescence around the need for backward integration and the revival of traditional business management practices as enablers in the global war for economic dominance. Unfortunately, a significant consequence of colonial rule was the systematic denigration and portrayal of traditional African institutions and knowledge systems as inferior to those of the West. Although the negative depiction of the African worldview has been extensively challenged in the academy, changes in their perception and adoption have remained slow. The ‘Igbo Apprenticeship System’ (IAS), widely recognised as the largest business incubator platform in the world today, is a great testament to the sophistication and resilience of indigenous African business models and the need to scale up their impact as a strategic step towards the economic emancipation of the continent. However, one fundamental aspect of IAS's success story that is hardly ever mentioned in the extant literature is its approach to conflict management. Understandably, business by its nature is competitive and conflict-prone. Nonetheless, the Igbos appear to have successfully managed different types of conflicts associated with their traditional business model without recourse to western methods or processes. Using a conceptual approach, this chapter attempts to examine the efficacy of the conflict transformation mechanisms in the ‘Igbo Traditional Business School’ (I-TBS) against the background of emerging challenges in the twenty-first-century business environments in Africa and around the world. From the prism of the Conflict Transformation Theory, the chapter argues that I-TBS can serve as a vehicle for the economic growth of the continent, but it must be prepared to deal with ‘new’ conflicts and demands arising from within and outside of its ecosystem.