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Collaborative emission reduction among supply chain members has emerged as a new trend to achieve climate neutrality goals and meet consumers’ low-carbon preferences. However, carbon information asymmetry and consumer mistrust represent significant obstacles. This paper investigates the value of blockchain technology (BCT) in solving the above issues.

A low-carbon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer is examined. This study discusses three scenarios: non-adoption BCT, adoption BCT without sharing the supplier’s carbon emission reduction (CER) information and adoption BCT with sharing the supplier’s CER information. We analyze the optimal decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer through the Stackelberg game, identify the conditions in which the supplier and manufacturer adopt BCT and share information from the perspectives of economic and environmental performance.

The results show that adopting BCT benefits supply chain members, even if they do not share CER information through BCT. Furthermore, when the supplier’s CER efficiency is low, the manufacturer prefers that the supplier share this information. Counterintuitively, the supplier will only share CER information through BCT when the CER efficiencies of both the supplier and manufacturer are comparable. This diverges from the findings of existing studies, as the CER investments of the supplier and the manufacturer in this study are interdependent. In addition, despite the high energy consumption associated with BCT, the supplier and manufacturer embrace its adoption and share CER information for the sake of environmental benefits.

The firms in low-carbon supply chains can adopt BCT to improve consumers’ trust. Furthermore, if the CER efficiencies of the firms are low, they should share CER information through BCT. Nonetheless, a lower unit usage cost of BCT is the precondition.

This paper makes the first move to discuss BCT adoption and BCT-supported information sharing for collaborative emission reduction in supply chains while considering the transparency and high consumption of BCT.

This paper's purpose is to suggest that manufacturers strategically place soft orders for assembly materials with suppliers in Silk Road Economic Belt countries who probably doubt the realization of the soft orders placed.

First, a two-stage Stackelberg competition is constructed, taking into account the supplier's trust level in formulating the decision process in the assembly supply chain. The authors then provide a buyback contract to coordinate the supply chain, in which the manufacturer obtains enough supplies by sharing some of the perceived risks of not fully trusted suppliers. Furthermore, the authors conduct a numerical study to investigate the influence of trust under a decentralized case and a buyback contract.

The authors found that all supply chain partners in Silk Road Economic Belt countries experience potential losses due to not fully trusting certain conditions. The study also shows that, in Silk Road Economic Belt countries, operating under a buyback contract is better than being without one in terms of assembly supply chain performance.

On the one hand, the authors only consider the asymmetry of demand information without considering that of cost structure information. On the other hand, a natural extension of the paper is to integrate single-period transactions into the multi-period transaction problem setting. As all these issues require substantial effort, the authors reserve them for future exploration.

Doing business with not-fully-trustworthy partners in Silk Road Economic Belt countries is risky, and this study reveals how trust works in global cooperation and with strategic reactions in situations of partial trust.