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The study of cause lawyers has focused heavily on the private sector, but both public and private attorneys bring voting rights litigation. This chapter first situates voting rights litigation within cause lawyering, as described by Scheingold and Sarat. It then suggests criteria for analyzing cause lawyering across public and private sectors and applies them to the attorneys who have done the majority of voting rights litigation for American Indians: The Voting Section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division and the Voting Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union. The chapter suggests that the public and private attorneys are more similar than one might expect in their motivation, relationship to clients, and range of political strategies used. Their organizational practice sites differ greatly, but the dynamics of the public practice site confirm that Voting Section attorneys are cause lawyers.

Handler's genealogy of postmodernism recounted in his address recognizes its origin in aesthetic disciplines and its somewhat viral transcription into social jurisprudence: “the postmodern concept of subversion developed first in language and literary theory, art, and architecture and then spread into politics and law” (1992a, p. 698). Although Handler's rejection of deconstruction stems from what he sees to be its political quiescence, its association with aesthetic critiques of modernism haunts his claims as one source of its essential conservatism. Aesthetic values, he implies, remain distant or distinct from pressing issues of political and social inequality.

Scholars increasingly recognize the centrality of legal ideas and language to the political vision that inspires American conservatism. However, relevant studies have been limited to the discursive practices that motivate conservative activism at the grass-root level. Exploration of the legal discourses employed by prominent public officials thus carries significant scholarly potential. For example, this chapter's investigation of President Ronald Reagan reveals that his political vision was suffused with legal discourse. Reagan's legal discourse, moreover, has exerted constitutive effects both on American conservatism and on the form and substance of a great deal of contemporary American public policy.

Since its emergence as a field of study, law and society scholarship has grown to encompass an array of disciplines, perspectives, methods, and political orientations. A consequence of this disciplinary hypostatization has been to produce a scholarly goulash which, while at times nourishing, now faces the dual dangers of institutional fracture and intellectual incoherence. The aim of this essay is to map a way to embrace the eclecticism that characterizes the field and yet avoid the dangers of dilettantism and to cultivate the interdisciplinarity its founders envisioned without sacrificing a sense of shared purpose or abandoning the possibility of collectively producing a better understanding of law.

Undergraduate legal studies classrooms are ideal places in which to engage discourses on judging, and to invite students to analyze and understand contemporary cultural and political representations of the proper roles of judges and judging in democracies. This chapter examines undergraduate understandings of judicial independence and judicial activism, via class discussions surrounding the judicial retention election in Iowa in 2010. The election was occasioned by the groundbreaking state supreme court case Varnum et al. v. Brien (2009), legalizing same-sex marriage in the state. Drawing on participant–observation research as a professor in these courses, and examining student dialogue, class discussion, and web-board postings on the topic, I find that legal studies students are able to articulate a complex range of views regarding the judiciary, judicial activism, and same-sex marriage. Their ability to engage in (mostly) civil discourse on the topic of judging is of particular societal importance, given the limitations of contemporary public discourses about judging. These findings point, as well, to the potential role for engaged academics in expanding and contextualizing public conversations about judicial independence, judicial activism, and rights. The chapter also highlights, however, limits in that educational experience, in particular students' lionization of legal processes, simultaneous to their cynicism about, and lack of engagement in, electoral/political processes. This points to the development of interdisciplinary legal studies curricula as a means toward effective education for democracy.

“Guantánamo lawyers” are a variegated group of lawyers from diverse practice settings, backgrounds, and beliefs. Drawing from interview and archival data, this chapter explores why these lawyers have mobilized to work on Guantánamo matters. What processes engender “heterogeneous mobilization” (i.e., mobilization from different practice settings, and diverse professional, as well as political backgrounds, and beliefs) of lawyers? What are the impacts of such mobilization on the work of lawyers? Adopting a social movement lens and a contemporary historical perspective, this chapter identifies lawyers’ perceptions of their role vis-à-vis the “rule of law” as the most significant cross-cutting motivation for participation. The overlap in human rights orientation of legal nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the legal academy, and the corporate pro bono practice at top law firms, facilitates collaborative lawyering between lawyers. Despite some potential limitations of such collaborations, heterogeneous mobilization appears to contribute, at least in the case of Guantánamo, to a greater likelihood of resistance by lawyers to the retreat from individual rights in the name of national security.

It is widely recognized by scholars that superhero stories tend to glorify vigilante justice; after all, these stories often maintain that extralegal acts of violence are necessary for combatting existential threats to personal and public safety. This scholarly common sense fosters a widespread dismissal of superhero stories as uncomplicated apologia for an authoritarian politics of law and order that is animated by hatred of unpopular people and ideas. However, some prominent contemporary Batman stories, including those told in the graphic novels of Grant Morrison and in the blockbuster movies of Christopher Nolan, are ambivalent: in their portraits of Batman and Joker as dark twins and secret colleagues, these stories both legitimize and challenge the countersubversive politics of American law and order.

This chapter comments on the papers produced as part of the symposium on Law and the Imagining of Difference. The chapter observes that the diversity that marks the human species gives rise to differences across individuals and groups. These differences create a challenge for law, for legal rules, and categories tend, among other things, to flatten or suppress difference. How to ensure that law treats differences properly? One way is to require that legal rules be rationally related to a proper purpose. Another is to require that persons be treated equally. If the principle of equality solves certain problems of flattening, it also may create problems. The key to applying properly the principle of equality, then, is to answer a set of antecedent questions: “who” must be treated as equal to whom, “with respect to what” rights or interests, and “how”? Martha Minow has provided rubrics for addressing these questions in ways that uncover problematic applications of the principle of equality. The chapter addresses the distinct versions of equality presupposed in claims for Douglas NeJaime’s arguments for same-sex marriage, Julie C. Suk’s social and economic approach to sex-based equality, and Megan A. Conway’s and Zanita E. Fenton’s ambitious explorations of the value of equality in the law of disabled persons. The chapter concludes that law can be directly responsive to some claims of inequality, but that other claims will require something other than law.