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In 2006 the German-based electronics company Siemens faced widespread corruption and bribery allegations. Investigations of the German state attorney’s office disclosed an amount of more than 2.3 billion of suspicious payments to foreign governments (Schubert & Miller, 2008). It turned out that Siemens had bribed governmental officials in order to secure contracts and to obtain favorable conditions over more than three decades (Schmidt, 2009). Though Siemens had a clearly stated anticorruption policy this did not prevent the company from getting involved in one of the largest corporate scandals in German business history.

A deeper analysis of the scandal reveals at least four fundamental shortcomings which enabled the corrupt practices on all organizational levels. First, most of the managers saw no alternatives to secure their foreign business, especially in countries where bribery payment has been a widespread practice. Second, the managers had created misguided bonds of loyalty believing that personal engagement in the corruption scheme was part of their dedication to the company. Third, due to corporate routines and commonly accepted practices, most managers lacked a clear sense of reality seeing corruption as part of the regular business at Siemens. Fourth, poor governance structures and a lack of clear regulations for doing business in a corrupt environment made it easier for managers to bypass official regulations.

As other worldwide sourcing industries the retail sector is also prone to various forms of corruption. In particular large retail chains doing business in developing countries are often faced with corrupt bureaucracy and struggle with dubious administrative processes. On the other hand the purchasing divisions of large retailers decide upon million dollar deals with their suppliers which may tempt manufacturers to pay bribes for winning the deal. While such forms of corruption may be found also for other businesses there are other practices which may be recognized as corruption which are typical in the retail sector. One of the most controversial discussions concerns the practice of so-called slotting fees which are charged to manufacturers as a contribution to the handling costs of the retailer. Since such fees are negotiated in secrecy and not broken down by categories of expenditure they are often seen as a bribery-like payment demanded for getting contracts or staying in business. In the following chapter we will analyze these practices from an economic perspective. We will provide some empirical findings on how such payments are assessed in practice and conclude with some ethical considerations concerning the practice and the effects of slotting fees.

The purpose of this paper is to identify three commonly observed mistakes made when managing suppliers and describe factors that contribute to successful buyer–supplier partnerships.

Five extensive case studies in the automotive and clothing industry, as well as cases discussed in the literature, are analysed.

Barriers to successful partnerships are a too strong emphasis on cost cutting and a too controlling management approach on the part of the buyer, and the abuse of insider knowledge for faking performances on the side of the supplier. Open communication, willingness to engage in mutual learning and encouraging innovations are observed in successful partnerships.

A limited number of case studies in the German automotive industry and the Turkish clothing industry are used. Both industries are subject to significant change which means that generalisations should be made with caution. Therefore, we discuss only problems and solutions that have also been identified in studies conducted in other industries and/or countries.

Managers learn how to best manage partnerships with suppliers and what mistakes to avoid.

Partnerships aiming at improving working conditions are discussed. Findings and recommendations help managers improve their corporate social performance in the supply chain.

Partnerships are approached from the perspective of the supplier to identify commonly made mistakes and successful practices of buyers.

Given its social importance, Sport (especially Football), which has experienced an astounding transformation into a global industry with significant economic impact, has been a vehicle for the transmission of cultural and universal values. Its structural complexity (players, transfer agents, clubs and its owners, right holders of different contracts) creates a lot of moving parts that can easily hide illicit activity, especially because this structure incorporates the international market. The movement of large amounts of money, the difficulty in accounting for all transactions, and ironically, the clubs’ own financial needs increase this sector’s vulnerability to organized crime. For many years, this sector has had a relatively free hand in its efforts to make criminal assets legal. This is made possible by some ineffectiveness of current national and international laws and enforcement bodies, which have not kept pace with the changing situation. It is already known that sport historically has been used as a tool for enrichment of a specific group of companies, an issue deserving of public concern. This chapter argues for a sensitive situation involving the actors of the public and private sectors, notably its regulations, in order to curb corruption and money laundering through sport. The purpose is to address these matters by identifying the risks of misconduct within sport organizations, and proposing measures that could prevent, hamper, and punish any attempts to thwart these organizations’ main goal: promoting sport as a way for cultural improvement and teaching people the values of tolerance and civilized coexistence.

In its most basic usage, “corruption” means a change from functional or good to dysfunctional or bad. This definition is far too broad to be of use to scholars or policymakers, who need a more precise, shared definition so that they can communicate meaningfully with one another. Scholars and policymakers have developed scores of definitions, which this chapter briefly explains. Within this galaxy of definitions, scholars and policymakers have tended to favor one definition, which this chapter calls the “general definition.” The general definition describes organizational corruption as: the abuse or misuse of power or trust for self-interested purposes rather than the purposes for which power or trust was given. This chapter discusses and illustrates the general definition. The chapter concludes by pointing out that the general definition is only one definition. In many places, the public is deeply concerned with phenomena such as undue influence, which should also be taken into consideration as a form of corruption even though it falls outside of the general definition.

Using a general model of corruption that explains and accounts for corruption across professions and institutions, this chapter will examine how certain practices in the media, especially in areas where journalism, advertising and public relations regularly intersect and converge, can be construed as instances of corruption. It will be argued that such corruption, as in the case of cash-for-comment scandals, advertorials, infomercials, and infotainment, as well as public relations media releases disseminated misleadingly as journalistic opinion, is regular, ubiquitous, and systematic.

In 2012, the New York Department of Financial Services threatened to revoke Standard Chartered Bank’s U.S. license for alleged money laundering violations involving Iran. The bank’s settlement with US regulators and law enforcement cost the bank approximately $1.099 billion. In 2013, as a signal that no bank was too big to jail, the Holding Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act was introduced into the U.S. Congress. We focus on a clinical examination of the Standard Chartered money laundering case and examine the role of the US regulators and law enforcement in the settlement.

It is well-reported that financial and investment sectors of the economy have grown in recent years, but also that problems of corruption, both institutional and venal, are present. Within the sector, financial auditors and investment consultants have been entrusted to work with and for those for whom financial sector stability and adequate financial returns are crucial. However, these two professions have too often served as handmaidens of corruption. This chapter reviews the history of financial auditing and investment consulting and outlines areas in which corruption manifests. It argues for an end to corruption and it asserts that the two professions could and should be the core of an uncorrupted robust system of financial practice and regulation. Such an arrangement could safeguard a world in which investment business practices are sustainable, honest, and truly productive.