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This article will attempt to answer the following question: what has been done to prevent corruption and promote a “good government” in Latin America, what are the results and what explains the current situation? After analyzing very different experiences, the following could be stated: (1) there is at least a formal concern for promoting integrity in several countries, but there are problems of diagnosis and formulation; (2) the examples of implementation failures are far too many in Latin America. In any case, the most important factor explaining failures of design and implementation is the presence of a social trap and a political trap. The social trap is expressed by the incoherence of society itself, which demands honesty from Government, but in practice incentivizes corruption by paying bribes, breaching rules, and demanding privileges within the framework of clientelist networks. The political trap emerges from the strong path dependency effect resulting from the consolidation of patronage or clientelist networks.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the amount of online information reported by Spanish municipal-owned enterprises (MOEs) according to the legal requirements indicated in the Spanish Law 19/2013 on Transparency and Good Governance. In addition, the authors analyze how different variables can affect the extent of online information reported by such enterprises.

To do this, we conducted a content analysis of the web pages of Spanish MOEs located in cities with more than 100.000 habitants, as well as those cities that are provincial capitals. To find information about these enterprises, the authors accessed the General Intervention Board of the State Administration (IGAE) webpage (www.igae.pap.minhafp.gob.es/sitios/igae/es-ES/Paginas/inicio.aspx). This sample was composed of 273 enterprises majority owned and controlled by local governments.

The findings reveal that the amount of information reported by Spanish MOEs, in accordance with the legal requirements, is quite reduced. The most influential variables for explaining Spanish MOEs’ commitment to information disclosure are population size, political positioning of the local government and reputation.

This study seeks to contribute to the scarce literature on mandatory transparency in the public sector as well as to reinforce the degree of compliance with requirements of information disclosure.

Spanish-speaking children learn to read words written in a relatively transparent orthography. Variations in orthographic transparency may shape the manifestation of reading difficulties. This study was intended to help clarify the nature of developmental dyslexia in Spanish. Developmental dyslexic group (DD) were compared to two control groups, a chronological age-matched control group (CA) and a reading level-matched control group (RL). Measures included naming speed, verbal working memory (WM), phonological short-term memory (STM), phonemic awareness, and different reading subtests (letter, word and pseudoword reading, punctuation mark, reading skills). On the reading subtests, accuracy and reading speed were measured. Results demonstrated that developmental dyslexics show a severe deficit in lexical access on accuracy and speed measures, in addition to reading-related cognitive deficits in areas such as naming speed, verbal WM, phonological STM, and phonemic awareness. Hierarchical cluster analysis demonstrated that a subgroup of children with DD showed lower IQs and more severe reading-related cognitive deficits in naming speed, verbal WM, and phonological STM. Our results are consistent with studies conducted in the Spanish language and in other transparent orthographies.