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Payments to healthcare providers create incentives that can influence provider behaviour. Research on unit-level incentives in primary care is, however, scarce. This paper examines how managers and salaried physicians at Swedish primary healthcare centres perceive that payment incentives directed towards the healthcare centre affect their work.

An interview study was conducted with 24 respondents at 13 primary healthcare centres in two cities, located in regions with different payment systems. One had a mixed system comprised of fee-for-service and risk-adjusted capitation payments, and the other a mainly risk-adjusted capitation system.

Findings suggested that both managers and salaried physicians were aware of and adapted to unit-level payment incentives, albeit the latter sometimes to a lesser extent. Respondents perceived fee-for-service payments to stimulate production of shorter visits, up-coding of visits and skimming of healthier patients. Results also suggested that differentiated rates for patient visits affected horizontal prioritisations between physician and nurse visits. Respondents perceived that risk-adjustments for diagnoses led to a focus on registering diagnosis codes, and to some extent, also up-coding of secondary diagnoses.

Policymakers and responsible authorities need to design payment systems carefully, balancing different incentives and considering how and from where data used to calculate payments are retrieved, not relying too heavily on data supplied by providers.

This study contributes evidence on unit-level payment incentives in primary care, a scarcely researched topic, especially using qualitative methods.

The purpose of this paper is to explore work motivation among professionals at well-functioning primary healthcare centers subject to a national healthcare reform which include financial incentives.

Five primary healthcare centers in Sweden were purposively selected for being well-operated and representing public/private and small/large units. In total, 43 interviews were completed with different medical professions and qualitative deductive content analysis was conducted.

Work motivation exists for professionals when their individual goals are aligned with the organizational goals and the design of the reform. The centers’ positive management was due to a unique combination of factors, such as clear direction of goals, a culture of non-hierarchical collaboration, and systematic quality improvement work. The financial incentives need to be translated in terms of quality patient care to provide clear direction for the professionals. Social processes where professionals work together as cohesive groups, and provided space for quality improvement work is pivotal in addressing how alignment is created.

Leaders need to consistently translate and integrate reforms with the professionals’ drives and values. This is done by encouraging participation through teamwork, time for structured reflection, and quality improvement work.

The design of the reforms and leadership are essential preconditions for work motivation.

The study offers a more complete picture of how reforms are managed at primary healthcare centers, as different medical professionals are included. The value also consists of showing how a range of aspects combine for primary healthcare professionals to successfully manage external reforms.