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Organisational culture (OC) shapes individuals’ perceptions and experiences of work. However, no instrument capable of measuring specific aspects of OC in community pharmacy exists. The purpose of this paper is to report the development and validation of an instrument to measure OC in community pharmacy in Great Britain (GB), and conduct a preliminary analysis of data collected using it.

Instrument development comprised three stages: Stage I: 12 qualitative interviews and relevant literature informed instrument design; Stage II: 30 cognitive interviews assessed content validity; and Stage III: a cross-sectional survey mailed to 1,000 community pharmacists in GB, with factor analysis for instrument validation. Statistical analysis investigated how community pharmacists perceived OC in their place of work.

Factor analysis produced an instrument containing 60 items across five OC dimensions – business and work configuration, social relationships, personal and professional development, skills utilisation, and environment and structures. Internal reliability for the dimensions was high (0.84 to 0.95); item-total correlations were adequate (r=0.46 to r=0.76). Based on 209 responses, analysis suggests different OCs in community pharmacy, with some community pharmacists viewing the environment in which they worked as having a higher frequency of aspects related to patient contact and safety than others. Since these aspects are important for providing high healthcare standards, it is likely that differences in OC may be linked to different healthcare outcomes.

This newly developed and validated instrument to measure OC in community pharmacy can be used to benchmark existing OC across different pharmacies and design interventions for triggering change to improve outcomes for community pharmacists and patients.

This chapter discusses adjudication, expertise, and cultural difference as it appears in criminal court cases concerning female genital cutting (FGM) in the EU, as reported in a 2015 comparative overview. It begins with the distinction between typical and atypical FGM cases; a distinction that connects court cases to the cultural realities of the practicing communities, suggesting that the lack of cultural knowledge can cause unnecessary suffering to families and/or individuals who wrongly undergo prosecution in alleged FGM cases. A contrario, the intervention of experts in FGM court cases could be a positive approach to assessing the legitimacy of public intervention in certain cases.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse those obligations to share information and deliver assistance which flow from the legislation intended to prevent the money laundering as contained in the Law 19/2003 of the 4 July, which transposes into Spanish law the provisions of Directive 2001/97/EC, which provisions set out the obligations of notaries, registrars, lawyers and court attorneys and their compatibility with their duties of professional privilege.

The new law has provoked a debate centred in the compatibility of the obligations of disclosure with legal professional privilege and the rights of the defence. This issue is discussed in the paper.

With regard to lawyers there arises a conflict between the duty to maintain client confidentiality and the obligations of disclosure in the prevention of money laundering which must be resolved in favour of the former, it being established in Spain by a law of superior status. This means that if a lawyer transfers the information concerning his suspicion he should therefore be punished as committing the crime of disclosure of confidential material.

Only Spanish literature is used.

With respect to the lawyers, the carrying out of the obligations of disclosure imposed by the new Spanish Law 19/2003 breaches the duty of client confidentiality. For notaries, registers and court attorneys the problem does not exist.

An overall view is offered of the difficult situation in which some legal professionals find themselves in light of the prevention of money laundering in Spain.

This paper aims to understand whether Portugal, being a relatively peripheral country – in political, economic and military terms – of Southwest Europe, was recently a target of hybrid threats. The prevalence of a specific type of threat was found. Thus, this paper analyses the non-kinetic hybrid threats in Portugal, in a temporary hiatus of two years (2017-2018).

This study has two parts: a conceptual analysis of hybrid threats created by us and, based on the typology previously presented, an analysis of the hybrid threats in Portugal between 2017 and 2018. The first part relied on source analysis, as the result of a desk review methodology, supported by monographs, declassified official documents and reports. The second part is also the result of source analysis, but more extensive. In addition to the desk review methodology, the study included semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders from the Portuguese security and armed forces, who asked not to be quoted. Media content analysis was also carried out – for trends and fact-check – mostly for the events related to the “narratives led operations” (for propaganda, misinformation, counter-information and strategic leaks).

To date, Portugal – compared with other European states – has not been a significant target for hybrid threats. It is diluted in the Portuguese geopolitical dimension. Nevertheless, not escaping what is happening in Europe, it has also been the target of non-kinetic hybrid threats, especially in cyberspace. In the field of so-called “narrative-driven operations”, there have been some occurrences – whether related to fake news, far-right movements or strategic leaks. In addition, cyberattacks from foreign groups for information and data gathering have increased in recent years, making governmental and private critical infrastructures more vulnerable.

One of the characteristics of hybrid threats is their difficult identification. Therefore, information is scarce, which has complicated the research, leading us to assume, in many cases, speculation about the threat. It should also be taken into account that, in the case of cyberspace, until 2018, 90% of the occurrences were not reported, and the study has dealt with only official numbers.

It is not a policy paper. Although it neither points out national vulnerabilities to this type of threat nor makes procedural recommendations or considerations, it is fundamental in identifying the peculiarity of hybrid threats in a democratic state.