Search results

Section 177 of the Company Act 2013 and Regulation 18 of the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements 2015 allow the audit committee to invite firm executives to participate in the audit committee meetings. In this study, we investigate the negative impact of the presence of invitees in the audit committee on firm value.

The study uses the Propensity Score Matching and Difference-In-Difference methodology (henceforth, PSM-DID) to establish a causal relationship between the presence of invitees and firm value. The final sample consists of 24,232 firm-year observations representing 4,493 distinct firms from 2016 to 2021. We also address the endogeneity and autocorrelation issues using the system-generalized method of moments (henceforth, GMM) as a robustness test.

We find that the presence of invitees in the audit committee decreases the firm value because investors consider this an alarming signal. We further find that the firms, audited by the Big 4, do not experience a decrease in firm value due to higher audit quality, whereas the firms with high promoter ownership experience a decrease due to the presence of agency cost.

We contribute to the literature on firm value and strengthen the literature on the importance of good governance in a developing nation using the signalling theory. This study adds to the understanding of firm value. The findings have implications for management literature and are valuable for policymakers and standard setters in evaluating the impact of disclosures in the capital market. The managerial implications emphasize the need for careful consideration of invitees in audit committees, considering industry, regulatory environment, and firm goals. Firms are advised to assess the benefits and costs, monitor the impact regularly, and strengthen internal controls.