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The purpose of this paper is to describe the wealth expropriation from minority to majority shareholders due to the lack of legislation protecting the interests of minority shareholders in an acquisition deal, validating the claims made on studies made by Zingales and by La Porta et al.

Despite an overall takeover premium of nearly 250 percent, most minority shareholders actually suffered wealth losses ranging from US$ 7.1 to 31.14 millions. These losses are measured using different methodologies, such as accounting value; liquidation value; and economic value.

The Campos Chilenos case study presented here serves as a testing platform for the relationship between well‐developed legal systems and economic development in both a current and future sense. In a current sense, the case illustrates how inadequate minority shareholder protection led to minority shareholder wealth expropriation, discouraging minority investment from both domestic and foreign investors (and limiting economic development).

Future implications lay in the corporate governance regulation reforms passed in the aftermath of the Campos Chilenos case. If the Chilean government actively enforces new regulations, the level of economic development in Chile will exceed that of its peers in Latin America and other emerging economies, as claimed by La Porta et al.

This study will be useful for governance makers and regulators in emerging countries.

Over the last decade, the Chilean economy has experienced rapid growth, allowing per capita GDP to rise from $10,700 to $19,887. Additionally, the capital markets size increased over 16%. Given this, it is expected that Chile will be considered a developed country by 2020, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Chile is in the initial stages of joining the OECD; a process that is expected to accelerate positive changes in the economy. However, in recent years, publicly traded Chilean firms began to face financial scandals causing the upheaval of the regulatory market structures and initiating environmental legislation. These scandals have consistently occurred across all economic sectors and typically have included companies with large market capitalizations and strong risk management procedures. Nevertheless, these mechanisms have proven unsuccessful due to misinformation or information manipulation. The changes to the Chilean economy can be considered as operational risk to its member firms. These risks typically result from inadequate or failed internal processes or people systems, and/or from external events. The radical changes in this transitional economy and the impact on the differing companies involved are good examples that should provide a warning for emerging market economies trying to implement risk management control systems. Unfortunately, agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States cannot be modeled in the traditional sense in countries similar to Chile. Different authors simplified operational risk management, but this framework is not feasible in emerging economies based solely on the criteria of identification, evaluation, monitoring, and management.

This chapter develops a Probit model that identifies the financial variables explaining the bankruptcy of banking institutions in Ecuador as a function of efficiency, assets, capital, risk and operating income. The implications of this study verify the validity of the solvency theory over the self-fulfilled panic speculations. The criteria used was a high Pseudo R2 and an as high as possible Efficiency Index. The model yielded a Pseudo R2 of 89.14% and an Efficiency Index of 96.7%. The model is useful in preventing bankruptcy of a bank one year in advance.