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The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to know the views of university stakeholders concerning intellectual capital (IC) reporting; second, to examine the quality of voluntary IC disclosure by public Spanish universities on their websites; and third, to analyze some of the potential factors affecting this kind of disclosure.

The paper applies a content analysis and a survey. The content analysis was used to analyze the websites of 50 public Spanish universities in the year 2016, while the survey was submitted to all members of the Social Councils of Spanish public universities. Also, a regression analysis (ordinary least square model) is conducted to relate the disclosure index to its determinants.

The results of this study show that human capital was the most disclosed category with relational capital being the least frequently disclosed. However, the quality of structural capital disclosures was higher than relational and human capital. Moreover, the results show that size and university’s internationality affect IC disclosure in Spanish public universities.

This paper stimulates the debate between universities and policy-makers concerning the benefits related to IC reporting as a tool for addressing different stakeholders’ needs. In order to satisfy the information needs of university stakeholders, Spanish universities can be recommended to focus on reporting higher quality information on financial relations, students’ satisfaction, quality standard, work-related knowledge/know-how and collaboration between universities and other organizations such as firms, local government and society as a whole.

This research brings new expertise regarding IC disclosure in higher education and to reveal some of the possible determinants to improve this disclosure.

This study aims to evaluate changes in the presence of women on Spanish boards after the Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (2006) and the Organic Law 3/2007 on Gender Equality, and this study compares the educational background of women and men directors. Also, this study analyses the influence of gender diversity and educational background of women directors on economic performance, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and, ultimately, firm value. In addition, this study explores the differences in board gender composition and its effect on firm value during the crisis and post-crisis periods. Finally, this study analyses the different influence of women directors depending on their typology.

This study uses a system of structural equations and a sample of 4,101 directors of 30 Spanish companies listed on IBEX-35 over 2008–2017.

The results show that women’s presence on boards has grown since 2008, and they have higher educational background than men. This study finds that women directors improve economic performance and CSR, though results are non-significant for firm value. Women directors with a bachelor’s or master’s degree increase economic and social performance but reduce firm value. Women directors with business or industry-related studies positively influence CSR but business specialisation negatively affects economic performance and firm value.

This study analyses the direct and indirect effect of women directors on firm value, the influence of their educational background and the potential differences arising from the economic situation (crisis) and the type of board position they hold.

The purpose of this paper is to use the dynamic capabilities framework to explain the effect of board networks, as a source of intellectual capital, on firm performance. The authors propose that the influence of board interlocks depends on their ability to contribute to strategic decision making. As a result, their effect is subject to the business context in which they occur and the different role of the interconnected directors involved.

The authors use social network analysis to make board connections and to calculate centrality measures. The authors also identify busy boards to analyze whether their effect differs from centrality. The authors estimate the theoretical model using the Generalized Method of Moments in order to take advantage of the panel database.

For a sample of Spanish firms from 1999 to 2015, the results show there is no direct significant effect of directors’ networks on firm performance. However, the authors find a positive and significant influence of intra-industry board connections, particularly when they are established among outsiders.

The Spanish context of the study can limit the generalization of the papers’ results.

The results can be useful both for practitioners – since they can serve as a guide for companies to reformulate their boards in search of the optimal structure-, and when implementing good governance codes – establishing limits for director interlocking.

This study helps to offer a better understanding of how directors’ networks can add value to the firm depending on the kind of resources they provide (context) and the role of the director who is connected.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the ownership structure and the investment in research and development (R&D) for a sample of listed Spanish companies.

Following the agency theory and the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective, the authors propose that R&D investment is affected by ownership structure, specifically by the identity of the controlling owner (family firms and firms with an institutional investor) and the level of contestability by other shareholders. In order to test these hypotheses, the authors build an original database identifying, at a 10% threshold, the ultimate shareholders of a sample of 96 Spanish firms listed during 2008–2018 (1,002 obs).

The results show that there is no significant relationship between the ownership concentration and the R&D investment. Only when the authors consider the nature of the main shareholder, the authors find that in family firms there is an inverted U relationship between ownership and R&D, so that at low levels of ownership, the R&D increases, while at high levels of ownership (that we compute around 54%) the R&D decreases. Also, when the main shareholder is an institutional investor, the greater its ownership, the higher the R&D investment. Finally, the authors test that, contrary to what mainstream suggests, contestability in family firms is higher when ownership in the hands of other family shareholders increases.

The work uses an original database to test a nonlinear relationship between ownership and R&D investment in family firms. Also, the study addresses a topic hardly ever discussed in the literature about R&D as it is the role of the contestability by other controlling shareholders.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la relación existente entre la estructura de propiedad y la innovación corporativa para una muestra de empresas cotizadas españolas.

Utilizando los planteamientos de la teoría de la agencia y de la perspectiva de la riqueza socioemocional proponemos que la I+D empresarial está relacionada con la estructura de propiedad, específicamente con la naturaleza del accionista de control (empresas familiares y empresas con un inversor institucional como principal accionista) y con el grado de contestabilidad por parte de otros accionistas significativos. A fin de testar nuestras hipótesis, construimos ad hoc una base de datos de propiedad original en la que identificamos, al umbral del 10% de propiedad, a los accionistas últimos de una muestra de 96 empresas cotizadas españolas para el periodo 2008–2018 (1.002 obs).

Nuestros resultados muestran que no existe relación significativa entre la concentración de propiedad y la inversión en I + D. Solo cuando consideramos la naturaleza del principal accionista encontramos que en las empresas familiares la relación entre la propiedad de la familia y la innovación corporativa adopta una forma de U invertida, tal que a bajos niveles de propiedad la I + D crece, mientras que a altos niveles de propiedad (que computamos en torno al 54% de propiedad) la inversión en I + D decrece. Asimismo, en las empresas con un inversor institucional como principal accionista, cuanto mayor es la propiedad de este inversor institucional, mayor es la I + D de la empresa. Finalmente testamos que, en contra de la corriente dominante, en las empresas familiares la propiedad en manos de otras familias incrementa el grado de contestabilidad a la familia controladora respecto a su inversión en I + D.

El trabajo utiliza una base de datos de propiedad original para testar una relación no lineal entre concentración de propiedad e innovación corporativa en las empresas familiares. Asimismo, el estudio aborda un tema apenas analizado en la literatura de I + D como es el papel de la contestabilidad al accionista de control.

This work provides an empirical analysis to determine whether directors’ compensation is lower (“transparency control effect” and “transparency deterrent effect”) or higher (“effects of transparency on increasing competition in pay”) among firms with greater transparency in terms of directors’ compensation.

A disclosure index about board compensation and different models based on linear panel-data regression have been developed, on a sample of 73 Spanish firms for the period 2007–2012.

Our results suggest that disclosure on pay strategy to directors leads to an increase in directors’ compensation, therefore, in this case, the effect of transparency on increasing competition in pay seems to prevail. Conversely, the disclosure on individual directors’ compensation and payment leads to a decrement in directors’ compensation, prevailing the transparency control effect and transparency deterrent effect.

The results of this study might be of interest to investors (to take into account these effects before they implement additional corporate governance reforms) and regulators (to be aware of the importance of this issue).

First, we study the effect that transparency and voluntary disclosure regarding board compensation has on the level of directors’ compensation. Second, in this study we go one step further in the transparency of board compensation disclosures by constructing a disclosure index. Finally, the results contribute to the necessary debate that is currently taking place in the Spanish, European and international context regarding this issue.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to examine the hypothesized effects of board characteristics and performance on directors’ compensation in the Spanish corporations, whose corporate governance is a special example of a unitary board system.

Methodology/approach – In order to test the influence of a set of factors on directors’ compensation levels, we have developed several models based on linear panel data regression. The sample included 76 listed companies on the Spanish computerized trading system or Continuous Market for the period 2004–2009.

Findings – The control mechanisms, like board characteristics and performance and their effect on the level of directors’ compensation, depend on the types of director (executive, independent and proprietary).

Research limitations/implications (if applicable) – This study has certain limitations mainly related to problems associated with obtaining information. The methodology should be complemented by other types of analyses, such as the influence of the characteristics of the board on the remuneration structure in a greater level of disaggregation.

Practical implications (if applicable) – The results of this research chapter give reasons to regulators and investors to be aware of the importance of the board's characteristics as corporate control mechanisms over the directors’ remuneration and the necessity of connection between directors’ compensation and the firm's performance.

Originality/value of paper – Firstly, descriptive empirical evidence on the level of directors’ compensation is provided within a unitary board system for different types of directors. Secondly, an ample panel data set enables the examination of a set of determinants using panel data methods which control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Finally, the perspective is extended from executive director compensation to other types of directors, such as proprietary or independent, which are very important features of the Spanish board structure.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the potential impact of stakeholders’ behavior on business failure, through its influence on the generation and distribution of value added.

Using a sample of 2,277 Spanish SMEs – half of which were businesses that failed during the years 2006‐2009 – the authors conducted an empirical study on a number of variables representing the participation of stakeholders in the generation and distribution of value added. This was undertaken in order to discern differential behavior between the variables and prove their usefulness in predicting business failure. For this purpose, a mean difference analysis between failed and non‐failed businesses and a multivariate logistic regression model were applied.

The results obtained show that the stakeholders’ behavior in relation to their participation in the generation and distribution of value added, affects the likelihood of business failure.

This paper provides empirical evidence of the influence of stakeholders’ behavior on the likelihood of business failure, through their participation in the generation and distribution of value added. The results are useful for creating management strategies because they offer advice on the implementation of business management models based on the stakeholder approach, and on the appropriate involvement of all those who make up the conglomerate in the generation and distribution of value added. They also emphasize the value of recording information related to the Value‐Added Statement in order to explain a firm's level of dependence on its stakeholders and assess the firm's risk of insolvency.