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The publication presents an analysis of the cost and schedule performance of incentive/disincentive projects and case studies toward developing a systematic disincentive valuation process, with Construction Analysis for Pavement Rehabilitation Strategies (CA4PRS) software integration that aids agencies in minimizing the likelihood of court challenges of disincentives.

From a California transportation database, the authors performed cost and schedule analyses of 43 incentive/disincentive (I/D) projects and case studies on four of those I/D projects. Interviewees included subject matter experts from transportation organizations to ensure applicability and maximum value-adding, and the process was implemented on ten California transportation projects and monitored for performance.

The presented process mitigates the contractor's ability to claim disincentives as penalties in a court of law through the following: (1) all calculations are performed using project-specific bases, backed by estimations of actual incurred costs; (2) the CA4PRS software allows for estimation transparency and (3) the clarity of cost inclusions reduces any chances of “double-dipping” between disincentives and liquidated damages.

Transportation agencies have historically faced legal challenges to their enforcements of disincentives. As agencies continue to apply disincentives on more megaprojects, contractors will likely attempt to pursue legal challenges more frequently. The presented process mitigates the likelihood of these challenges going to court and increases the accuracy and efficiency of disincentives.

While there have been publications that discuss the legal challenges of imposing disincentives, they mainly provide guidelines and lack applicable processes. Existing literature that does present incentive/disincentive valuation process focuses on incentive valuations and neglects the disincentives' legal challenges. The following publication fills this gap by presenting an applicable disincentive valuation process for transportation projects which incorporates the guidelines for legal mitigation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore issues relating to imposing a ban on the importation of asbestos-contaminated building materials (ACBMs) in the Australian context to better understand the multiple accountabilities and consequences.

This study undertakes a qualitative content analysis of the multiple accountabilities and stakeholder expectations using the lens of actor–network theory. This study further explores the weaknesses and complexities associated with implementing a complete ban on asbestos, ensuring that only asbestos-free building materials are imported to Australia. This study uses data collected from 15 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, responses from the Australian Border Force to a questionnaire and 215 counter accounts from the media, the Australian Government, industry organizations, non-governmental organizations and social group websites during the period from 2003 to 2021.

This study reveals that stakeholders' expectations of zero tolerance for asbestos have not been met. This assertion has been backed by evidence of asbestos contamination in imported building materials throughout recent years. Stakeholders say that the complete prevention of the importation of ACBMs has been delayed because of issues in policy implementations, opaque supply chain activities, lack of transparency and non-adherence to mandatory and self-regulated guidelines.

Stakeholders expect public and private sector organizations to meet their accountabilities through mandatory adoption of the given policy framework.

This research provides a road map to identify the multiple accountabilities, their related weaknesses and the lack of implementation of the necessary protocol, which prevents a critical aspect of legislation from being effectively implemented.

In an emerging global economy the ability of the telecommunications sector to provide an internationally competitive network for transferring information has significant implications for trade and economic growth. Because of recent large world‐wide investments in telecommunications infrastructure, quantifying the impact of telecommunications in economic growth has received much attention. However, economic analysts, in the absence of investment data for many developing countries, adopt the International Telecommunications (ITU) practice of using main telephone lines to measure the stock of telecommunications capital. The accuracy of this proxy has not been subject to careful statistical scrutiny. This study develops a supply‐side growth model which employs teledensity and the share of telecommunications investment in national income as telecommunications capital proxies. Estimation results suggest a significant positive cross‐country relationship between telecommunications capital and economic growth, when using alternative measures of telecommunications capital.