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This paper aims to examine the Salomon principle of separate legal personality and its impact on the regulation of directors’ remuneration in the UK. The aim of the paper is to explore the Salomon principle to determine whether it serves as a driving factor for directors’ remuneration levels. The paper will also examine the restrictive approach of the courts to move away from the principle and their reluctance to get involved in directors’ remuneration issues of a company. The paper explains the Salomon principle, describes the nature of the problem on directors’ remuneration and provides an analysis on how the Salomon principle impacts on the directors’ remuneration.

The paper reviews case law, statutory provisions and academic opinions on the directors’ remuneration and the concept of separate legal entity. The paper critically reviews the impact of the concept of separate entity on directors’ remuneration.

The paper finds that the courts are reluctant to come away from the concept of separate legal personality as well as reluctant to get involved with directors’ remuneration. This reluctance of the court makes the concept of separate legal personality to act as one of the drivers of directors’ remuneration.

The paper offers a different explanation into why directors’ remuneration continuous to be an issue in the UK. It points out that the concept of separate legal personality is a potential driver of directors’ remuneration in the UK.

This study extensively aims to investigate the effects of different aspects of corporate governance (CG) mechanism, including board size, executive directors’ shareholdings, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, a family member as the CEO and/or chairperson of the board, independent directors in remuneration committee and number of board meeting, on executive directors’ remuneration in small firms listed on Bursa Malaysia (BM).

The sample of this study consists of 173 bottom-listed companies from Bursa Malaysia in Year 2010. The Year 2010 was chosen because the disclosure of remuneration committee activities and directors’ pay structure is required under the revised Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance, 2007. Furthermore, the period selected is after the global economic crisis (2008), which may have an effect on the remuneration structure in small firms. The ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the relationship between remuneration as dependent variable and other independent variables.

A finding from this study reveals that there is a significant positive relationship between executive ownership and executive remuneration, and between board size and executive remuneration. The results provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. This indicates that the independent directors are not truly independent to monitor and control the firm activities, including minimizing the excessive remuneration.

This study examines how the corporate governance (CG) affects remuneration among 173 small firms in Malaysia based on market capitalization, for one year, 2010. Hence, the results may not be generalizable to other periods or types of the companies. This shows the possibility of the absence of some additional variables in the research model and hence a limitation to the findings of the study. Although the study is being parsimonious in the choice of relevant variables, prior literature serves the guide in the selection of the used variables. This therefore gives room for future research using the potential omitted variables. Furthermore, the study focuses on total remuneration, such as fees, salaries, bonuses and benefits in kind, which makes aggregate directors’ remuneration. However, this study did not consider the remuneration related to stock options. Finally, this study only uses secondary data; hence, it could be interesting to use other instruments to collect data like a questionnaire to add more weight to the research. This study only uses one-year data; therefore, impact of changes between years cannot be analysed.

Results of the study provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. They reduce the effectiveness of non-executive directors because most of them are appointed by a family member and not socially responsible to their stakeholders.

This study aims to pinpoint gaps in the literature on corporate governance and remuneration by producing a comprehensive bibliometric review for the period 1990–2020.

Bibliometric analysis is the quantitative study of the bibliographic material in a specific research field. It allows an analyst to classify that material by paper, journal, author, indexation, institution or country, among other possibilities. This study reviews a total of 298 Web of Science–indexed journal articles on corporate governance and top-management remuneration schemes.

The authors find five distinct research strands: (1) firm performance and remuneration of top management, (2) the remuneration and independence of boards of directors and the efficiency of boards of directors as a governance system, (3) outside-director remuneration and the efficiency of outside directors as a monitoring system, (4) director remuneration and the corporate governance of companies and (5) the role of ownership structure and top managers' compensation schemes as corporate-governance tools. The authors identify gaps in the literature and avenues for future research for each of these strands.

The authors’ findings have implications for board diversity (e.g. gender diversity), remuneration policy for top-level managers and governance issues (independent directors, separation of ownership with control). This study is the only one to summarize the key topics on which top research has been focused and can be broadly used for corporate governance management perspective.

This paper provides an overview of how the literature on corporate governance and remuneration has developed and a synopsis of the most influential and most productive authors, countries and journal sources. It creates an opportunity for other researchers to focus on this area. This study will also serve as a foundation for future meta-analyses.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between board diversity and total directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. The authors have operationalised two variables to represent board diversity: the proportion of women directors on the board, to present gender diversity and the proportion of Bumiputras directors, to represent ethnic diversity.

This study has used a panel least squares to test the relationship between board diversity and total directors’ remuneration.

Based on a 1,094 firm-year sample from 2007 to 2009, the authors found a positive and significant relationship between gender-diverse boards and remuneration, but a negative and significant relationship between ethnically diverse boards and remuneration. The interaction between gender and ethnically diverse boards results in a weaker negative relationship between ethnically diverse boards and remuneration with an increased presence of women directors. Finally, the authors found a positive and significant impact on remuneration when there are at least three women and three Bumiputras directors. The findings are robust after controlling for corporate governance variables, institutional variables and firm characteristics.

The main implication of this finding is the positive effect of firms hiring more women in top management roles on remuneration. In addition, the negative effect of Bumiputras suggests that their role is to offer political expedience to the board and thus provide economies of scale through their status to the country.

This study tests the effect of both gender and ethnicity simultaneously on directors’ remuneration.

This study examines the relationship between institutional investors and director remuneration in Malaysia against an important institutional backdrop of political connection. Our panel analysis of 434 firms from 1999 to 2003 finds a negative relationship between institutional ownership and director remuneration suggesting the effectiveness of institutional monitoring. Although we find no evidence to suggest a politically determined remuneration scheme, the negative relationship between institutional ownership and remuneration becomes less in politically connected firms. This suggests that political connections mitigate institutional monitoring in relationship-based economies.