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The purpose of this paper is to compare the effect of corporate governance variables and fraud litigation on audit fees both before and after the implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002.

The paper utilizes a sample of firms that had litigation proceedings filed against them for fraudulent financial reporting, and compare these firms to a sample of non‐fraud firms in the pre‐and post‐SOX period. First, the authors examine indicators of audit fees using the Simunic model. Next, the authors develop a logistic regression model with corporate governance variables and other financial control variables in order to identify the characteristics of firms that are accused of fraud in the pre‐and post‐SOX period.

The paper identifies specific components of corporate governance that are positively related to audit fees and which subsequently aid in classifying companies subject to fraud litigation. The most successful logistic regression model for 2005 (post‐SOX) is 64.4 per cent accurate in distinguishing firms litigated for fraud, while the most successful model for 2001 (pre‐SOX) is 61.4 per cent accurate in distinguishing such firms.

The research design and findings assist in providing additional evidence about the association between the effectiveness of the corporate governance structure and the external auditor in assessing the risk of fraud.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate several variables that are theoretically associated with the internal audit function (IAF) having an active role in corporate governance.

The paper uses responses from 782 US Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) in the CBOK (2006) database for the investigation. The paper makes the assumption that an IAF has only one CAE, thus the dataset represents 782 US IAFs.

It is found that an IAF having an active role in corporate governance is significantly and positively associated with the use of a risk‐based audit plan, existence of a quality assurance and improvement program, and audit committee input to the audit plan. Control variables such as stock exchange listing, firm size, the existence of an internal control framework, and a CAE with an internal auditing qualification also are positively associated with the IAF having an active role in corporate governance.

A limitation of this study is that CAE perceptions may deviate from actual practice. Also, the sample is limited to the US CAEs who are also IIA members, thus it may not reflect the views of non‐members and the CAEs from other countries.

The results have implications for CAEs who wish to increase the chance for their IAFs to play an active role in corporate governance. The IIA may benefit from these results in its supporting role for the internal auditing profession.

The study is complementary to the literature on the existence and size of the IAF and reveals several avenues for further research.

This study aims to examine the mediating effects of corporate governance mechanisms like the board of directors on the association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and the risk of material misstatements, including inherent risk and control risk. In particular, the authors study the mediating effects of board characteristics such as board size, independence and gender diversity.

Based on a sample of 100 audit clients listed on the FTSE 100 from 2015 to 2021, this study uses structural equation modelling to test the research objectives.

The findings indicate a significant and negative association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and inherent risk. However, there is no significant evidence observed for control risk. The utilisation of disruptive technology by the audit client has a significant impact on the board characteristics, resulting in an increase in board size, greater independence and gender diversity. The authors also find strong evidence that board independence mediates the association between disruptive technology usage and both inherent risk and control risk. In addition, board size and gender exhibit distinct and differential mediating effects on the association and across the two types of risks.

The study reveals that the significant role of using disruptive technology by audit clients in reducing the risk of material misstatements is closely associated with the board of directors, which makes audit clients place greater emphasis on the construction of effective corporate governance.

This study offers essential primary evidence that can assist policymakers and standard setters in formulating guidance and recommendations for board size, independence and gender quotas, ensuring the enhancement of effective governance and supporting the future of audit within the next generation of digital services.

With respect to relevant stakeholders, it is imperative for audit clients to recognise that corporate governance represents a fundamental means of addressing the ramifications of applying disruptive technology, particularly as they pertain to inherent and control risks within the audit client.

This study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the joint impact of corporate governance and the utilisation of disruptive technology by audit clients on inherent risk and control risk, which has not been investigated by previous research.

The paper examines the relationship between board effectiveness and audit fees for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, given the unique nature of SOEs, the paper assesses country-level influences, such as economic freedom, political democracy and protection of minority shareholders, which can impact board effectiveness and audit fees.

A combination of two-stage and ordinary least squares regression is used to examine the board characteristics-audit fee relationship for SOEs in a multinational setting during the period from 2016 to 2018.

The results indicate that board characteristics that represent a high level of effectiveness are associated with higher audit fees in SOEs. Furthermore, the findings suggest SOE's operating in countries evidencing medium levels of democracy and economic freedom and medium to high levels of protection of minority shareholders may be motivated to reduce agency conflicts by promoting accountability and transparency, thereby demanding increasing levels of corporate governance, monitoring and audit quality, thereby increasing audit fees.

The results provide further support for the OECD (2015) guidelines promoting the use of high-quality external audits in SOEs.

As a result of the scarceness of research in this area, the current study extends the literature by examining the role of corporate governance and audit fees in SOEs, while examining the influence of economic freedom, political democracy and protection of minority shareholders.

This study aims to examine the link between boards and audit committees and firm performance in Kuwaiti listed firms in the context of recent and extensive corporate governance regulatory reform.

Panel data regression analysis with fixed effects and clustered standard errors of firm performance for 61–97 listed industrial and services firms in Kuwait over a seven-year period. The dependent variables are the returns on assets and equity, the debt-to-equity ratio and leverage and Tobin’s Q and the independent variables comprise board of directors and audit committee characteristics, including size, the number of meetings and the numbers of independent and outside board and expert committee members. Firm size, subsidiary status and cash flow serve as control variables.

Mixed results with respect to the characteristics of the board of directors. Board size and independent and outsider board members positively relate only to Tobin’s Q and insiders only to debt to equity. For audit committee characteristics, committee size, independence and expertise positively relate to the return on equity and committee size and expertise only to Tobin’s Q. Of the five performance measures considered, board and audit committee characteristics together best determine Tobin’s Q.

Data from a single country limits generalisability and control variables necessarily limited in a developing market context. Need for qualitative insights into corporate governance reform as a complement to conventional quantitative analysis. In combining accounting and market information, Tobin’s Q appears best able to recognise the performance benefits of good corporate governance in terms of internal organisational change.

The recent corporate governance code and guidelines reforms exert a mixed impact on firm performance, with audit committees, not boards, of most influence. But recent reforms implied most change to boards of directors. One suggestion is that non-market reform may have been unneeded given existing market pressure on listed firms and firms anticipating regulatory change.

Kuwait’s corporate governance reforms codified corporate governance practices already in place among many of its firms in pursuit of organisational legitimacy, and while invoking substantial change to audit committees, involved minor change to firm performance, at least in the short term. Some firms may also have delisted in expectation of stronger corporate governance requirements. Regardless, these direct and indirect processes both improved the overall quality of listed firm corporate governance and performance in Kuwait.

Seminal analysis of corporate governance reforms in Kuwait, which have rapidly progressed from no corporate governance code and guidelines to an initially voluntary and then compulsory regime. Only known analysis to incorporate both board of directors and audit committee characteristics. Reveals studies of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship may face difficulty in model specification, and empirical significance, given the complexity of corporate governance codes and guidelines, leads in changing firm behaviour and self-selection of firms into and out of regulated markets.

This paper aims to highlight the role and impact of corporate governance in combating fraud by drawing on insights from the literature, identify gaps in the literature and suggest new directions for future research.

The paper is based on a comprehensive general literature review using multiple search engines and databases.

This paper finds that effective corporate governance can help reduce fraud risk, prevent fraud and detect fraud, particularly corporate fraud, insider fraud and asset diversion. Some companies use corporate governance mechanisms to bolster their reputation following fraud detection. Ineffective corporate governance increases fraud risk, provides the opportunity for perpetrating fraud and reduces the likelihood of fraud detection. The paper sheds light on several governance mechanisms that could help in mitigating fraud risk, as reported in the literature. The paper categorises these governance mechanisms into four broad governance aspects, including board leadership and the role of ethics; (b) board characteristics, composition and structure; ownership structure; accountability. The paper proposes a guide summarising these broad fundamental governance aspects, including specific anti-fraud controls and examples of how organisations could enhance ethical cultures and the tone at the top.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to elucidate the role of corporate governance in countering fraud and develop guidance in this area. The proposed guidance could be helpful to businesses leaders, policymakers, researchers and academics alike.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the potential influence of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on audit risk in Tunisian companies.

Based on a sample of Tunisian non-financial firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE) over the periods 2005 to 2010 (pre- 2011 revolution) and 2011 to 2017 (post −2011 revolution), consisting of 371 observations for the whole period, the authors apply the generalized least square (GLS) to test the research hypotheses and model.

The results are consistent with the agency theory suggesting that efficient corporate governance is able to control and reduce a company’s agency problem. Evidence reveals that the effectiveness of the director’s board/ownership structure and audit quality have the most influence on audit risk before than after the 2011 revolution, although governance mechanisms should play a more active role in encouraging companies to be more transparent in the post-revolution period. Moreover these findings are confirmed when identifying a composite measure of corporate governance.

Significant implications are provided for analysts, investors, regulators and academics. First, findings can help Tunisian regulators determine corporate governance disclosure requirements. Second, this research will make investors and stakeholders aware of the fact that minimizing auditor risk will be effective in reducing agency problems in emerging markets like Tunisia. Then, this work can help researchers better understand and realize the corporate governance role in the quality of audit process and financial statements and encourage them to deeply and broadly investigate this issue on other emerging markets.

This study stands for an extension of the existing research on corporate governance and audit risk. It fills a research gap in the local context. In fact, the considered data are those of the pre- and post-revolution Tunisian market, mainly in periods of instability. Although emerging markets make up the vast majority of economic activity around the world, they have received limited attention in academic research.

This study aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance structures of non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) on their profitability.

The analysis is performed using data derived from the Bank of Ghana database during a nine-year period, 2006-2014. Correlated panels corrected standard errors model is used to estimate the regression equation. The study uses board size, board independence, gender diversity, CEO duality and tenure and board meetings as proxies for corporate governance. Audit committee size, independence and meetings are used as measures of audit committee activity. The study also uses the return on assets as measures of NBFI profitability.

Results of the study show that there exists positive relationship among board size, audit committee size, meetings of the audit committee and profitability. However, board composition, gender diversity, board meetings and audit committee independence show a negative relationship with NBFI performance. From the findings of the study, it is evident that there are mixed results regarding corporate governance mechanisms and profitability of Ghanaian NBFIs. The results imply that the Ghanaian NBFI industry have unique characteristics and may react differently to corporate governance structures.

The value of this study is in its contribution to the extant literature on corporate governance and profitability of NBFIs.

This paper aims to investigate management auditing, a thorough examination of an organization and the management in place, through an empirical research to gather data about how management audits are perceived and implemented among Geneva’s (Switzerland) business community. The board of directors is in charge of a corporation’s overall supervision. The internal auditing function works under the aegis of the board to ensure that the directors will properly execute their responsibilities as defined by corporate governance rules. Management auditing could thus be used to improve corporation performance. However, management audits are not commonly used or referred to as a tool to address corporate governance. Findings enable the authors to both explain why management audits are not commonly used or referred to as a tool to address corporate governance and generate related research hypotheses.

In this paper, the authors rely on an ethnographic study aimed at exploring perceptions of management audits in service companies from the Geneva region. This study is based on transcripts from 85 semi-directed interviews, conducted over a three-year period, of professionals with managerial and auditing backgrounds. The economic context during these three years was consistently characterized by the Swiss and international financial crises, ensuring that the findings remain comparable over this time period.

This paper identified three main factors that influence the integration of management audits into corporate practices: the degree of acceptance of the tools and requirements of management audits, the national culture and values embodied in the practice and the degree of corporate governance maturity. This paper presents the findings in the form of hypotheses that can be tested on any adoption of good corporate governance practices – not on management audits alone.

Notwithstanding the limitations due to its nature and extent, this study’s main limitation is its lack of validation of the hypotheses. In further research, the authors intend to use a quantitative survey to validate the research hypotheses and make statistical inferences.

This paper contributes to the literature because it is, to the authors’ knowledge, the first study to empirically examine the significant link between management audits and corporate governance. The findings could be interesting for an international audience because they indicate possible action points that boards of directors can leverage to carry out management audits. The findings also bridge a gap between the literature on management audits and the expanding role of the internal audit function. This study also examines the way companies – in the Swiss context – understand, perceive and may be ready to apply management audits as a good corporate governance practice.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance structures influence the audit process in terms of audit fee pricing for regulated companies.

The paper first reviews prior literature and identifies factors within the categories of client size, audit risk, audit complexity, auditor‐related issues and corporate governance characteristics that are likely to influence audit fees of banking clients. It then regresses these variables on audit fees using an ordinary least square regression model for a sample of US listed bank holding companies (BHC).

The paper finds no significant association between most corporate governance variables and audit fees, suggesting that governance agents do not require additional assurance from the auditor, given close oversight by regulators. It also observes a negative association between audit committee independence and audit fees, implying that auditors reduce their effort and thus audit fees in the presence of an independent audit committee because they perceive that such committees reduce control and financial reporting risks.

In contrast with prior findings based on non‐regulated companies, governance agents in regulated companies such as BHC do not demand a more extensive audit. This reflects a substitution effect of regulatory oversight for internal governance monitoring. The paper also shows that BigN auditors modify their audit strategies in response to corporate governance mechanisms. Modifying audit strategies in accordance with the strength of governance mechanisms is consistent with recommendations in professional standards and would enable auditors to address risks more appropriately, thereby increasing audit quality and efficiency.