Search results

In the construction of charging piles, traditional gas stations possess significant advantages in terms of regional and financial resources. The transformation of gas stations into “refueling+charging” integrated gas stations relies on charging pile manufacturers and government, involving coordination issues with them. This paper aims to propose a joint coordination contract based on the principles of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing. The objective is to achieve systemic coordination among integrated gas stations, charging pile manufacturers, and the government, optimizing the planning of the quantity of charging piles and charging prices.

We have constructed an operational system model based on the Stackelberg game between charging pile manufacturers, integrated gas stations, and government. We have analyzed the optimal quantity of charging piles and charging prices under the impact of government subsidy policies in both decentralized and centralized operation scenarios. Additionally, we have proposed a joint coordination contract based on cost-sharing and revenue-sharing to coordinate this tripartite operational system.

The study reveals that, under simple cooperative contracts, the optimal decision does not yield maximum profits for the operational system due to the “double-marginal effect”. However, under the impact of the joint coordination contract, which combines cost-sharing and revenue-sharing as proposed in this paper, gas stations will consider the charging pile manufacturer’s costs and government subsidies when determining the optimal quantity and price. This not only achieves system coordination but also results in Pareto improvement in the benefits of all system members by adjusting contract parameters.

The value of this research lies in its insights into operational strategies for the construction of charging piles for electric vehicles. By analyzing optimal decisions under different contract arrangements, the study provides guidance to relevant stakeholders, enabling the operational system to achieve greater efficiency and coordination and realize more extensive Pareto improvements. Furthermore, it extends the application of coordination contract theory in the context of charging pile construction and operations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of clients' trust, opportunism and adaptation on contractual (non)cooperation with a mediating role of coordination in the construction industry.

A questionnaire was used to collect data from employees of the Pakistani construction industry. Smart partial least square (SmartPLS) has been used for analyzing the data of 270 respondents from construction projects.

The results of the SmartPLS indicate that (1) Trust and contract coordination positively while opportunism negatively influence contractor's contractual cooperation. (2) Contract adaptation and contract coordination positively influence the noncontractual cooperation of the contractor. (3) Moreover, contract coordination positively mediates the relationship between trust and noncontractual cooperation, but negatively mediates the relationship between opportunism and contract adaptation and noncontractual cooperation.

The findings of this research suggest several policy implications for administrative authorities, project managers and policymakers. These authorities need to focus on clients' trust, opportunism and adaptation because these factors significantly influence contract coordination and cooperation in the construction industry. Emphasizing these factors will enable project managers to gain economies of scale and mitigate project failure.

To the best of the authors’ search and knowledge, they did not find any study examining the mediating role of coordination between trust, opportunism, adaptation and cooperation in the construction industry. Hence, the present study advances their understanding in the field of project management and construction business.

The paper aims to compare the coordination of supply chain networks in contractually different complex construction projects.

A comparative case study of the coordination of collaborative work in two successful hospital construction projects was conducted. One of the projects applied multiple dyadic contracts, whereas the other project applied one multi-party contract between the parties. The projects were located in the USA. Data were collected by observing the coordination on the construction sites for six weeks and by conducting 72 interviews.

The paper shows that depending on the contract type, the timing and extent of complementary procedural coordination differs during projects. Compared with one multi-party contract, the dyadic contracts needed to be complemented during the design phase with three additional procedural coordination mechanisms: organizational design, processes for collaborative work and integrated concurrent engineering sessions. Additionally, common rules of conduct were taken into use during the construction phase. However, regardless of the contract type, procedural coordination mechanisms, such as co-located working, collaborative decision-making in inter-organizational meetings, a liaison role and shared project goals were needed throughout the projects.

If multiple dyadic contracts are applied, procedural coordination mechanisms have to be co-created by all supply chain parties at the beginning of the project.

The paper provides an understanding on successful contractual and complementary procedural coordination mechanisms of supply chain networks in complex construction projects.

How to determine the appropriate contractual structure for an outsourcing relationship has been a major theme in the business process outsourcing (BPO) literature. Drawing on transaction cost economics, this study aims to examine how anticipated coordination and adaptation costs in a BPO relationship affect the choice of contract types. Specifically, this research categorizes contracts types (fixed-price, time and materials and hybrid contracts) based on levels of contract design comprehensiveness and flexibility to change.

The research setting is the BPO for a focal firm, involving a contractor. Data from 153 US companies are collected using a structured questionnaire on senior executives of functional areas of marketing, IT and finance. Hypotheses were tested using ordered probit model.

The results show that maturity is negatively associated with anticipated adaptation costs, while modularity and IT detachability are negatively related to anticipated coordination costs. Furthermore, adaptation costs have a direct impact on the choice, whereas the anticipated coordination costs do not have a significant direct impact on contract choice. The strength of adaptation costs' impact, however, is significantly reduced when coordination costs are high.

This study explicitly examines the role of anticipated coordination and adaptation costs in shaping the strategic choice of contract types in the BPO market. By differentiating the two types of anticipated transaction costs, this research enables a better understanding of the dynamics between transaction characteristics, anticipated transaction costs and contract types in complicated relationships such as BPO relationships.

There are particularly high fresh agricultural product (FAP) loss rates in actual supply chain operation and the development of FAPs e-commerce is hindered to some extent. The purpose of this paper is to achieve the coordination of three-layer FAP supply chain and maximize profit through the contracts among the supply chain members.

A three-layer FAP supply chain that consists of a fresh produce e-commerce enterprise, third-party logistics service provider (TPLSP) and community convenience store under e-commerce environment is considered. New game models are developed and optimal decisions in centralized and decentralized channel are characterized. Different contract coordination mechanisms are designed to improve the supply chain performance. Finally, computational studies are conducted.

The decentralized supply chain cannot be coordinated by a freshness-keeping cost-sharing contract, and it can be coordinated by a freshness-keeping cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract. The optimal unit online selling price, unit logistics distribution price, fresh-keeping effort and unit self-collection service price can all be achieved.

The paper provides a practical guideline to managers in fresh produce industry in terms of how to cooperate with other supply chain members so as to maximize total profit and achieve Pareto improvement while also supply the freshest and safest produce to the target market under e-commerce environment.

Few studies have explored the coordination of three-layer FAP supply chain under e-commerce environment with TPLSP and community convenience store’s participation in decisions, especially considering that the market demand for FAPs is affected by freshness and unit online selling price. In this paper, all these scenarios are taken into account and corresponding mathematical models are developed. In particular, different contract coordination mechanisms are designed and examined simultaneously.

Regarding the global development of the wine industry, China has gained a notable share in terms of wine consumption, and its domestic wine production has increased steadily since 2000. The wine production process requires close coordination between growers and processors to avoid disruption and instability in the supply chain of the wine grapes. However, vertical coordination in the Chinese wine regions has received little attention. Based on the existing theoretical background on vertical coordination, this study aims to detect the evolution processes of vertical coordination in the Chinese grape market.

Exploratory qualitative research fits with the aim of this study. From December 2018 to January 2019, interviews with grape growers and wine processors of various Chinese wine-producing areas took place. After transcribing all recorded files into text, a qualitative data analysis following the approach of Mayring (2015) was used to analyse and interpret the data.

The models of vertical coordination in the grape supply in China vary between the producer's requirements on grape quality/quantity and the arrangements of grape supply chains, which are diverse depending on regional strategies of the local government.

However, in this research, the authors did not get into details on the organization of the contractual coordination, and due to the limited access to grape growers, the relationship between farmers and processors cannot be analysed in detail. With a better understanding of the coordination relationship and enhanced contract enforcement, the vineyard management and grape supply chain management can be better performed, inducing a steady industrial development.

Regarding the global development of the wine industry, China has gained a notable share in terms of wine consumption, and its domestic wine production has increased steadily since 2000. However, vertical coordination in the Chinese wine regions has received little attention. The study provides a first insight into the grape market structures, as very little is known.

In a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, a properly designed contract can lead to supply chain coordination. In this chapter, we model the selection of an appropriate coordinating contract from a menu of contracts including wholesale price, buyback, and markdown money, while allowing both the supplier and the retailer to assume the roles of Stackelberg leader and/or supply chain captain. This work extends previous literature that assumes that the supplier is both the Stackelberg leader and the supply chain captain. In our models, either agent can make stocking and pricing decisions. Our findings suggest that the feasibility of a coordinating contract depends on the addition of Pareto-improving, profit-sharing conditions that motivate agents to take part in the contract. Further, the selection of an optimal contract is based not only on which agent holds the overstock liquidation advantage, but also on the decision structure of the supply chain. For instance, when the supplier is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the supply chain captain, as well as holds the inventory liquidation advantage, and controls the stocking level, then a wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain under the proposed Pareto-improving profit sharing, termed Pareto-improving coordination. Additional results and managerial implications are presented in the chapter.

In the paper, the authors study the simultaneous influence of incentive compatibility and individual rationality (IR) on a multi-echelon supply chain (SC) under uncertainty. The authors study the impact of contract sequence on coordination strategies of a serial three-echelon SC consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer in an uncertain environment.

The authors develop a game-theoretic framework of a serial decentralized three-echelon SC. Under a decentralized setting, the supplier and the manufacturer can choose from two contract types namely, wholesale price (WP) and linear two-part tariff (LTT) and it leads to four different cases of contract sequence.

The study show that SC coordination is possible when both the supplier and the manufacturer choose LTT contract. This study not only identifies the influence of contract sequence on profit distribution among SC agents, but also establishes cut-off policies for all SC agents for each contract sequence. This study also examine the influence of chosen contract sequence on optimal profit distribution among SC agents.

Three-echelon SC coordination under uncertain environment depends upon the contract sequence chosen by SC agents.

This study results will be helpful to managers of various SCs to take operational decisions under uncertain situations.

The main contribution of this study is that it explores the possibility of coordination by supply contracts for three-echelon SC in a fuzzy environment.

The purpose of this study is to identify a typology of procurement contracts in the context of software development projects that allows firms to align design flexibility with design uncertainty at the project level. The theoretical lenses of contract theory and software engineering are used to explain why the five archetypes in the proposed typology provide gradually increasing levels of design flexibility and to develop hypotheses about the associations between design flexibility and a set of project cost dimensions.

The hypotheses are tested with objective contractual data from 270 software development contracts entered into by a leading international bank over a period of three years.

Data analysis confirms the existence of the proposed typology and shows that design flexibility is negatively associated with control and positively associated with coordination, trust, duration and price.

Although the findings are based on the contracting practices of a single, albeit sophisticated, organization, they shed light on the ability of firms to align flexibility with uncertainty at the onset of new projects by taking advantage of nuanced contractual mechanisms to produce a broader set of contractual archetypes.

This paper is the first in the outsourcing literature to analyze a nuanced contractual typology in software development projects through the perspectives of both contract theory and software engineering.

Supply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.

In this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.

Our game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.

This study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.

The paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.

This study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.