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The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019.

The author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal with endogeneity concerns prevalent in corporate finance variables.

The agency view is consistent with the board size in the context of India. The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. The author also noticed that firms should have sizeable institutional ownership, particularly pressure-insensitive investors, in equity as they can reduce agency-related issues.

This study focuses on one of the largest emerging economies, i.e. India.

The purpose of this paper is to examine if certain board characteristics have an impact on the financial performance of manufacturing firms in India.

The study draws on data from 275 firms listed in NSE during from 2011 to 2015, using a multiple regression model. The present study examines the effect of board characteristics such as board size, CEO duality, independence and board activity devoted to the effectiveness of firms performance regarding market and accounting based financial performance measures.

The finding supports an inverse association between the extent of board characteristics and the firms’ performance indicators. The study also finds a statistically significant negative relationship between board size and Tobins Q, ROA and ROE. The evidence also shows that the board independence and meeting frequency moderate the relationship between return on equity and return on assets by enhancing these measures among corporate governance mechanisms.

The present study does not include all possible board characteristics, i.e., large shareholders dominance on the board and promoter’s and institutional shareholding, to support firm’s performance. Further research might include the ownership structure of the board to improve firm’s performance.

The study focuses on the corporate governance issues such as size, duality, independence and activity of the boards and their influence on firm performance. The subject analyzes the possible impact of board characteristics and firm-related features that have received much attention from academic research, which has largely focused on studying the publications of corporate governance in India and Asian context.

Building on the institutional theory perspective on corporate governance change and based on interviews with investor relations (IR) managers in large Japanese companies, this study aims to examine Japanese IR managers’ perceptions of the influence of foreign shareholders on Japan’s corporate governance reform and stakeholder-based system. The paper examines tensions, conflicts and collaborations among different stakeholders involved in corporate governance changes in Japan, especially in the areas of firm ownership, employment relations and boards of directors. The paper explains why convergence does not happen in some large Japanese companies by investigating Japanese managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in multiple corporate contexts.

The author conducted in-depth interviews with ten IR managers at large, listed Japanese companies in Kyoto and Tokyo and two managers at foreign investment banks in Tokyo, between 2018 and 2021.

This paper explores five themes that emerged from my interviews: Chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) mixed perceptions of foreign investors, the effectiveness of CEO compensation and outside directors, managers’ reluctance to accept stock price-driven business strategies, foreign investors’ engagement vs investments in index funds and gender patterns, including the effectiveness of token female outside directors. The Japanese companies the author looked at incorporated foreign shareholders as consultants and adopted a few major shareholder-based customs, such as CEOs communicating with investors, having outside directors, increasing CEO compensation and slimming down unprofitable parts of the business via restructuring and downsizing. Simultaneously, they resisted a few major shareholder-based practices. Foreign shareholders’ pressure revealed tensions and contradictions between the Japanese stakeholder system and shareholder primacy-based customs.

This paper is one of the few qualitative studies that explores Japanese IR managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in corporate governance reform, with a particular focus on ownership, employment relations and board members. This paper provides examples of tension, conflict and cooperation between Japanese managers and foreign investors, as seen through the eyes of Japanese IR managers. Examining changes in Japan’s stakeholder-based system of corporate governance reform enables us to better understand the processes by which, with vigorous pressure from government and foreign shareholders, a non-western country like Japan may adopt shareholder-based customs and how such a change may also lead to institutional changes.

The author aims to find value relevance of board characteristics and ownership structures in the banking industry of Bangladesh, an emerging economy with absence of good governance.

Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), fixed effect and generalized method of moments (GMM) methods have been utilized to analyse 5-year data of 28 listed banks.

All governance indicators except institutional ownership have insignificant impact on return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Institutional ownership has significant negative impact indicating that institutional investors can worsen bank performance in unregulated environments. Additional analysis shows significant positive impact of higher institutional ownership ratios.

Small sample from a single industry of one country may limit the applicability of the findings to all developing economies.

During the fast growth periods of developing economies, institutional investors with small stakes may become value destructive due to speculative behaviour.

This is one of the pioneering studies to suggest that governance mechanisms have insignificant, in some instances adverse, impact on firm value in emerging economies.

In recent years, firms tend to direct their attention in communicating their environmental actions with their stakeholders. However, the level of environmental disclosers varies significantly among firms. This paper aims to explain the variation in environmental disclosure of firms based on their ownership type, namely – state ownership and institutional ownership. The study further aims to understand whether and how the relationship between ownership structure and environmental disclosure changes regarding countries’ development levels.

This paper uses a sample of 27,847 firm-year observations from 72 countries/economic districts between the years 2002 and 2017 and regression analysis to test how the relationship between different ownership structures and environmental disclosure and whether this relation is conditional on countries’ development levels.

This study finds that firms with higher state ownership have higher environmental disclosures and higher institutional ownership has a negative effect on environmental disclosures. Furthermore, this paper also documents that firms with higher state ownership and operating in developed countries have incrementally higher environmental disclosure, relative to firms operating in developing countries.

The study has limitations that would provide possible starting points for further research. The first limitation is related to the environmental disclosure measure, which reflects the level of environmental disclosure of firms based on their disclosure information given in the Thomson Reuters, Asset4 database. A more refined measure can be constructed using hand-collected data based on linguistic analysis, which may reflect not only the level of the disclosure but also the quality of the environmental disclosure. The second limitation is the limited focus of the study toward state and institutional shareholding. Therefore, future research may consider examining the different types of ownership such as family ownership.

The findings of the study may help policymakers and regulators to consider the potential impact of various ownership types on environmental disclosures. Also, given the impact of countries’ development levels, regulators should consider that a one-size-fits-all is not applicable in environmental disclosures. Therefore, each country should consider the institutional dynamics of their operating environment to set appropriate regulations to enhance environmental disclosures.

From a social perspective, the findings indicate that firms’ stakeholder engagement via environmental disclosures depends on the type of the controlling shareholders.

This study contributes to the literature by developing a new construct for environmental disclosure based on Biodiversity, Climate Change, Environmental Investments and Spill Impact Reduction performance measures. Further, grounding on legitimacy and stakeholder theories, this study shows the influence of ownership type on environmental disclosures and how this effect changes in accordance with the countries’ development.

The authors compare two market collapse incidents, focusing on their role as turning points for ESG considerations among investors that do not fall under the SRI class. The authors draw from the signaling theory to posit that ESG performance acts as a buffer to retain institutional shareholders under stress conditions.

The authors collect extensive data on institutional shareholdings and corporate performance during the pandemic and the 2008 financial crisis to examine the potential of ESG to act as a downward risk hedging mechanism. The authors test whether superior ESG scores function as insurance and resilience signals that lock investors in through times of high probability of divestments.

Findings indicate that ESG weighs in investment decisions during economic downturn and poor returns. The nature of this positive relationship is not static but dynamic contingent on overall risk materiality considerations.

The authors update regulators, firms, investors and academics on ESG, risk and crisis management. The shifting materiality and the altering impact of ESG practices is our core implication, as well as limitation, in terms of metrics, temporal evolution and interaction with institutional factors, along with portfolio alpha and safe haven potential in ESG asset classes.

The authors extend current literature focusing on portfolio returns and firm valuations to highlight the role of ESG in shareholder retention during poor return periods. The authors further add to existing studies by examining the shifting materiality of ESG pillars during different crisis settings.

This study aims to see the moderating effect of board diversity on the relationship between ownership structure and real earnings management.

This study uses unbalanced panel data of 75 listed energy firms (346 firm-year observations) from three South Asian emerging economies (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) from 2015 to 2019. The two-step system GMM estimation is used for data analysis. This study also uses fixed effect regression to obtain robust findings.

The findings show that firms with a greater ownership concentration and managerial ownership significantly reduce real earnings management. In contrast, the data refute the idea that institutional and foreign ownership affect real earnings management. We also find that board diversity interacts significantly with ownership concentration and managerial ownership, meaning that board diversity moderates the negative link of the primary relationship that reduces real earnings management. On the other hand, board diversity has no interaction with institutional and foreign ownership, implying no moderating effect exists on the primary relationship.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is unique research investigating how different ownership structures affect real earnings management in the emerging nations’ energy sector, which the earlier studies overlook. More specifically, this research focuses on how board diversity moderates the relationships between ownership structure and real earnings management, which could be helpful for future investors.

This study aims to identify the factors that lead non-financial companies listed in the UK to use an internal audit function (IAF) as a monitoring mechanism. Although the use of an IAF in the UK is voluntary, no prior research has examined the drivers for using one.

Financial and non-financial data were collected from the annual reports of 332 UK non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Main Market. Univariate tests and multivariate logistic regression tests were used to test the research hypotheses. A theoretical framework based on both agency theory and transaction cost economics (TCE) theory was used to explain the economic factors affecting the use of an IAF.

The study provides evidence that firm size, level of internal risks, agency problem between owners and managers and existence of an effective audit committee are associated with the existence of an IAF. Thus, the need to have strong internal control and risk management systems and to reduce both internal and external agency costs drives companies to have an IAF. These results suggest the importance of IAF as an internal corporate governance tool and the effectiveness of UK governance regulations in monitoring the effectiveness of internal control systems.

Given the importance of the IAF’s corporate governance role, the study provides some policy implications. Regulators should pay more attention to the issue of maintaining an IAF, especially by large companies, the relationship between the IAF and other governance parties, especially the audit committee, and the disclosure of more relevant information about the IAF’s characteristics and practices.

This is the first study to examine the factors affecting the existence of the IAF within the UK’s distinctive regulatory approach of “comply or disclose reasons”. Furthermore, it provides a theoretical framework that explains how both the agency theory and TCE theory can interpret the adoption of internal audit.

Past studies show that companies’ connection with the government (or politically connected companies (PCCs)) contributed negatively to their financial performance. The grabbing hand theory suggests that political connection demand companies to serve political and social obligation that exhaust companies’ financial resources. The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous studies by examining the role of monitoring mechanisms, specifically corporate governance mechanism and institutional ownership (IO), whether they weaken or strengthen the financial performance of PCCs in Malaysia.

The sample consists of all companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the year of 2004-2007. The time periods were chosen because there were no significant economic and political events that could possibly distorted the financial and non-financial data.

The findings show that companies’ political connection (the presence of political figure or government representative as members of board of director) has consistently showing negative relationship with performance. The result is consistent with the grabbing hand theory that argues that companies’ connection with government would actually destroy companies’ value. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the percentage of independent board members does not have any significant effect on firm’s performance. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the composition of independent board members have shown a positive significant effect on the company’s performance. However the second monitoring mechanism, the percentage of institutional investors, have a tendency to weaken the company’s performance.

The findings of this study provide an additional understanding of the consequence of government intervention on companies’ performance. This study also highlights the role of monitoring mechanism (independence board members and IO) in strengthening or weakening the performance. The findings suggest that the proper appointment criteria for board members should be seriously considered to ensure better corporate governance structure. Therefore, the formation of the nomination committee as suggested by the current Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance play an important contribution to ensure candidates nominated as board members have proper credentials and qualifications to carry out responsibilities as board members.