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The purpose of the study is to investigate strategies for enhancing pollution oversight by local governments while reducing government-enterprise collusion (GEC) levels. Additionally, the factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants are explored. Potential approaches to improving them and for effectively reducing waste incineration pollution are suggested.

The authors examined the most effective methods for mitigating incineration-related pollution and preventing collusion and developed a differential game model involving interactions between local governments and incineration plants. The findings of this work have significant policy implications for central governments worldwide seeking to regulate waste incineration practices.

The results indicate that, first, elevating environmental assessment standards can incentivize local governments to improve their oversight efforts. Second, collusion between incineration plants and local governments can be deterred by transferring benefits from the plants to the local government, while increased supervision by the central government and the enforcement of penalties for collusion can also mitigate collusion. Third, both central and local governments can bolster their supervisory and penalty mechanisms for instances of excessive pollution, encouraging incineration plants to invest more in pollution control. Finally, when the central government finds it challenging to detect excessive incineration-related pollution, enhancing rewards and penalties at the local government level can be a viable alternative.

This study stands out by considering the dynamic nature of pollutants. A differential game model is constructed which captures the evolving dynamics between local governments and incineration plants, offering insights regarding the prevention of collusion from a dynamic perspective. The findings may provide a valuable reference for governments as they develop and enforce regulations while motivating incineration plants to actively engage in reducing waste-incineration pollution.

This paper aims to propose a solution for dissolving the “privacy paradox” in social networks, and explore the feasibility of adopting a synergistic mechanism of “deep-learning algorithms” and “differential privacy algorithms” to dissolve this issue.

To validate our viewpoint, this study constructs a game model with two algorithms as the core strategies.

The “deep-learning algorithms” offer a “profit guarantee” to both network users and operators. On the other hand, the “differential privacy algorithms” provide a “security guarantee” to both network users and operators. By combining these two approaches, the synergistic mechanism achieves a balance between “privacy security” and “data value”.

The findings of this paper suggest that algorithm practitioners should accelerate the innovation of algorithmic mechanisms, network operators should take responsibility for users’ privacy protection, and users should develop a correct understanding of privacy. This will provide a feasible approach to achieve the balance between “privacy security” and “data value”.

These findings offer some insights into users’ privacy protection and personal data sharing.

This study aims to investigate the most effective approach for governments and enterprises to combat desertification by considering the governance cycle. The focus is on understanding how the government can incentivize enterprises to actively engage in desertification combat efforts.

Both the government and the enterprise are treated as rational entities, making strategic choices for joint participation in combating desertification. Recognizing the dynamic nature of the desertification combat area, differential game models are employed to identify the optimal mode for combating desertification.

The findings underscore the significant influence of the governance cycle duration on the selection of desertification combat modes for government and enterprise. A cooperative mode is best suited to a short governance cycle, while an ecological subsidy mode is optimal for a longer cycle. Enhancing governance technology and shortening the governance cycle are conducive to combating desertification. Reducing taxes alone may not be an effective control strategy; rather, the government can better motivate enterprises by adopting tax rate policies aligned with the chosen governance mode.

This research contributes by elucidating the impact mechanism of the government cycle’s length on the desertification combat process. The results may offer valuable insights for governments in formulating strategies to encourage corporate participation in combating desertification and provide theoretical support for selecting optimal desertification combat modes.

In the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.

To explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.

The research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.

Most of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.

The existence of the advertising delay effect and its impact on supply chain operations have been demonstrated in the current study. Therefore, this study develops a timely inventory control strategy for the fresh produce supply chain to address the advertising delay effect in the fresh produce supply chain.

This study proposes a game model based on the Nerlove-Arrow time delay differential equation and Pontryagin's maximum principle. Through comparative analyses of the optimal equilibrium strategies, the authors compare the optimal equilibrium strategies, product goodwill and optimal inventory trajectories for suppliers and retailers under secondary replenishment decisions and decentralized decisions.

The authors find that (1) Only when the sales cycle meets certain conditions can the overall profit of the supply chain under the secondary replenishment decision be greater than that under the decentralized decision. As the price markup coefficient increases, the total profit of the supply chain first increases and then decreases. (2) With the increase in the delay time, the replenishment quantity during the initial period gradually decreases. After the delay time elapses, the inventory depletion rate under secondary replenishment decisions is faster than that under decentralized decision-making. (3) Although there is a continuously increasing maximum value of product goodwill with the increase in delay time, it becomes difficult to achieve this value for longer delays.

The authors’ findings provide a theoretical basis for supply chain members of fresh agricultural products to select replenishment and inventory control strategies when adopting different levels of delay in advertising marketing.

Firstly, this paper explains the impact of advertising delay effect on fresh produce supply chain from a dynamic perspective, and secondly, it provides guidance on advertising formulation and inventory replenishment for fresh produce retailers under the influence of advertising delay effect.

The purpose of the study is to investigate and analyze the dynamics of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, particularly, focusing on profit-driven speculative behaviors exhibited by enterprises within this context. The study aims to understand the various factors influencing the behavior of stakeholders involved in grain storage, including government storage departments, agent storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies.

The study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate profit-driven behaviors in government-enterprise grain joint storage. It analyzes strategies of government departments, storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies, considering factors like supervision costs and speculative risks. Simulation analysis examines tripartite payoffs, initial probabilities and the impact of digital governance levels to enhance emergency grain storage effectiveness.

The study finds that leveraging digital governance tools in government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanisms can mitigate risks, enhance efficiency and ensure the security of grain storage. It highlights the significant impact of supervision costs, speculative risks and digital supervision levels on stakeholder strategies, offering guidance to improve the effectiveness of emergency grain storage systems.

The originality of this study lies in its integration of digital governance tools into the analysis of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, addressing profit-driven speculative behaviors. Through a tripartite evolutionary game model, it explores stakeholder strategies, emphasizing the impact of digital supervision levels on outcomes and offering insights crucial for enhancing emergency grain storage effectiveness.

Intelligent new energy vehicles (INEVs) are becoming the competitive hotspot for the automobile industry. The major purpose of this study is to determine how to increase innovation efficiency through knowledge sharing and technology spill between new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises and technology enterprises. This will help to improve the core competence of the automobile industry in China. Also, it serves as a guide for the growth of other strategic.

The authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the cross-border cooperative innovation problem. Firstly, the payment matrix of NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and government is established, and the expected revenue of each participant is determined. Then, the replication dynamic equations and evolutionary stability strategies are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation.

Results showed that: (1) An optimal range of revenue distribution coefficient exists in the cross-border cooperation. (2) Factors like research and development (R&D) success rate, subsidies, resource and technology complementarity, and vehicles intelligence positively influence the evolution towards cooperative strategies. (3) Factors like technology spillover risk cost inhibit the evolution towards cooperative strategies. To be specific, when the technology spillover risk cost is greater than 2.5, two enterprises are inclined to choose independent R&D, and the government chooses to provide subsidy.

The research perspective and theoretical analysis are helpful to further explore the cross-border cooperation of the intelligent automobile industry. The findings suggest that the government can optimize the subsidy policy according to the R&D capability and resource allocation of automobile industry. Moreover, measures are needed to reduce the risk of technology spillovers to encourage enterprise to collaborate and innovate. The results can provide reference for enterprises’ strategic choice and government’s policy making.

The INEV industry has become an important development direction of the global automobile industry. However, there is limited research on cross-border cooperation of INEV industry. Hence, authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and the government, and explore the relationship of cooperation and competition among players in the INEV industry, which provides a new perspective for the development of the INEV industry.

This paper aims to refine the mechanisms affecting the two-way technology spillover and carbon transfer interactions between supply chain enterprises, and to guide their reduction of carbon emissions.

This study formulates a supplier-led Stackelberg game model to explore the effects of the interactions between two-way technology spillover effects and carbon transfers in decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios. The optimized Shapley value is introduced to coordinate across the supply chain and determine the overall profits lost in the decentralized scenario.

Emission reductions by the low-carbon manufacturer are negatively correlated with the carbon transfers. Vertical technology spillovers promote carbon reduction, whereas horizontal technology spillovers inhibit it. The vertical technology spillovers amplify the negative effects of the carbon transfers, whereas the horizontal technology spillovers alleviate these negative effects. When the vertical technology spillover effect is strong or the horizontal technology spillover effect is weak in the centralized scenario, the carbon reduction is negatively correlated with the carbon transfers. Conversely, when the vertical technology spillover effect is weak or the horizontal technology spillover effect is strong, the enterprise’s carbon reduction is positively correlated with the carbon transfers. An optimized Shapley value can coordinate the supply chain.

This study examines the effects of carbon transfers on enterprises from a micro-perspective and distinguishes between vertical and horizontal technology spillovers to explore how carbon transfers and different types of technology spillovers affect enterprises’ decisions to reduce carbon emissions.

Based on dual information asymmetry, the two-stage segmented compensation mechanism for technological innovation of civilian enterprises’ participation in military (CEPIM) has been discussed.

On the basis of the traditional principal-agent problems, the incentive compatibility condition is introduced as well as the hybrid incentive compensation model is established, to solve optimal solution of the compensation parameters under the dynamic contract condition and the validity is verified by numerical simulation.

The results show that: (1) The two-stage segmented compensation mechanism has the functions of “self-selection” and “stimulus to the strong”, (2) It promotes the civilian enterprises to obtain more innovation benefit compensation through the second stage, (3) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government compensation effectiveness and the innovation ability of compensation objects and (4) The “compensable threshold” and “optimal compensation threshold” should be set, respectively, to assess the applicability and priority of compensation.

In this paper, through numerical simulation, the optimal solution for two-stage segmented compensation, segmented compensation coefficient, expected returns for all parties and excess expected returns have been verified under various information asymmetry. The results show that the mechanism of two-stage segmented compensation can improve the expected returns for both civilian enterprises and the government. However, under dual information asymmetry, for innovation ability of the intended compensation candidates, a “compensation threshold” should be set to determine whether the compensation should be carried out, furthermore an “optimal compensation threshold” should be set to determine the compensation priority.

The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of competitive cooperation methods on the pricing strategies, recycling and remanufacturing strategies and competitive model selection strategies of supply chain firms.

This paper establishes a CLSC game consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. Firstly, five CLSC models are established in both horizontal and vertical dimensions, each of which competes with one another. Secondly, the recycling and remanufacturing pricing strategies are analyzed under different competition or cooperation models. Finally, the results are verified through numerical analysis.

The overall profitability of the CLSC is highest when the manufacturer–retailer partnership alliance is in place. The relationship between retailers and manufacturers is also found to be the best way to achieve overall optimization of the CLSC.

The paper investigates the relationship between the competitive partnership and the total profit of the CLSC, taking into account how to optimize the overall benefit, and focusing on how to optimize the individual interests of each participating enterprise. The results can provide basis and guidance for managers' pricing decision and competition cooperation.