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The exchange of reciprocal and quantitative consideration between transaction parties rests on the independent intentions and judgments of potential benefit for each. A transaction consummated between independent parties should logically be beyond subsequent unilateral modification. And, because “duality” is inherent in every exchange-priced transaction, the account form follows the lead of transaction substance. Conditions precedent to consummation of a transaction is two affirmative value judgments by the parties as to the benefits expected.

This chapter introduces a risk control framework on credit card fraud instead of providing a solely binary classifier model. The anomaly detection approach is adopted to identify fraud events as the outliers of the reconstruction error of a trained autoencoder (AE). The trained AE shows fitness and robustness on the normal transactions and heterogeneous behavior on fraud activities. The cost of false-positive normal transactions is controlled, and the loss of false-negative frauds can be evaluated by the thresholds from the percentiles of reconstruction error of trained AE on normal transactions. To align the risk assessment of the economic and financial situation, the risk manager can adjust the threshold to meet the risk control requirements. Using the 95th percentile as the threshold, the rate of wrongly detecting normal transactions is controlled at 5% and the true positive rate is 86%. For the 99th percentile threshold, the well-controlled false positive rate is around 1% and 83% for the truly detecting fraud activities. The performance of a false positive rate and the true positive rate is competitive with other supervised learning algorithms.

Building on transaction cost economics (TCE) and recent critique on international business (IB) research, we intend to sharpen our knowledge on the application of TCE in entry mode studies.

We develop a two-sided model of transaction costs by considering the multinational corporation (MNC) and the local partner.

Overall, we illustrate that the decisions firms undertake are not always in line with traditional MNC-centric TCE reasoning. Specifically, we identify three situations when “traditional” TCE predicts transaction costs lower than they actually are. Based on our findings we derive implications for future TCE studies.

Our study is among the first to highlight the relevance of potential partners’ transaction costs during market entry. Our model of dually impinged transaction costs is supposed to guide future research and can be of direct use to firms assessing costs of entry.

Williamson's systematic treatment of transaction costs in explaining governance structures has rarely been applied to the field of environmental economics. The aim of this chapter is to address this oversight by analysing how transaction cost economics can help choose among environmental policy tools.

We apply the analytical framework of discrete structural alternatives – market, hybrid forms and hierarchy – to the choice of environmental policy instruments. Environmental-related transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with categories of policy instruments, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction costs economizing – result.

First, we suggest defining the transaction as the trading of property rights to the use of natural resources. Second, the characteristics of the transaction are described as mainly measurement costs. Third, we determine the conditions under which a particular ‘governance structure’ that is a policy instrument is chosen.

A major contribution of our analysis is to question the relevance of many economists’ prescription in favour of incentive-based instruments. Indeed, in some plausible circumstances a command-and-control instrument may be more efficient by economizing on transaction costs.

Environmental economics has employed the seminal contribution of Ronald H. Coase (1960) intensively but has remained relatively unaffected by the contributions of perhaps his most influential follower, Oliver E. Williamson. Our chapter is a first step towards an operationalization à la Williamson of Coase's (1992, p. 778) ‘fundamental insights’ in the environmental realm.

Research sponsored by entities in developed countries, but conducted in developing countries, has recently been the focus of academic debate, international declarations and media controversy. Much of this attention has focused on whether the trials are exploitative and if so what should be done to avoid exploitation. This chapter takes Alan Wertheimer's principles of mutually advantageous transactions and applies them to the question of exploitation in international research. In this chapter, I develop an analysis of exploitation and apply this to the hypothesis that some pharmaceutical companies who run drug trials in developing countries wrongfully exploit the trial participants.

Previous studies show that crude oil is negatively correlated with stocks but has almost the same rate of return as stocks, and so adding crude oil into a portfolio with equities can provide significant diversification benefits for the portfolio. Given the diversification benefit of crude oil mixed with equities, we examine the value effect of crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers. Differing from traditional corporate risk management literature, this study examines corporate derivatives transactions from the shareholders' diversification perspective. The results show that crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers do impact value. If oil and gas producing companies stop shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, company stock prices increase significantly. In contrast, if oil and gas producing companies initiate short positions in crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices tend to drop (still significant, but less so). Thus, hedging by producers is not necessarily good. Transaction limitation is shown to be one of the possible sources of the value effect of corporate derivatives transactions.

This chapter applies an “integrative” model to examine the impact and interaction of economic and moral/social factors in the corporate tax compliance context. More specifically, it examines whether social norms moderate the effect of economic factors in this context.

Fifty-five MBA students assumed corporate CFO roles and analyzed a proposed aggressive corporate tax shelter transaction (“tax shelter”). Participants indicated whether they would recommend the tax shelter and answered questions regarding the transaction and their corporate tax compliance views.

Hierarchical Regression results indicate that, in the corporate tax compliance context, decision makers’ norms (moral/social factors) moderate the effect of perceived expected value of aggressive tax transactions (economic factors). More specifically, results indicate that (1) perceived legality of aggressive corporate tax transactions significantly impacts willingness of corporate decision makers to recommend them, even when controlling for perceived economic effect of the transaction, and (2) due to moral/social factors, corporate decision makers often may not support aggressive tax treatments with material positive expected values.

Accordingly, (1) custom and social factors should be integrated into the corporate tax compliance decision-making framework, and (2) campaigns to strengthen corporate tax compliance should focus on the law’s text and intent as well as upon sanctions for noncompliance.

This chapter addresses social embeddedness effects on ex ante management of economic transactions. We focus on dyadic embeddedness, that is the history of prior transactions between business partners and the anticipation of future transactions. Ex ante management through, for example, contractual arrangements is costly but mitigates risks associated with the transaction, such as risks from strategic and opportunistic behavior. Dyadic embeddedness can reduce such risks and, hence, the need for ex ante management by, for instance, making reciprocity and conditional cooperation feasible. The chapter presents a novel theoretical model generating dyadic embeddedness effects, together with effects of transaction characteristics and management costs. We stress the interaction of the history of prior transactions and expectations of future business. Hypotheses are tested using new and primary data from an extensive survey of more than 900 purchases of information technology (IT) products (hard- and software) by almost 800 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Results support, in particular, the hypotheses on effects of dyadic embeddedness.