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This research seeks to understand how shareholder constituencies including controlling family, nonfamily insiders, as well as domestic and foreign institutions in the corporate governance system of emerging economy firms perceive institutional risks in terms of regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions and influence strategic choices in the internationalization of their invested firms.

The sample data are Taiwanese publicly listed companies in the electronics and computer industry. Panel data of the parent firms and their overseas affiliates are available from the annual report and Taiwan Economic Journal database. Country-level data are available from the World Investment Report and the IMD World Competitiveness Report. Statistical regression models including tobit and logistic regression are used to analyze the data.

Controlling family and nonfamily insider shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a shared ownership. Domestic institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to adopt a shared ownership and enter in host countries with larger and smaller institutional distances in terms of regulative and normative institution, respectively. Foreign institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a whole ownership.

The strategic choices of foreign market entry made by emerging economy firms are significantly shaped by the different risk perceptions of shareholder constituencies in their corporate governance system toward the institutional distances between the home and the host country.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

This study focuses on listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. It found that an increase in the ownership proportion of institutional investors (INs), including foreign investors, investment trusts, and dealers can enhance the informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between these factors follows an inverted U-shaped pattern, indicating that excessively high ownership ratios can actually lead to a decrease in the informativeness of stock prices. Additionally, increasing the ownership proportions of foreign investors and investment trusts can reduce the risk of stock price collapse, while dealers show no significant relationship in this regard. This study also reveals that the technical variable of the price deviation rate is an important explanatory factor for post-collapse returns. It is positively correlated with the magnitude of the price decline after a collapse, meaning that stocks with weaker pre-collapse performance experience larger post-collapse declines. When the data during the 2020 pandemic period are excluded, changes in foreign ownership ratios show a significant positive correlation with postcrash returns in both the long and short term. The significant correlation in the short term may be due to a high proportion of foreign ownership. Any reduction in this could put pressure on stock prices, and retail investors may follow suit and sell-off, using foreign investors as a reference. The significant correlation in the long term might be due to foreign investors themselves possibly also trying to avoid the pressure that their own short-term sell-offs could exert on stock prices. The changes in the ownership ratios of investment trusts and dealers indicate that medium and long-term changes have a significant impact on postcrash returns, while the changes in the major players' ownership show no significant correlation. When data from 2020 are included in the analysis, the significance of all INs decreases.

We assess whether smaller investors are more likely to hold shares of closed-end funds that invest more heavily in illiquid securities. We also examine the relationship between the liquidity of the securities held in the portfolios of closed-end mutual funds (portfolio liquidity) and the liquidity of the closed-end funds’ shares (fund-share liquidity). Using a sample of 1,619 fund-years from 2010 to 2012, we find that smaller investors are more likely than institutional investors to own closed-end funds. We also find that the liquidity of closed-end funds’ portfolios is positively associated with the liquidity of the funds’ shares. Our findings are consistent with the “liquidity benefits” notion that closed-end funds are a means for smaller investors to invest in less liquid securities. In addition, our findings are consistent with the “valuation skepticism” notion which indicates that, due to the difficulty of objectively valuing illiquid securities, different perceptions of the value of illiquid securities held in funds’ portfolios may result in greater fund-share liquidity.

Purpose – This study aims at presenting an overview, development, and process of current corporate governance practices in Bangladesh.

Design/Methodology/Approach – Based on New Institutional Sociology (NIS) as a theoretical framework and by using archival data, this study highlights the roles of key institutional forces in reinforcing the existing corporate governance practices in Bangladesh.

Findings – This study notes that corporate governance practices in Bangladesh are still at infancy. While Bangladesh is trying to adopt many international corporate governance best practices for institutional legitimacy, the weak institutional enforcement regime, along with the absence of an effective check and balance, poses serious challenges to the firm-level good corporate governance practices in Bangladesh. The absence of isomorphic pressures to regulate the firms leads to many incidences of noncompliance.

Practical implications – This study takes part in the following global debate: whether corporate governance in an emerging economy is a reality or an illusion.

Originality/Value – This study seeks to contribute to the increasing literature by recognizing the interest of readers, academics, practitioners, and regulators to gain more insight and understanding of corporate governance practices in an emerging economy, such as Bangladesh.

Purpose – The aim of this article is to examine the effects of ownership concentration and board characteristics on the performance of firms domiciled in Jordan.

Design/methodology/approach – The article employs two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions on a sample of 103 firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for financial years 2002–2005.

Findings – The empirical results suggest that ownership concentration, multiple directorships and board size are each positive and significant in determining firm performance. Although this result contradicts the findings of some developed country studies, they are consistent with recent emerging market studies.

Implications – The findings of this article echo some of prior researchers’ contention that reforms in corporate governance principles in emerging markets should go beyond adopting the best practice in developed markets and take into account the country- and firm-specific characteristics.

Originality/value – This article exploits a unique dataset of ownership and board characteristics in an emerging market, as well as provides additional evidence on the relation between corporate governance and firm performance. Results of this research provide useful information for policymakers and legislators to understand the environment for corporate control in developing countries.

Indian Companies Act (2013) and revised clause 49 of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) provides for a major overhaul of corporate governance norms to be adopted by firms in India. Some of the key provisions of the act pertain to board subcommittees. Given this background, the chapter seeks to analyze the role of overall board composition and board subcommittees (audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) on firm performance. In addition, the relationship between ownership and firm performance is analyzed. The study documents that large listed companies in India that have constituted a nomination and remuneration committee have had positive influence on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ). Board subcommittees’ (i.e., audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) independence is positively associated with firm performance as measured by TQ. Overall, the board size is positively associated with firm performance. However, in the presence of a nomination and remuneration committee, board size is negatively associated with firm performance. This study offers insights for policymakers interested in analyzing corporate governance practices in terms of board subcommittees as evidenced from a developing economy such as India.